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April: Hungarian election top of packed billing
A busy year of elections shows no sign of slowing down, so let’s preview April’s ballots. Remember, there will be a score on the Matters-o-Meter, except the elections covered in the 2026 preview article, which will get a prediction.
On 4 April, the Maldives held a constitutional referendum on unifying parliamentary and presidential elections. Since declaring independence from the UK in 1965, the Maldives has had various political systems, but has a strong presidency, in part due to the legacy of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who was President from 1978 to 2008. During most of his presidency, there was a system where Parliament would nominate a candidate for president (as happened in 1978) and then there would be a referendum on him, rather than a multi-party system. However, through the 2000s, there were calls for liberalisation, many of which were heeded by Gayoom, such as allowing political parties. In 2007, a referendum made the country a more normal presidential system.
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom In 2008, Gayoom ran for re-election, while the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) put up Mohamed Nasheed. In an upset, Nasheed was elected president in a runoff. Even though Nasheed was a democrat, he too faced protests in the Arab Spring and resigned as a result in 2012. He ran for election again in 2013, but was beaten by Abdulla Yameen from the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), founded by Gayoom after he split from his old party. The MDP are more liberal, while the PPM are more conservative and Islamist. In 2018, Yameen lost to the MDP candidate Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. Yameen ended up falling out with Gayoom, and formed his own People’s National Congress (PNC), which replaced the PPM as the main conservative and Islamist party. However, in the 2023 election the PNC and PPM ran a joint candidate, with Yameen ineligible due to a corruption conviction (that has since been overturned). This was the PNC’s Mohamed Miuzzu, the Mayor of Malé, who beat Solih in a runoff. The PPM later dissolved and merged into the PNC.
President Mohamed Miuzzu Traditionally, parliamentary elections are held a year into the President’s term as an early check on his power. The PNC won a landslide in 2024, with 66 of 93 seats, with the MDP winning twelve, minor parties four, and independents eleven. The actual question on the ballot is:
Do you approve the ratification of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides for the Presidential and People’s Majlis elections to be held concurrently and for a change to the term of the People’s Majlis?
So basically, the 2029 parliamentary vote will be brought forward to 2028, and held alongside the presidential election, as will all further elections. The PNC has promoted it as a cost-saving measure, noting that schools have to be closed, officials trained and transportation arranged. However, the MDP have criticised it, because the parliamentary vote will have less perceived importance when staged alongside a presidential one, and therefore it feels to them like a weakening of the democratic process.
Matters-o-Meter: Before the vote, I wrote that: “This referendum could be seen as a mid-term referendum on Miuzzu, due to the party-line split. However, it is hard to pretend this vote will have wide-ranging ramifications for the Maldives.” In fact, the huge rejection (68.7%) is a big loss for Miuzzu, and the PNC will have to regroup. 4/10
On the same day, the Maldives has local elections. Local councils and Women’s Development Committees (which are what they sound like) will be elected across the island, on the same day as the referendum.
Matters-o-Meter: I wrote that: “This is an important test, with the most important role being that of Mayor of Malé, the Maldives’ capital and largest city, where over a third of the people live. Incumbent President Miuzzu was the Mayor of the city, but the MDP’s Adam Azim won a by-election in 2024. The PNC candidate is former Minister of Defence Moosa Ali Jaleel.” Azim won easily and this is definitely a good day for the MDP. 4/10
On 7 April, Georgia’s 14th congressional district had the second round of a special election. Covered in last month’s article, the election was in a red part of the Republican-leaning swing state, being held by notorious right-wing maverick Marjorie Taylor Greene, who resigned after clashing with Donald Trump. Democrat Shawn Harris took the first round, and is joined in the runoff by Trump-endorsed Republican Clayton Fuller, who won three times the vote of Greene-style conservative Republican Colton Moore.
Matters-o-Meter: This is a pretty red district and the first round was more interesting as it showed which type of Republican would win. Fuller won with 55.9% of the vote. 4/10
On the same date, Georgia’s 53rd Senate District had the second round of its special election, thanks to the resignation of Colton Moore.
Matters-o-Meter: In the first round, Lanny Thomas (R) won 38.7% ahead of Jack Zibluck (D) on 27.0%. Thomas won easily with 68.7% of the vote. 2/10
On the same date, Georgia’s 94th House District had the second round of its special election after the resignation of Karen Bennett (D).
Matters-o-Meter: Two Democrats reached the runoff, with Kelly Kautz and Venola Mason beating two other Democrats. No Republican ran, even in the first round. Mason with with 68.5% support. 2/10
On the same date, Georgia’s 130th House District hasdthe second round of its special election caused by the resignation of Lynn Heffner (D).
Matters-o-Meter: Sheila Nelson (D) and Thomas McAdams (R) beat three other Democrats and one other Republican in the first round. Nelson won easily in this blue district with 70.7%. 2/10
On the same date, Wisconsin held an election to its Supreme Court. Judges get ten-year terms, with seven positions, meaning elections are held seven out of ten years in a decade. Though unlike political posts, judicial ones are nonpartisan, judges are generally considered “liberal” or “conservative”, with a current 4-3 liberal split. The seat up for grabs belongs to conservative Rebecca Bradley, who is not running for re-election. This time, the conservative candidate is Maria Lazar, and the liberal one is Chris Taylor, both of whom sit on the Court of Appeals currently. Lazar is endorsed by the Republicans, and Taylor by the Democrats, making it a partisan election in all but name.
Matters-o-Meter: Elections to Wisconsin’s Supreme Court have garnered huge attention recently, especially the 2025 race, with Susan Crawford’s win over Brad Schimel protecting the 4-3 liberal majority. Because whatever happened the liberal majority will remain, there is not nearly as much hype this time. However, as Taylor won with 60.1% of the vote, it will become a 5-2 majority and therefore solidify the liberal dominance over the court, in a country where court cases are hugely watched. 5/10
On 9 April, Assam had legislative elections. Assam is a state in India, where politics has been split into two main camps. On the right, there is the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party, BJP) and their National Democratic Alliance (NDA). After their landslide victories in 2014 and 2019, the main opposition Indian National Congress (INC) formed the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), uniting its own centrist allies with the more radical left. This led to a closer result in 2024. Like the country more broadly, Assam was dominated by the INC in the early decades, but lost to the Janata Party (People’s Party) in 1978. This was a false dawn, as the Janata Party was heterogenous, united only by their opposition to the INC, and fell apart returning the INC to power. However, at this time, there was unrest in Assam, known as the Assam Movement of 1979 to 1985.
Protests during the Assam Movement Assam is on the border with Bangladesh, and illegal Bangladeshi migrants became a serious issue in Assam. To make matters worse, parties would illegally add them to the electoral roll to try and win votes. In 1985, the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) signed the Assam Accord with the government of India, to secure the border and hold new elections. The AASU figures contested the election as independents, won, and then formed the Asom Gana Parishad (Assam People’s Council, AGP) to govern. Politics had gone from a dominant-party affair to a two-party one, but in 1991 the BJP would win seats, raising it to three significant parties. Still, in 2001, the INC won power under Tarun Gogoi. They were re-elected in 2006, where the businessman Badruddin Ajmal’s new Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF), a Muslim nationalist party, won seats for the first time. They renamed themselves to the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) in 2009. 2011 saw a third term for Gogoi, but the strong performance of the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF), which performed well amongst the tribal Boro people, very few of whom are Muslim (with some being Hindu and Christian, but a large amount following traditional religions). This raised the major parties to five (INC, AIUDF, BPF, AGP and BJP).
Tarun Gogoi led the INC to power from 2001 to 2016 In 2016, after Narendra Modi and the BJP/NDA had taken power nationally, Gogoi fell too. The BJP recruited the AGP and BPF into the NDA, and won the election, with the BJP on sixty of 126 seats, the AGP on fourteen, and the BPF on twelve for a total of 86. The INC won 26 and the AIUDF thirteen, with one independent. Sarbananda Sonowal of the BJP took power. The last election was in 2021. At that point, the BJP switched its alliance in Bodoland from the BPF to the United People’s Party Liberal (UPPL), the BPF’s main opposition. The NDA won a slightly smaller majority with 75 seats, as the BJP still won sixty, the AGP nine, and the UPPL six. The INC formed a Mahajot (Broad Alliance) which won fifty seats, with the INC on 29, AIUDF on sixteen, and BPF on four. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) also won a seat as part of the alliance, while one non-aligned independent won a seat too. Despite the win, a faction of the state BJP wanted Sonowal out as CM, and indeed he was replaced by Himanta Biswa Sarma, a Gogoi-era Minister who defected to the BJP in 2015 and was Finance Minister under Sonowal. Sonowal was moved to the federal government to be Minister of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways.
Incumbent CM Himanta Biswa Sarma In north-eastern areas, including Assam, the NDA alliance is also called the North-East Democratic Alliance (NEDA). The BJP is aligned with the AGP again, but has also switched back to supporting the BPF. Meanwhile, the INC’s alliance is called the Asom Sonmilito Morcha (Assam United Front, ASOM) and contains the CPI(M), among others. However, the AIUDF and UPPL are contesting separately.
Matters-o-Meter: Polls have the NEDA ahead, backed by the first-past-the-post electoral system. 2024 general election where they won eleven seats (nine for the BJP, one for the AGP, and one for the then-member UPPL) compared to three for the INC. These state elections are important not just for Assam, but the national leadership of Narendra Modi. If ASOM pulls off an upset, Gaurav Godoi, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition nationally and son of Tarun Gogoi will become CM. Either way, we won’t know the results until they are declared on 4 May. 5/10
On the same date, Kerala also had a state election. Kerala was formed in 1956 in a reorganisation of states around linguistic lines, with the state being created for Malayalam speakers, with Tamil speakers being placed in Madras State, today known as Tamil Nadu. Kerala was the first state where the INC was removed from power, in 1957, when the Communist Party of India (CPI) took power. The communist government was controversial and after protests known as the Liberation Struggle in 1959, the national government (still controlled by the INC) dissolved the state government, a controversial act as the CPI still had legislative support. The Congress were back in control, and the national diplomatic government were quite close to the Soviet Union. Because of this, a faction of the CPI wanted good relations with the INC. These were known as the CPI “rightists”, and after a bitter factional battle, many CPI “leftists” split to form the CPI(M), including E. M. S. Namboodiripad, who was Chief Minister of Kerala in the 1957-9 government.
E. M. S. Namboodiripad was the first non-INC Chief Minister in all of India The CPI(M) became the dominant communist party in Kerala (and the larger one in India), though the CPI, now controlled by the “rightists”, still existed. With the INC and other parties, this led to a multiparty system even though India was still nationally dominated by the INC. Generally, elections were fought between the INC and CPI(M), but majorities in either direction were rare, leading to them relying on others. The alliance system was born for the 1980 election, with the CPI(M) leading the Left Democratic Front (LDF), and the INC leading the United Democratic Front (UDF). Since then, this situation has not changed too much, even after the BJP came onto the national scene, and then became the hegemonic party from 2014 on. However, since 2006, the CPI(M) has always been the largest individual party. They won that election, but though they won more seats than the INC in 2011, the UDF alliance was narrowly ahead, governing under Oommen Chandy. In 2016, the current CM Pinarayi Vijayan took power in a landslide win for the LDF.
In power since 2016, Pinarayi Vijayan (CPI(M)) is the longest-serving Chief Minister of Kerala The LDF won an even bigger landslide in 2021. They won 99 of 140 seats, with the CPI(M) taking 62 and the CPI seventeen. The rest went to the Kerala Congress (M) (KEC(M)), with the M standing for its founder K. M. Mani. The Kerala Congress split from the INC in 1964 and had some early success (especially in Christian areas) but soon became bogged down in splits and having to side with the LDF or UDF, with the Mani faction being formed in 1979. Two seats went to the Janata Dal (Secular) (People’s Party (Secular), JD(S)), a split from the national Janata Dal (a continuation of the old Janata Party, and similarly fractious) over an alliance with the BJP. The Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) split from the INC in 1999 when Sonia Gandhi, born in Italy, took over, and won two seats. A different split from the Kerala Congress, the Kerala Congress (B) (KC(B)) won a seat. Another party that split from a larger one over an alliance with the BJP was the Loktantrik Janata Dal (Democratic People’s Party, LJD), and they won one seat. The Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) is an important ally of the INC, but some members quit to form the Indian National League (INL) after the demolition of a mosque, and won one seat. A group that split several times from the INC (and its splinters) called the Congress (Secular) won a seat. Finally, the Janadhipathya Kerala Congress (JKC, Democratic Kerala Congress) which split from the KEC(M) over seat distribution in the LDF won a seat too. Six LDF independents also won a seat.
The LDF dominated the 2021 election On the UDF side, they won the remaining 41 seats. The INC won 22, the IUML fifteen, and the official Kerala Congress (KEC) won two. Three parties won one seat: the Revolutionary Marxist Party of India (RMPI), a split from the CPI(M); the Kerala Democratic Party (KDP), a split from the NCP from local members who wanted to leave the LDF; and the Kerala Congress (Jacob) (KEC(J)), a split from the KEC(M). No-one else won seats, including the BJP/NDA. The main alliances are the same this time, with the LDF against the UDF, but some parties are different. The national JD(S) allied with the BJP, so the state party split to form the Indian Socialist Janata Dal (ISJD). Also, an NCP faction also allied with the BJP, and got control of the original party name, with the faction still in INDIA and the LDF called the Nationalist Congress Party – Sharadchandra Paway (NCP-SP). Meanwhile, the Kerala LJD merged into the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD, National People’s Party), a Janata Dal split formed in 1997. The JKC is gone from the LDF after its only MLA was convicted of evidence tampering. The LDF is therefore made of the CPI(M), CPI, KEC(M), ISJD, NCP-SP, RJD, INL, Congress (Secular), KEC(B), minor parties and independents. On the UDF side, the sole KDP MLA is listed as an independent candidate. The list is made up of the INC, IUML, KEC, RMPI, KEC(J), minor parties and independents. Their candidate for CM is the INC’s V. D. Satheesan, a veteran MLA who was first election in 2001.
Leader of the Opposition V. D. Satheesan (INC) Matters-o-Meter: Though these parties are opposed at the state level, they are aligned nationally against the BJP. Polling suggests a very tight race, and if the UDF wins it is a big boost for the INC. It should also be noted that the NDA could win a couple of seats here and there to re-enter as a third force, though they often perform badly here. In the 2024 general election, the UDF won eighteen seats (fourteen for the INC), the LDF one, and the BJP one, showing that the BJP has made ground since 2021. 6/10
On the same date, there was a regional election in Puducherry. Puducherry is a union territory, meaning it is administered by the central government, but there is a devolved regional assembly. Puducherry is made up of four districts that were French, rather than British colonies. What this means is that they are unconnected geographically.
The red circles are the four districts of Puducherry It left France in 1954 effectively, and officially in 1962, joining India. Initially, the INC were hegemonic here, with the main opposition being a communist “people’s front”. However, in Madras State, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK, Dravidian Progressive Federation) was gaining ground, and it was popular in Pondicherry (as the territory was then called too): both regions speak Tamil. Dravidian refers to an earlier “Self-Respect Movement” in the south of the country aiming to achieve equality for lower castes. They won power here in 1969, but a dispute led to a split and the formation of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK, the Anna refers to C. N. Annadurai, the Chief Minister of Madras/Tamil Nadu who died in 1969). The AIADMK overtook the DMK as the largest party in Pondicherry, but suffered a big loss in 1980 and thereafter was smaller, seeing the return of the DMK-INC party system as the AIADMK allied with the INC in each election from 1985 to 1996. The INC and DMK remained the main two parties, but the BJP won a seat for the first time in 2001. The INC won and N. Rangaswamy became CM not long after.
Chief Minister N. Rangaswamy was in the INC, but quit to form his own party That election saw three alliances: the INC-led alliance won thirteen with the INC winning eleven of thirty seats, with two seats for the Tamil Maanila Congress (Moopanar) (TMC(M)), a split from the Tamil Nadu INC led by G. K. Moonapar in opposition to alliance with the AIADMK winning two. On the NDA side there were twelve seats, with the DMK winning seven, the Pondicherry Makkal Congress (Pondicherry Popular Congress, PMC), a TMC(M) splinter on four, and the BJP on one. The AIADMK, which had its own alliance, won three, and there were two independents. After the election, the AIADMK sided with the INC. In 2006, the INC-led coalition (known at the time as the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) nationally) got a name in Puducherry, the Secular Progressive Alliance (SPA). It won twenty seats, with the INC on ten, the DMK on seven, two for the Pattali Makkal Katchi (Proletarian People’s Party, PMK), founded amongst the Vanniyar caste, and one for the CPI. The AIADMK were the main opposition, with their alliance on seven, with three for the AIADMK. The PMC merged into the INC but then split again as the Pondicherry Munnetra Congress (also PNC, Pondicherry Progress Congress) and won three seats, while the Marumalachi Dradvida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK, Renaissance Dravidian Progressive Federation), a DMK split formed against nepotism in the party won a seat. There were three independents, but it was a clear SPA/UPA majority and allowed Rangaswamy to continue. Later that year, Pondicherry was renamed to Puducherry (and all parties with Pondicherry in their name followed suit). However, due to disunity within the INC, Rangaswamy was deposed in 2008 and replaced by his own Agriculture Minister V. Vaithilingam.
V. Vaithilingam became Chief Minister in 2008, leading Rangaswamy to form his own party Ahead of the 2011 election, Rangaswamy quit the INC to form the All India N. R. Congress (AINRC). N. R. is his initials but officially stands for “our rule”. The AINRC-led coalition won the election with twenty seats: fifteen for the AINRC, and five for the AIADMK. On the UPA side, they won nine, with seven for the INC and two for the DMK. There was one independent, and the AINRC decided to break the coalition, instead adding the independent so they would get a majority. In 2016, it was a win for the UPA on seventeen, as the INC won fifteen and the DMK two. The AINRC won eight, the AIADMK four, and one independent won. V. Narayanasamy became CM. After resignations cost the INC the majority, there was a no-confidence vote in 2021. This time, the NDA was composed of the AINRC, BJP, and AIADMK. They won the election with sixteen seats, ten for the AINRC and six for the BJP. On the UPA side, they won eight seats with six for the DMK and two for the INC, plus an aligned independent. Five other independents won seats, and this led to Rangaswamy returning as CM. This was a massive realignment, a big collapse for both the INC and AIADMK (who won nothing), and the first real BJP presence in Puducherry.
Matters-o-Meter: This time, the alliances are similar, with the AINRC, BJP, AIADMK and minor parties on the NDA side, and the INC and DMK on the SPA side. After holding Puducherry’s sole federal seat in 2024, Vaithilingam has returned to contest this election as leader of the territory’s INC. However, it is reasonable to say that there is not quite as much attention to this election as there is for the ones in Assam and Kerala, due to the territory’s smaller nature. 4/10
On 10 April, Djibouti had a presidential election. Djibouti became independent in 1977, with independence leader Hassan Gouled Aptidon leading the country as an autocrat after that, banning opposition parties until 1992. As he aged, he became more reliant on his powerful nephew Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who was his handpicked successor when he retired in 1999. Guelleh’s rule has been controversial and seen as autocratic as well. In 2005, 2011, and 2021 the opposition boycotted elections. Guelleh is now going for a sixth term as the candidate of his People’s Rally for Progress (RPP) party and Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP) coalition.
Matters-o-Meter: Guelleh’s actual opposition are not running, and instead someone called Mohamed Farah Samatar, of the Unified Democratic Centre, is running against him, who seemingly no-one has ever heard of. This is as close to a one-party state as you can get without actually being one. Provisional results have Guelleh on 97.8%. 3/10
On 12 April, Peru will hold elections to the Andean Parliament. This is simultaneous with the general election held, which I will detail later. The Andean Community (CAN), a sort of quasi-EU formed with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile in 1969 got its Parliament in 1979, by which time Venezuela had joined in 1973, and Chile had left in 1976. In 2006, Venezuela left, and Chile became an “associate member” (up from an “observer”). Though four of the five MERCOSUR states are associate members (Bolivia is a full member), they do not have members of the Andean Parliament. However, Chile does, as do the four remaining full members.
Matters-o-Meter: Though this can be considered a test for the main parties, which I will describe when we get to the actual Peru section, it will be ignored due to the importance of the presidency and Parliament. 3/10
On the same date, Benin will have its presidential election. Benin received independence from France in 1960 as Dahomey, but was unstable with several coups. Finally, in 1972, Maj. Mathias Kérékou kept power after declaring the country a communist state in 1975 (also changing its name to Benin). However, the fall of communism saw him allow multi-party elections, and in 1991, running as an independent instead of a communist, he was thrashed by the economist Nicéphore Soglo. Soglo’s economic liberalisation hurt his popularity, and Kérékou won back power in 1996. After a contested 2001 election, Kérékou was term-limited and in 2006 Chairman of the West African Development Bank Thomas Boni Yayi won in a landslide, being re-elected in 2011, also in a landslide. In 2016, Boni was term-limited leading to a fresh slate of candidates. His preferred choice, Lionel Zinsou, was beaten by independent businessman Patrice Talon, who was previously a donor but fell out with Boni.
President Patrice Talon Talon inherited a vibrant democracy, uniquely stable in West Africa but a fractured one with several parties, and focused on constitutional reform. This included a mammoth 10% threshold and F.CFA 249m deposit, but this led to a boycott by the main parties, and then the usual autocrat’s playbook like banned protests and Internet shutdowns began. Two identical pro-Talon parties, the Progressive Union (UP) and Republican Bloc (BR) won all the seats. In 2021 he faced no real competition. However, some dialogue led to the participation of opposition in 2023 through the party The Democrats. However, the renamed Progressive Union Renewal (UP-R) and BR won all the seats in 2026 due to the electoral threshold being raised further to 20%. This time, the registration rules have led to a lack of a candidate from The Democrats. Instead, there are only two men on the ballot. With Talon respecting term limits, the UP-R and BR have nominated Romuald Wadagni, the Minister of Economy and Finance.
Romuald Wadagni There is still an opposition candidate, Paul Hounkpè of the Cowry Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE). This was a party supportive of Boni during his presidency.
Prediction: There is no doubt Wadangi will win, keeping the Talonists in power, which has led to severe democratic backsliding in Benin. The interesting thing will be whether a rift appears between Wadagni and Talon, and what attitude he will have towards the constitution.
On the same date, Hungary will hold a general election. Hungary returned to democracy after decades of communist rule with elections in 1990. These were won by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), a rural and conservative movement, which was considered “moderate opposition” in the last days of communism, against the urban Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which was more liberal and radically opposed to the communists. The right-wing Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (FKgP), which was in power in between the end of World War II and the communist takeover came third. The communists rebranded as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and came fourth, while Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), a liberal students’ party opposed to communism came fifth. The sixth and final main party was the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), which was banned by the communists soon after they took over but revived. A right-wing MDF-FKgP-KDNP coalition was formed under József Antall.
József Antall (MDF) In 1992, the FKgP withdrew support for Antall, but most of its own MPs sided with Antall and formed a new United Smallholders’ Party (EKGP). In 1993, Antall died and was replaced by Péter Boross for the rest of the term. Due to an unstable democratic government, the MSZP were voted back in, with majority, in 1994, with the SZDSZ in second and the MDF trounced in third. The FKgP came fourth (with the EKGP not represented), the KDNP fifth and Fidesz sixth. To get a two-thirds majority and allow more breathing room, MSZP leader Gyula Horn formed a coalition with the SZDSZ. With the MDF struggling, Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán saw room on the right, so changed his liberal party into a centre-right one.
Current PM Viktor Orbán of Fidesz In 1998, Orbán led Fidesz to first place in terms of seats, ahead of the MSZP. There was a small recovery for the FKgP, but the SZDSZ and MDF had a downturn, with the KDNP not making Parliament at all. The far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) instead came sixth. Orbán formed a Fidesz-FKgP-MDF coalition. The bad result for the other parties showed that Hungary was now a two-party system, with Fidesz and the MSZP. During this time, some of Orbán’s more illiberal instincts were shown by appointing partisan figures to state bodies and eschewing consensus-building politics. In 2002, Fidesz and the MDF ran a joint list and came first, with the MSZP in second. The SZDSZ came third, while MIÉ and the FkGP lost all their seats, never to return. The SZDSZ sided with the MSZP, putting the latter in power under the independent Péter Medgyessey, Horn’s Finance Minister. However, he fell out with the SZDSZ, and Ferenc Gyurcsány, an actual MSZP member and Medgyessey’s Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports, became PM.
Ferenc Gyurcsány In 2006, the MSZP won ahead of Fidesz, this time in alliance with the KDNP. The SZDSZ came third, with the MDF, now running on their own in fourth. Gyurcsány’s MSZP-SZDSZ coalition carried on, but the SZDSZ fell out with them in 2008. Gyurcsány’s reputation had been massively hurt by the Őszöd speech, where a private address to an MSZP conference was leaked. In the speech, Gyurcsány swears liberally, criticises his own government (saying that “we” have lied on numerous occasions) and insults everyone including the country, public, and so on. In 2009, Gyurcsány resigned. Independent Gordon Bajnai was the only person the SZDSZ would support, being Minister of National Development and Economy. With this, it is no surprise that Fidesz-KDNP won a massive landslide in 2010, two-thirds of seats. The MSZP was decimated, while the new far-right Jobbik (“Right Choice”, but also standing for Right-Wing Youth Community) came third. Politics Can Be Different (LMP), a new green party, came fourth. The MDF fell out of parliament and the SZDSZ basically ceased to have any base at all. But the main thing was that Orbán was back, and this time with a supermajority, quickly editing the constitution.
Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” has led to him being a model of right-wing populists around the globe Orbán moved further to the right during his eight years out of power and since his re-election. In 2014, with the new electoral system, Fidesz-KDNP won again, beating a four-party opposition list called Unity. This consisted of the MSZP, and an alliance between Bajnai’s Together 2014 and their ally, an LMP splinter called Dialogue for Hungary (PM). Gyurcsány had fallen out with the MSZP and instead formed his own liberal party called the Democratic Coalition (DK), but this was also part of Unity. Finally, Gábor Fodor, a former leader of the SZDSZ, found the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP). Jobbik came third, with the LMP fourth. After this win, Orbán declared himself an “illiberal”, focusing on the state’s Christian and national character over liberal democracy. This has pretty much affected all parts of Hungarian civic life. In 2018, Fidesz-KDNP won another supermajority, with Jobbik second. The MSZP-MP coalition was third, with the DK and LMP also represented (as was Together (which dropped the ‘2014’)) by one seat). The solution to this, from the opposition’s view, was Péter Márki-Zay.
Péter Márki-Zay The idea was that the entire opposition would unite behind one candidate. This included the DK, MSZP, LMP – Hungary’s Green Party (as they were now called), PM, the liberal Momentum Movement, and even Jobbik, which had moved to become a more mainstream conservative party. Their candidate was from none of these, but the independent Márki-Zay, Mayor of Hódmezővásárhely, who had formed the Everybody’s Hungary Movement (MMM) to oppose Fidesz in local elections. The alliance was called United for Hungary, but despite the hype from the opposition, Fidesz-KDNP won another supermajority with 135 of 199 seats. United for Hungary won 57. The remaining six went to the far-right Our Homeland Movement (MHM). One seat also went to the National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary (LdU) for the German minority. By now, the EU was concerned that one of its own members had become a sort of semi-autocracy, but a scandal regarding President Katalin Novák blew a hole in Orbán’s role as the defender of Europe’s traditional values.
Katalin Novák Novák granted presidential pardons to mark the Pope’s visit to Hungary. One, given under pressure from Protestant bishop and former Fidesz minister Zoltán Balog, was to a man named Endre Kónya, a deputy director of an orphanage who was convicted after he covered up the director’s child sex abuse (which lead to one of the children committing suicide) by threatening the children who spoke up. Balog was close to both President Novák and the orphanage, with Konya being from a prominent Protestant family. When this came to light, there was outrage, leading to the resignation of both Novák and Justice Minister Judit Varga, who also signed through the pardon. Varga’s own ex-husband Péter Magyar released audio tapes revealing more of the scandal, which led to huge protests and Magyar becoming prominent. Magyar himself had been involved in Fidesz, the Hungarian state, and public enterprises (the three had become intertwined), but left this all behind, publicly declaring his opposition to all things Fidesz and calling Orbán corrupt. He then took over the tiny Tisza Party, named after a Hungarian river but also standing for Respect and Freedom Party, which instantly became the main opposition in the European Parliament elections.
Péter Magyar At the same time, the official opposition was floundering, especially as COVID-era “state of emergency” laws allowed the government to rule by decree, thus lessening the role of Parliament. After Tisza rose, they became completely irrelevant, thus painting Hungary as a two-party country, Fidesz and Tisza. Both the Everybody’s Hungary People’s Party (MMN, as the MMM had become) and Momentum Movement then said they would not run to avoid vote-splitting. The LMP, and PM (renamed Dialogue – The Greens’ Party) announced the same, and finally, the MSZP, the last party to govern Hungary before Orbán did so too. The DK and the now-irrelevant Jobbik are still running. Orbán is definitely on shaky ground, as the Novák affair was damaging for anyone but especially the self-proclaimed hero of family values. A main argument from him is that Ukraine is backing Magyar in an attempt to get Hungary mired in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Orbán’s Hungary has been among the least supportive of Ukraine in the EU and NATO. On the other hand, Fidesz has been accused of being too close to Russia. According to leaks, Russia has been involved in the Fidesz campaign, with one proposal being to stage a false assassination attempt on Orbán. The release of a film accusing Fidesz of bribery and intimidation in poor areas also caused a stir, with one opposition candidate threatened that his children would be taken into care.
Matters-o-Meter: It is quite difficult to get a grip on polls, because they are mostly aligned with either the government or the opposition. The governing polls show Fidesz-KDNP in the lead, and the opposition ones show Tisza in the lead. The MHM will probably survive, but the DK probably won’t. One is more inclined to believe that Tisza is in front, but not by as much as the opposition polls say. Gerrymandering may also help Fidesz-KDNP Anyone doubting the importance of this election, which might be the most important in the whole year, should read the list of endorsements. For Fidesz-KDNP, the whole global right has endorsed him. This includes the Presidents of the US (Donald Trump), Russia (Vladimir Putin), Argentina (Javier Milei), and Serbia (Aleksandar Vučić); the Prime Ministers of Italy (Giorgia Meloni), Israel (Benjamin Netanyahu), Czechia (Andrej Babiš), and Georgia (Irakli Kobakhidze); and the former PMs of Poland (Mateusz Morawiecki), and Serbia (Miloš Vučević). Right-wing party leaders in Romania (George Simion), Germany (Alice Weidel), France (Marine Le Pen), Italy (Matteo Salvini), the Netherlands (Geert Wilders), Poland (Jarosław Kaczyński), Austria (Herbert Kickl), Spain (Santiago Abascal) and Lithuania (Remigijus Žemaitaitis) also got involved. This is unusual for a domestic election, to say the least.
A video posted on Viktor Orbán’s Instagram page showed him being endorsed by a number of right-wing politicians, including Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu Though liberal European leaders have been more silent, there is one big exception, with Polish PM Donald Tusk vocal in his support for Magyar. It genuinely feels like, as the Tisza slogan goes, “now or never” to remove Orbán. And it will have massive implications for Hungary, whether it becomes Orbán’s fiefdom forever, or returns to being a broadly liberal member of the EU. It is obvious who those in all power circles want to win, with Brussels, Warsaw and Kyiv hoping for Tisza, and Moscow among those hoping for Fidesz. 9/10
On the same date, Peru has its general election. A country that has experienced periods of democracy and coups since indepenendence from Spain, in 1990 they elected agriculturalist professor Alberto Fujimori from the right-wing Cambio 90 (Change 90) party. With economic problems and an insurgency from the far-left Shining Path, Fujimori committed a self-coup to take control in 1992. This led to easy election wins in 1995, but in 2000, he was ran closer by Third Way politician Alejandro Toledo from the Possible Peru party. When videos implicating his chief of staff and power behind the throne Vladimiro Montesinos leaked, Fujimori was forced into exile in Japan.
Alberto Fujimori Toledo won new elections in 2001 against Alan García, who was President from 1985 to 1990 from the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), a left-wing party he had moved to the right. García was finally re-elected in 2006 against the left-winger Ollanta Humala. Humala would be elected himself in 2011, beating Fujimori’s daughter Keiko Fujimori in a very narrow run-off. Humala annoyed his left-wing base by moving to the centre. In 2016, the younger Fujimori faced Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in a runoff. This was even closer than the 2011 race, but Kuczynski won, and though a conservative also annoyed his base by moving more to the centre. He was an economist who had been a minister in previous administrations, including Toledo’s Prime Minister, but resigned due to corruption allegations in 2018. VP Martín Vizcarra replaced him, but was removed in 2020 for “moral incapacity”, previously understood as a mechanism to remove people in office who had gone insane and thus seen as a coup by the opposition-controlled Congress. Protests saw his replacement Manuel Merino go, and Francisco Sagasti replaced him for the rest of the term. Kuczynski’s party died, and instead, Fujimori faced Pedro Castillo, from the left-wing Free Peru (PL) party. Remarkably, Fujimori, who had lost with 48.6% in 2011, and 49.9% in 2016, lost with 49.9% of the vote again.
Keiko Fujimori has lost the last three run-offs With his party in minority in Congress, Castillo was attacked by the body and impeachment proceedings began against him nearly immediately. Thus, he tried a self-coup, but this was called unconstitutional and he did not have support from the military. He was removed and replaced by VP Dina Boluarte. Boluarte was a moderate who was removed from Free Peru when she publicly said she did not agree with the party ideology. Left-wing pro-Castillo protests began in rural and Indigenous areas, leading to a crackdown by Boluarte, who has been accused of treason by the left and had an approval rating of 0% at one time. After more protests due to pension reform she was impeached in 2025 and replaced by President of Congress José Jerí from the conservative We Are Peru party. However, he had allegations of sexual assault hanging over him, leading to yet more protests, and he was eventually removed in February this year for influence-peddling. After this, an octogenarian Congressman called José María Balcázar has taken office.
José María Balcázar Ten parties won seats in the lower house in 2021, with Free Peru on 37 of 130, and Fujimori’s Popular Force (FP) on 24. The liberal Popular Action (AP) won sixteen, with the right-wing Alliance for Progress (APP) on fifteen and the far-right Popular Renewal (RP) on thirteen. The conservative Go on Country – Social Integration Party (AvP) won seven, with the progressive Together for Peru (JP), We Are Peru, and the conservative Podemos Perú (We Can Peru) all on five. The centrist Purple Party (PM) won three. The Free Peru leader Vladimir Cerrón is a candidate but barely registers on polls. Fujimori is trying again and could have a shot. There is little chance for the APP candidate and party leader César Acuña, but a decent opportunity for the RP leader Rafael López Aliaga, a former Mayor of Lima, to reach the second round.
Prediction: I predict a runoff between Fujimori and López Aliaga, which would ensure right-wing governance. The last two elected Presidents were removed by Congress, and this has led to instability. A closely-contested runoff could lead to there being a rift on the right. Will whoever wins be able to keep Congress in check?
On 13 April, there is a by-election in Scarborough Southwest, a federal constituency in Canada. Canada has a two-party system split between the governing Liberal Party of Canada and the opposition Conservative Party of Canada. The minor parties include the Quebec nationalist Bloc Québécois (Quebecker Bloc, BQ), the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP), and then the even smaller left-wing Green Party of Canada and right-wing populist People’s Party of Canada (PPC). As the by-election is in the province of Ontario, not Quebec, there is no BQ presence here. Canada has been governed by the Liberals since 2015, when Justin Trudeau was elected PM, having previously been ruled by Conservative Stephen Harper from 2006. Trudeau won a majority in 2015, then two minorities in 2019 and 2021. Behind in the polls, he resigned and was replaced by former Governor of the Bank of Canada, and after that its UK equivalent Mark Carner in 2025, who turned around the polling deficit after calling an early election. The Liberals won 169 of 343 seats, the Conservatives 144, the BQ 22, the NDP seven, and the Greens one. Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre tried to adopt a more populist tone without going completely far-right, being caught between a rock and a hard place due to Canada’s trade war with Donald Trump’s United States.
Mark Carney The Scarborough Southwest seat took its current name in 1997, but had its boundaries changed in 2004, 2015, and 2025. Previously, it was similar under the name Scarborough West. Since 1988, it has always been Liberal, except 2011, when nationally the Liberals came third and were replaced by the NDP as the main opposition. The NDP took the seat that time but lost it in the Trudeau wave of 2015. The winning Liberal candidate was Bill Blair, Toronto Chief of Police. Blair was made a Minister in 2018, with his last role (Minister of National Defence) being served from 2023 to 2025. Though the NDP came second in the seat in 2015, by 2019 they were third behind the Conservatives and their presence was gone from 2025: Blair won 61.5% of the vote, while the Conservative won 30.6% and the NDP candidate just 5.0%. Blair was not re-appointed a minister in the new Cabinet, instead becoming High Commissioner to the UK. It seems that Blair was liked within the Liberals for his competence, and this was a low-risk reward seeing as he had a safe seat. He was not reappointed as Carney wanted to promote new talent, perhaps trying to break from the Trudeau era.
Bill Blair The Liberal candidate this time is Doly Begum, who has come from provincial politics. Each province has parallel party structures and legislatures, with the province being controlled by the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario on eighty of 124 seats (PCs, ‘Progressive Conservative’ was the name of the federal Tories until a 2003 merger). However, in Ontario, the main opposition is the Ontario New Democratic Party on 27, with the Ontario Liberal Party on just fourteen (there are two Greens and one independent). Despite having the same name as the federal parties (more-or-less), and using the same colours, these are their own outfits with their own leaders and styles. For instance, Premier and Ontario PCs leader Doug Ford has been quite close to the federal Liberal government. It is not unheard of to have different allegiances at the state and federal level. Thus, Begum was elected an MPP for the Scarborough Southwest seat in 2018 not as a Liberal, but from the Ontario NDP, and after the 2022 election was even named Deputy Leader of the party. She resigned from all posts though to contest this election as a federal Liberal.
Doly Begum was Deputy Leader of the Ontario NDP but is contesting this seat as a Liberal Matters-o-Meter: It is assumed that the main rival will be the Conservative Diana Filipova, who works as a middle school teacher. This Toronto seat is a Liberal heartland, it was a sign of how low the Liberals went in 2011 that they ever lost it. Bucking the global trend, the polls show the Liberals with a much bigger lead than he had in 2025, leading some to posit that he may call early elections at some point to win a majority. Will the pending big win here tempt him? 5/10
On the same date, there is a federal by-election in Terrebonne, also in Canada. This is in the province of Quebec, known for its unique political system. Due to its French-speaking majority (as opposed to every other province with an English-speaking majority), it has a unique tradition of separatist political forces, including the BQ party. Terrebonne was created as a constituency in 2015, merging half of two old constituencies. Notionally it was held by the NDP, which swept Quebec in 2011. However, the seat was won by the Bloc candidate Michel Boudrias in a three-way marginal ahead of the Liberal and NDP candidates, with the Conservative also getting over 10% of the vote. Boudrias was something of a maverick and even temporarily resigned from the party, stating that it focused too much on Quebec sovereignty rather than a more pragmatic approach focused on Quebec’s interests. He rejoined after a change of leader. In 2019 he won easily due to a collapse of the NDP vote, with the Liberal the only serious challenger and the NDP candidate fourth behind the Conservative. However, in 2021, Boudrias was not selected as the candidate, with economist Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné being selected. Boudrias ran as an independent.
Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné (Bloc Québécois) However, Sinclair-Desgagné won without much trouble despite the vote split, with Boudrias fifth behind the Liberal, Conservative, and NDP candidates. She was the incumbent in 2025. However, due to Carney’s popularity for “standing up to Trump”, the Bloc’s position in Quebec was troubled as well. Here, their candidate was Tatiana Auguste, who worked as an assistant for a Quebec Liberal MP. The vote was very close. A preliminary count showed Auguste was the winner by 35 votes. Then the final count showed Sinclair-Desgagné ahead by 44. An automatic recount triggered by the closeness gave Auguste the win by one vote. The full results showed Auguste on 38.7%, Sinclair-Desgagné also on 38.7%, the Conservatives on 18.2%, with the NDP now on 2.6%. A one-vote gap was enough for various errors to overturn the result, like postal ballots not arriving in time. After a court case said there should be no by-election, it was brought to the Supreme Court, who overturned the judgement, stating that there should be a by-election after all, annulling the result immediately.
Tatiana Auguste (Liberal)’s victory was annulled in court Auguste and Sinclair-Desgangé are the candidates for the Liberals and Bloc again, with the Conservatives also reprising their candidate Adrienne Charles. The election comes at a time where Carney is promoting the Alto high-speed rail line between Toronto, Peterborough, Ottawa, Montreal, Laval, Trois-Rivières and Quebec City. Poilievre has massively come against the measure, and in this Montreal suburb, Sinclar-Desgagné has also tried to run on opposition to the impact it will have.
Matters-o-Meter: Due to defections, with three Conservative and one NDP MP joining the Liberals after the election, if the Liberals win all three by-elections on 13 April they will have a majority of one. With the other two being safe, this is by far the most interesting. The Liberals are more popular than they were even a year ago, but this effect is mostly taking shape in English-speaking Canada rather than Quebec. This will be a close one to watch. 6/10
On the same date, there is a by-election in University-Rosedale, also in Canada. This vote is in Ontario, caused by the resignation of Chrystia Freeland. Freeland became MP for Toronto Centre in 2013, and the northern part of her district was merged with a part of another constituency to make this one in 2015. Notionally, it was considered an NDP-held district in 2011, but in 2015 she easily beat the NDP and Conservative candidates and was named Minister of International Trade, then Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2017 by Trudeau. The 2019 election saw her re-elected without much change, though the NDP vote suffered due to a rather strong Green performance. She was named Deputy PM after that election, and then in 2020 also Minister of Finance. In 2021, the NDP and Conservative vote rallied a bit due to a decline in the Liberal and Green votes, but Freeland still won easily. A redistribution also added some more NDP votes at the expense of the Conservatives. In 2024, with Trudeau unpopular, Freeland boldly resigned and declared herself in opposition to Trudeau, and this led to Trudeau’s resignation. However, in the leadership election, she was absolutely thumped by Carney, a surprise as though Carney was the favourite, it was expected to be more competitive.
Chrystia Freeland was a big part of Team Trudeau, and then toppled him In 2025, Freeland won a mammoth 64.0% of the vote, ironically benefiting from the Carney landslide. The Conservative candidate won 23.5% and the NDP collapsed to 9.9% with the Green on 1.7%. Freeland was named Minister of Transport and Internal Trade, but resigned a few months later and stated she would not run at the next election. In 2026, she was appointed as an economic development advisor in the Office of the President of Ukraine, and thus resigned from all Canadian government roles, including MP. The Liberal candidate this time is Danielle Martin, a professor at the University of Toronto.
Matters-o-Meter: This central Toronto seat is Liberal country, again somewhere where it’s remarkable the NDP were ever in (even notionally) in 2011. Martin will win easily against the obscure Tory candidate Don Hodgson. All eyes will not be here, but on Terrebonne. 5/10
On 16 April, New Jersey’s 11th congressional district will hold a special election. New Jersey is a blue state within the US, with the 11th district being no different. Though it used to be held by veteran Republican Rodney Frelinghuysen, when he retired in 2018 and the incumbency was gone, Democrat Mikie Sherill started winning reliably. In 2024, he won 56.5% while her Republican opponent won 41.8%. Sherill was elected Governor of New Jersey in 2025 and resigned her congressional seat.
Gov. Mikie Sherill (D) resigned her seat after winning the gubernatorial race Because of the nature of the seat, the Democratic primary got a lot more attention. Essex County commissioner Brendan Gill was endorsed by Obama-era secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Jonson and former Gov. Phil Murphy (who was incumbent before Sherill), while Sen. Andy Kim endorsed Tom Malinowski, who used to be in Congress for the 7th district. Analilia Mejia who worked on Bernie Sanders’ 2020 campaign and now leads an advocacy group was endorsed by Sen. Sanders (Vermont) as well as Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Massachusetts) and other well-known progressives like Rep. Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez. Former Lt. Gov. Taesha Way also ran in the primary. Israel was a big factor in the primary, with Malinowski trying to take a middle ground, losing votes to Way as the pro-Israel organisation AIPAC ran negative ads on him, while Mejia, an unabashed leftist, described their actions in Gaza as genocide. In a close race, Mejia won 29.3%, Malinowski 27.6%, Way 17.4%, and Gill 14.2%, benefitting no doubt from the first-past-the-post system and perhaps AIPAC’s focus on Malinowski.
Analilia Mejia The former Mayor of Randolph Joe Hathaway ran unopposed on the Republican side.
Matters-o-Meter: There is little doubt Mejia will win this safe seat in the northern part of the state, which is exciting for the left as they will add to their congressional strength, having more influcence within the party. It should be noted that a regular election is coming soon, and the Democratic primary for that in June may also be contested hard, so let’s not overstate the importance. 5/10
On 19 April, Bulgaria holds its parliamentary election. Bulgaria has been in a prolonged political crisis that has now lasted half a decade. Bulgaria was a Warsaw Pact country, and somewhat unique in the fact that after adopting democratic elections in 1990, it actually still voted for the rebadged Communist Party (the now democratic Bulgarian Socialist Party or BSP) over the conservative Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), the main opposition group. The third party was the centrist Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), which focuses on minority votes, especially Turks but also Muslim Bulgarians and Roma. In 1991, there was a hung parliament, allowing the DPS to be kingmaker, siding with the SDS. This was the framework for Bulgaria to have a two-and-a-half-party system.
DPS leader Philip Dimitrov became Bulgaria’s first non-socialist leader since 1945 in 1991 In 1994, the DPS declined in support as some smaller conservative parties won seats, and the BSP-led coalition, Democratic Left (DL), won a majority. However, in 1997, there was a reversal, as the DL was defeated by the SDS-led United Democratic Forces (ODS). However, this system was about to fall stunningly in 2001, as a completely new party won exactly half the seats in its debut, this being the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV). Simeon II, the last Tsar of Bulgaria who was deposed by the communists at the age of nine, returned under the civilian name Simeon Sakskoburggotski, forming his party just weeks before the election. This massively ate into the ODS support, and the DL, renamed Coalition for Bulgaria (KzB) did not recover. The DPS was the only other party, and an NDSV-DPS coalition was formed under Sakskoburggotski.
This man ruled Bulgaria as Tsar Simeon II and Prime Minister Simeon Sakskoburggotski 2005 saw a more diverse parliament. The KzB recovered, beating the NDSV to second. The DPS came third, while the far-right Attack came fourth. The big losers were the ODS, who slid further to fifth. In part, this was because Ivan Kostov, PM in their last government (1997-2001) formed his own Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB) and came sixth after falling out with the new leader. The Bulgarian People’s Union, a farming-based alliance came seventh. This led to a coalition between the BSP, NDSV, and DPS under Sergey Stanishev. It was the last election before the emergence of the man who would come to define Bulgarian politics, Boyko Borisov.
Boyko Borisov was Prime Minister three times Stanishev would get one full term before new elections in 2009, but Borisov would be a formidable opponent. A senior civil servant, he joined the NDSV and was elected Mayor of Sofia in 2005. However, the NDSV would be punished for being in coalition with the Socialists and go into a terminal decline. He formed his own party, GERB, which stands for Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, a centre-right bloc. Like the NDSV in 2001, it had a crushing debut, winning 116 of 240 seats, nearly a majority on its own, while the KzB fell to just forty. The DPS got 38, with Attack staying on 21. The SDS and DSB led a Blue Coalition, which fell to just fifteen seats, while an agrarian party rebranded to a broader conservative tone with the name Order, Law and Justice (RZS), winning ten seats. The NDSV (now the National Movement for Stability and Progress) won nothing, and would never win anything again. Borisov became PM in a minority government. In 2013, protests began after a rise in electricity costs, in part caused due to the communist state-owned monopoly being divided up between three foreign firms, thus causing regional monopolies. This grew into a very large protest movement (with self-immolation even being a tactic that some used), and Borisov resigned.
Protests brought down the first Borisov government New elections would be held in 2013 under a caretaker government led by Ambassador to France Marin Raykov. This saw GERB decline to 97 seats, with the KzB now on 84, showing that there was a new two-party politics. The DPS was on 36 and Attack on 23. For the other parties, the Blue Coalition had broken up and both the DBS and SDS lost all seats, with RZS doing the same. As GERB refused to form a government, the KzB and DPS put together a technocratic one under Plamen Oresharski, Stanishev’s Finance Minister. This government was never popular, and after a year, GERB, the BSP and the DPS decided to hold new elections, leading to Oresharski resigning in 2014 and a caretaker government under Georgi Bliznashki. The election saw a more fractured parliament, with GERB now on 84 seats, and the KzB (renamed BSP – Left Bulgaria) on 39 and the DPS on 38. The DBS, SDS and others got back together as the Reformist Bloc (RB) and won 23 seats, while the right-wing populist Patrotic Front won nineteen. Another right-wing populist party, Bulgaria Without Censorship, won fifteen. The TV host Nikolay Barekov founded this party, and ran in the European elections in a right-wing coalition, but his ally broke to form the Patriotic Front. Attack fell to eleven, and former President Georgi Parvanov founded the Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABV) which is centre-left but has a conservative streak, and also won eleven. GERB formed a coalition with the RB, also supported by the Patriotic Front and ABV, restoring Borisov to power. In 2016, the BSP supported Rumen Radev, commander of the Air Force, for the presidential election, which he won. Though the Bulgarian presidency is mostly ceremonial, this ended up having major ramifications.
Rumen Radev, a constant thorn in Borisov’s side This election was a landslide win for Borisov against the GERB candidate, Speaker Tsetska Tsacheva, and thus Borisov resigned again, leading to 2017 elections under the caretaker government of former Speaker Ognyan Gerdzhikov. This election saw the revival of the two-party system, with GERB on 95, and Left Bulgaria (renamed BSP for Bulgaria or BSPzB) on eighty. The Patriotic Front and Attack ran together as United Patriots (OP), winning 27 seats, while the DPS slid to 26, and the right-wing Volya Movement (Will Movement) won twelve. The RB fell below the threshold, as did the ABV coalition, and Bulgaria Without Censorship did not run. A GERB-OP coalition was formed under Borisov, who this time served his entire term, lasting until April 2021. However, this is exactly when the crisis would begin, started by a folk singer named Slavi Trifonov.
Slavi Trifonov Protests had grown against Borisov in Bulgaria over the last year of his government. He had gotten the reputation of a mafioso, a man who abused his power for corruption and state capture, amongst opposition. In fact, the protests were in part triggered by Radev calling for the “mafia to get out”. However, he still had his supporters. A GERB-SDS coalition won 75 seats. Meanwhile, Trifonov, a folk singer who also had a TV career as a chat show host, formed his own populist party, There is Such a People (ITN), which leaned to the right and earned 51 seats. BSPzB, which was undergoing infighting fell to 43, while the DPS won thirty. Meanwhile, the DSB returned to form an alliance with more progressive-leaning parties to form the liberal Democratic Bulgaria (DB). A more ‘orthodox’ progressive bloc was Stand up! Mafia, Get Out! (ISMV), an alliance including liberal and centre-left parties, which won fourteen seats. The OP had split and its three components all failed to win seats (including one in coalition with Volya). As you can see, “corruption” was becoming a massive issue, with Radev putting himself against Borisov.
Protests against corruption in the last days of the last Borisov government Though the new anti-corruption parties (ITN, DB, ISMV) were formed against Borisov, GERB-SDS also had the most seats, making forming a government impossible. This led to new elections in July, under the caretaker government of Brig. Gen. Stefan Yanev, and ITN won the most seats with 65 compared to GERB-SDS on 63. BSPzB won 36, with DB on 34, the DPS on 29, and ISMV on thirteen. The ITN could maybe have put a government together with the BSP, DB, and ISMV but failed to do so, and this led to Yanev’s term being extended and another election in November, alongside presidential ones. A new force became the biggest party, known as We Continue the Change (PP). This was formed by two of Yanev’s ministers, Economy Minister Kiril Petkov and Finance Minister Assen Vassilev as a liberal party, who won 67 seats. GERB-SDS fell further to 59, and the DPS won 34 as the BSPzB fell even more to 26. PP hurt ITN, which fell to 25, and DB, which was on sixteen. The far-right party Revival entered with thirteen, but ISMV (renamed Stand Up.BG! We are coming! or IBG-NI) fell out of parliament. In the presidential race, Radev, endorsed by BSPzB, PP, ITN and IBG-NI thrashed the GERB-SDS-endorsed Anastas Gerdzhikov, Rector of Sofia University.
Ministers of interim PM Stefan Yanev formed We Continue the Change, but Yanev himself was more right-wing Finally, a coalition was formed between PP, the BSP, ITN and DB under Petkov. However, even though they were both formed as a reaction to the “mafia” (as GERB were often called by the opposition), the progressive and pro-EU PP and the conservative ITN did not work well together, and the coalition fell apart in 2022, leading to new elections under the caretaker Galab Donev (Yanev’s Deputy PM). Here, GERB-SDS rebounded to 67 seats, and PP won 53. The DPS won 36, with Revival up to 27, and BSPzB on 25. DB won 20, while Yanev, who was Defence Minister under Petkov but removed for referring to Russia’s war in Ukraine as a ‘special military operation’ (echoing the Russian term for it) founded Bulgarian Rise (BV) as a conservative party, winning twelve seats. The big loser was ITN, which fell out altogether. Again, no government could be formed. The problem was that Borisov saw himself and GERB as a centre-right pro-EU party, with himself like Angela Merkel (or perhaps more fittingly, Silvio Berlusconi). However, the other pro-EU parties all saw him as corrupt, and it was also hard to do a deal with the Eurosceptics. Donev’s term was extended, and new elections were formed in 2023. GERB-SDS continued with 69 seats, while a PP-DB alliance won 64. Revival continued to gain, winning 37, with the DPS on 36. BSPzB now won 23, with ITN returning on eleven, and BV missing out. Finally, a PP-DB and GERB agreement was formed. The PP’s Nikolai Denkov (Education Minister under Yanev and Petkov) would become PM, and then change with a GERB figure, European Commissioner Mariya Gabriel, after nine months. Denkov resigned after nine months as agreed, but then Gabriel decided she wanted to lead a government without PP-DB, leading to a breakdown of the government and new elections, again, held in June 2024 under Chairperson of the Chamber of Audit Dimitar Glavchev.
Mariya Gabriel’s decision to end the coalition with PP-DB led to new elections in 2024 GERB-SDS won 68 seats this time, and the DPS came second, on 47. PP-DB won 39, with Revival now on 38. BSPzB won nineteen, and ITN won sixteen, with the businessman Ivelin Mihaylov starting the new far-right Velichie (Greatness) party on thirteen. Again, no government could be formed, so new elections were held in October under Glavchev. This parliament was a mess. GERB-SDS won 66 seats, with PP-DB on 36, and Revival on 33. However, a split in one of the few constants in Bulgaria’s three-and-a-half-decades-long democracy, the DPS, led to two new parties. Delyan Peevski, a member of the NDSV moved to the DPS and was elected as an MP in 2009. When Oresharski made him head of the State Agency for National Security, this led to huge protests and was probably one of the main things that eventually destroyed Oresharski’s popularity. Peevski has been sanctioned by the US and UK for corruption and influence-peddling since 2021, and is seen as an oligarch. However, Peevski became DPS leader in 2023. This was controversial, not only because of Peevski’s activity but because he was the first non-Turkish leader of the party. Party founder Ahmed Dogan used his influence to make Peevski co-leader with Dzhevdet Chakarov, who is Turkish and was Minister of the Environment in the Stanishev government. Dogan then managed to remove Peevski as new leader. Peevski responded by forming his own party, the DPS – New Beginning (DPS-NN), which won 29 seats.
Delyan Peevski BSPzB, which renamed itself BSP – United Left, won nineteen, while the Dogan-Chakarov wing of the DPS, the Alliance for Rights and Freedoms (APS) also won nineteen, and ITN won seventeen. Radostin Vasilev, the Minister of Youth and Sports under Petkov, formed his own far-right party, known as Morality, Unity, Honour (MECh, Sword), which won eleven seats and Velichie won ten. A GERB-BSP-ITN coalition was formed, initially supported by the APS, but then by DPS-NN, under Rosen Zhelyazkov, the GERB Transport Minister in the last Borisov government. A budget increasing taxes led to more protests in 2025, leading to Zhelyazkov’s resignation and a caretaker government under Andrey Gyurov, deputy governor of the national bank. This is thus the eighth election since 2021.
PM Andrey Gyurov Radev resigned to enter active politics. He has made no secret of his hatred for Borisov, and formed a centre-left party called Progressive Bulgaria (PB). Like the ABV before it, it is somewhat lukewarm on relations with the EU (opposing sanctions on Russia, for example). PB is expected to win the election with somewhere between eighty and 100 seats, while GERB-SDS will continue to get somewhere between fifty and seventy. PP-DB will get between thirty and fifty, with Revival falling in between fifteen and 25.
Matters-o-Meter: One consequence of the entrance of Radev is that it will kill a lot of the smaller parties. The United Left, led by what was once Bulgaria’s biggest party, lost support under longtime leader Korneliya Ninova, who took the BSP away from its pro-European outlook under Stanishev and clung on to power for too long, thus making it hard to deal with the new anti-corruption parties (indeed the BSP and DPS were often considered ‘mafia’ by the DPS, just like GERB were). Though Ninova is gone now, the party will consider it a good day if they win any seats at all. Meanwhile, a court ruled that the DPS-NN was the real DPS, and are running under that name, aiming for around thirty seats. The APS has no chance. ITN, MECh, and Velichie are all expected to fall short too. What this means is, a PB/PP-DB coalition is possible, in what is probably a five-pole parliament, with GERB-SDS as the main opposition. This could be a stable centrist government, if it survives, finally ending Bulgaria’s problems. 6/10
On the same date, Bolivia will stage the second round of regional elections. Bolivia is a country that has undergone several coups in its two-century-long independence from Spain. Democracy was restored in 1982, when the military decided to recall the Congress from the 1980 election and ask it to select a President. Before that, the results were annulled by the coup. The 1997 election perhaps showed just how fractured the political system was. Hugo Banzer, the dictator from 1970 to 1978 won it, with five candidates on between 16% and 23% of the vote! Alliances would be formed for the congressional vote (if no candidate won a majority, Congress would decide), they would be unstable, and the president would have little power. As it was, the Congress supported Banzer this time. He resigned in 2001 after a cancer diagnosis, and VP Jorge Quiroga finished his term.
Hugo Banzer 2002 was the start of Bolivia’s political re-alignment. Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada (the centrist President from 1993 to 1997) won the most votes. But in second was a new force, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism, MAS), led by Evo Morales. Morales was elected as an MP in 1997. An indigenous trade union leader, he managed to speak to both the indigenous population and the broader urban and rural poor. Being a protest leader gained him prominence, and when Quiroga expelled him from Congress, he grew even more popular. Sánchez de Losada’s second presidency would not go well. Protesting the privatisation of gas and the prohibition of coca, an ingredient of cocaine that nonetheless has huge cultural and economic importance in indigenous culture, Morales called for huge protests and brought Bolivia to a standstill. In 2003, Sánchez de Losada resigned, replaced by VP Carlos Mesa. Mesa attempted to find some common ground with Morales and the wider Congress, but could not do so, resigning in 2005 and calling for new elections.
Evo Morales Quiroga returned to face Morales in the election, but was defeated in a landslide, putting MAS in power. Morales was very popular in Bolivia, and for years was seen as a hero for leftists the world over to follow. In 2009, he won an even bigger landslide, and had a similar margin in 2014. This term would be controversial. In 2009, he put forward a referendum for a new constitution. Starting from them, a President could only have two terms. In 2016, he put forward a referendum to change this, which was narrowly defeated. However, the Supreme Court ruled that a provision stating every citizen had equal rights to run for public service meant that term limits were invalid anyway, so Morales ran in 2019. Mesa returned as the opponent. The rules under the constitution got rid of the congressional vote, stating that to avoid a runoff, a candidate needed a majority, or more than 40% and more than 10% more than the next rival. Morales won 47.1%, compared to Mesa on 36.5%, re-electing Morales. However, there were serious questions about the result, which may well have been tampered with. Massive protests began, known as the Pitita Revolution. At first, Morales stated that a runoff would be held after all, but then resigned after losing the support of the police, military, and trade unions. Claiming he was the victim of a coup, senior party figures in the line of succession all left, leading to Jeanine Áñez, Second Vice President of the Senate and opposition member, taking power.
Jeanine Áñez New elections were held in 2020, with Morales’ Minister of Economy and Public Finance Luis Arce thrashing Mesa as the MAS candidate. Morales returned to Bolivia after Arce’s election, but the two would have a bitter struggle over the leadership of MAS. In the end, Morales left, but was banned from running for President. Arce was unpopular due to the chaos as well, and didn’t run either, and the MAS candidate came sixth, leading to Bolivia’s right finally winning an election. The runoff was expected to be between Quiroga and former 1990s minister Samuel Doria Medina. Both were considered to be right-wing ideologues. In a surprise though, Rodrigo Paz, son of former President Jaime Paz Zamora (who Doria served under) won the first round and beat Quiroga in a runoff. Promising “capitalism for all”, he had something of a libertarian streak and will move Bolivia to the right, although was more centrist than Quiroga or Doria.
Matters-o-Meter: The election was seen as an early test for Paz then, but politics seems to have returned to its state before MAS, where there are various regional networks and parties, each with different local contexts. For two decades, every vote was reported by national and world media as wins or setbacks for MAS. Now, Paz’s party has run a lukewarm, locally based campaign, as has both MAS and Morales’ new bloc. Indeed, national parties performed badly if they ran at all, with most votes going to regionalist parties. 4/10
On 21 April, Virginia will hold a ballot measure (referendum). This is in the context of the nationwide redistricting battle. Currently, in the US, the seats in the House of Representatives are given to each state based on population. However, the states themselves can choose how these seats are allocated (subject to national law). Though racial gerrymandering has been banned, there are no laws against partisan gerrymandering (indeed, lawsuits have claimed that partisan redistricting is actually racial). Gerrymandering has occurred in the past, and after Donald Trump (R) was elected President in 2024 with a narrow House majority, he wanted gerrymandering for the 2026 midterm election to protect it. Texas, the most populous Republican-led state, was the first to do so. This led to California, the most populous state in the Union, and one dominated by Democrats, responding in kind.
Donald Trump Smaller states then did the same. Republican Missouri has done so, subject to referendum, as did Republican North Carolina. However, a lawsuit reversed a similar map in Republican Utah. In Indiana, Republicans themselves opposed the redistricting, scuppering it. In Democratic Maryland, the state’s Senate President stopped the vote, stating he thought a court would strike it down, hurting the Democrats. Republican Florida, the second-most-populous Republican state, is expected to hold a session to do this in April, while New York, the second-most-populous Democratic state, has also announced intentions to do the same. However, in 2020, Virginia voted for a bipartisan commission to draw the boundaries (something supported by state Republicans, and opposed by state Democrats). After the beginning of this national battle and big Democratic wins in Virginia in 2025, the process of overturning this moved forward. Legislation has already been passed which would put the boundaries at 10-1 Democratic instead of 6-5 (based on 2024 results).
Matters-o-Meter: The referendum will give the state legislature this power only from 2026 until 2030, and has been seen as a party-line vote, with Democrats brining out the big guns in favour of it. These include former President Barack Obama, both federal senators from Virginia, Democratic US House leader Hakeem Jeffries and former leader Nancy Pelosi, and Gov. Abigail Spanberger and most other Virginia Democratic elites. Speaker Mike Johnson (R) leads a list of Republican names both nationally and in Virginia against it. No-one is in any doubt about principles, it is a clearly pragmatic move against the actions in Texas, and efforts in Florida and elsewhere. Polling is tight (tighter than most in Democratic Virginia), but many eyes in the highest halls of power in the US will be on this. 6/10
On 23 April, Tamil Nadu holds regional elections. In some ways, Tamil Nadu is a big brother to Puducherry: Tamil Nadu is a state (unlike the union territory Puducherry), and both speak Tamil. Upon Indian independence, the British-era Madras Presidency became Madras State, containing parts of other states. In 1952 Madras State held its first election, won by the INC, but not in majority. In 1953, Andhra State was formed (today’s Andhra Pradesh) out of Madras State, and in 1956, the state was further reorganised into its current boundaries. This new state was more favourable to the INC, with Andhra State parties no longer involved, and the INC won easily in majorty in 1957. The DMK would be the main opposition in 1962, and then win in 1967. Party founder C. N. Annadurai became the Chief Minister, but died in 1969.
C. N. Annadurai is known as the person with the largest funeral ever, with 15 million mourners Annadurai did live to see, weeks before he died, his state being renamed to Tamil Nadu. INC Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided that she would back the DMK, not challenging it in elections, in exchange for their support. Thus, they easily won in 1971. By 1977 however, the AIADMK had formed here, and just like in Pondicherry, won power (in this election, the INC also ran separately to the DMK). After a landslide national election win in 1980, the DMK convinced the INC to dismiss the government, but this led to a backlash and the AIADMK leader M. G. Ramachandran won an increased majority against the DMK-INC. In 1984, the INC switched to the AIADMK side, which won another landslide.
M. G. Ramachandran After Ramachandran’s death in 1987, the AIADMK split, with his wife V. N. Janaki becoming CM. However, J. Jayalalithaa, a frequent co-star of Ramachandran in their previous lives as film stars (and the extent of their celebrity cannot be understated at all as a big factor in their political success), now a senior member of the AIADMK, had her own faction claiming she was the true leaders. The party was split into the Jayalalitha faction (AIADMK (J)) and the Janaki one (AIADMK (JA)). The 1989 election was won by neither, with the DMK winning it in a landslide. However the AIADMK (J) was clearly the heir to the throne of the AIADMK, winning 27 seats compared to two for the AIADMK (JA). Congress, which took neither side, came third. M. Karunanidhi, who succeeded Annadurai as CM and DMK leader in 1969, took office again as Chief Minister.
M. Karunanidhi After this, the AIADMK was reunited under Jayalalithaa. In 1991, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a sepratist group in Sri Lanka’s civil war (where India sided with the government) assassinated former PM Rajiv Gandhi. The national government controlled by Congress used their popularity in the wake of this to dissolve the government, and tie the DMK to the assassination, leading to a landslide win for the AIADMK-INC alliance (winning 225 of 234 seats). Jayalalithaa became CM. However, scandals and Jayalalithaa’s lagresse led to a reversal, and in 1996 the DMK-led alliance won 221 seats, leading to the return of Karunanidhi. Their main ally was the TMC(M). In 2001, the AIADMK and Jayalalithaa won power again, though the INC was only a marginal ally. Instead, the TMC(M) and PMK joined their alliance.
J. Jayalalithaa The DMK had joined forces with the NDA in this race, but in 2006 swapped to the INC. The DMK won, restoring Karunanidhi. In 2011, the AIADMK won, and Jayalalithaa returned. From 1989 to 2011, power had constantly alternated between the two, only stopping due to the imposition of President’s rule (direct rule) in 1991, and Jayalalithaa’s brief disqualification due to criminal convictions from 2001 to 2002, when she had been acquitted. During that time, her lieutenant O. Panneerselvam led the state. In 2014, she was convicted in a disproportionate assets case, leading to her disqualification and replacement by Panneerselvam again. However, in 2015 she was acquitted and returned, before 2016 elections. Here, her party won enough for a majority with 136 seats. The Democratic Progressive Alliance (DPA) won the remaining 98, with 89 for the DMK, eight for the INC, and one for the IUML. Not long after, Jayalalithaa died and was replaced by Panneerselvam again.
O. Panneerselvam However, Panneerselvam soon resigned because Jayalalithaa’s chosen successor was V. K. Sasikala, her close ally. Panneerselvam resigned so Sasikala could take office, but then she too was declared guilty in the disproportionate assets case. From jail, she selected Edappi K. Palaniswami, a minister in the cabinet, as the new CM. At first, Panneerselvam took a faction out, but then merged under the condition that Sasikala was expelled. Sasikala’s nephew, T. T. V. Dhinakaran took a faction out called the Amma Makkal Munnetra Kazhagam (AMMK, Amma People’s Progressive Federation, Amma being a nickname of Jayalalithaa). Meanwhile, Karunanidhi died in 2018, replaced by his son M. K. Stalin. The 2021 election was decisively won by the SPA (the new name of the DPA), with 159 seats. 133 went to the DMK, with eighteen for the INC. Four went to the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK, Liberation Panther Party), a left-wing party which openly supports the LTTE. Both the CPI and CPI(M) won two seats. On the NDA side, the AIADMK won 66 seats, with the PMK on five and BJP on four for a total of 75. No-one else won seats, including the AMMK. Stalin became CM.
Chief Minister M. K. Stalin Tamil Nadu has been a state politically defined to a large extent by its desire to stay Tamil, which perhaps shows why both the nationally-strong INC and BJP instead attach themself to Tamil-based parties which are stronger in the state. Remember that before the DMK took power, the INC easily won Madras State, as it was then. Since independence, and even before, the INC had tried to “impose” (as the DMK would put it) the Hindi language on the country. In 1950, it was agreed that due to opposition from minorities, Hindi and English would be co-official for fifteen years. There was still big opposition to this, so in 1963 the INC national government ensured a law was passed to maintain English indefinitely. However, this was just a normal law. Massive protests and riots led by the DMK led the INC government to make further laws solidifying both English and minority languages, and this led to the protests subsiding. Since Annadurai, the DMK leader took power in 1967, a party that ultimately pledges its roots to him has always held the CM’s seat (apart from periods of direct rule), because the AIADMK is literally named after him. Though they are rivals then, both ultimately stem from the same Dravidian ideology of equality for southern India, its languages, and Tamil identity. Indeed, both parties had links with the LTTE.
Matters-o-Meter: In 2024, the INDIA alliance impressively won all 39 seats here in the national election (22 for the DMK, nine for the INC, two each for the CPI(M), VCK, and CPI, and one each for the MDMK and IUML). Still, Stalin has a battle on his hands to retain the CM’s seat from Palaniswami. Polls show the race as neck and neck, and if Palaniswami wins, it will be celebrated not just by the AIADMK, but by their allies the BJP, who could do with good news and taking down one of the opposition’s most well-known chief ministers. 6/10
On 23 and 29 April, West Bengal holds a state election. West Bengal is the creation of the Partition of India, where due to religious violence and Muslim calls for a separate, Muslim country in India, Pakistan was created out of India. East Bengal later became the independent country Bangladesh, following the 1946 election in Bengal where the separatist Muslim party won the election, and the INC winning most of the Hindu seats. Thus, after separation, the INC ruled the new state, confirmed with a majority in 1952, with the CPI as the main opposition. Bidhan Chandra Roy was the CM and won further majorities in 1957 and 1962 before dying that year. However, in 1967, an INC split led to them being out of power as an opposition alliance also including the CPI(M) and CPI took charge. By 1972, the INC were back in firm control, but in 1977 the CPI(M) won a landslide under Jyoti Basu.
Jyoti Basu The CPI(M) and Basu became the dominant force in West Bengal, winning elections in 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1996 with the INC a small opposition. In 1998, Mamata Banerjee split from the INC, forming her own Trinamool Congress (TMC, Grassroots Congress) after a dispute with the state INC leadership. In 2000, Basu resigned (after harbouring prime-ministerial ambitions) and was replaced by Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, the Deputy CM. Despite the split, the TMC and INC allied against the CPI(M)-led Left Front (LF), and in 2001 the TMC became the clear main opposition, though the LF won again, the CPI(M) lost its standalone majority. By 2006, the TMC had joined the NDA, leading to a divorce with the INC. It was an LF landslide anyway as the CPI(M) restored their standalone majority. For the 2011 election, the TMC rejoined the UPA and won a landslide, unseating the CPI(M) which had ruled since 1977. Banerjee became CM.
Mamata Banerjee For the 2016 election, there was a shock as the INC joined the LF parties in the Mahajot. The TMC won an even bigger landslide, and the INC was the largest Mahajot party. The last election was in 2021, a massive shock. The winner did not change, with the TMC winning 215 seats and their ally, the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM, Gorkha People’s Liberation Front), which campaigns for Gorkhaland to be made a separate state (Gorkha are a Nepali-speaking group) won one seat, taking the alliance to 216. The shock was that the BJP won 77 seats, being the main opposition. The Sanjukta Morcha (United Front) alliance only won one seat, with neither the CPI(M) or INC winning a seat. Instead, the Indian Secular Front (ISF) party, a Muslim party, won the only seat in the alliance. Banerjee remained as CM.
Matters-o-Meter: The result of the election is expected to go the TMC’s way, but the BJP has a chance to end Banerjee’s fifteen-year reign. Suvendu Adhikari is the leader of the BJP and CM candidate in the state. The Left Front and INC are running separately but do not expect to make much ground, while the TMC and BJP’s allies are only very small parties or independents. In the 2024 election, the TMC won 29 seats, the BJP twelve, and INC one in West Bengal. The TMC is part of INDIA nationally. This election however is very important as it exposes some of the biggest rifts in Indian society. Immigration from Bangladesh has always been an issue in West Bengal, and this issue has gotten larger due to the overthrow of the old pro-Indian Bangladeshi government in 2024, leading to fears in India that the new government is Islamist, hostile to India, and anti-Hindu. Immigration has come from both Bangladeshi Hindus and Muslims. In the BJP’s view, the TMC is helping illegal Muslims come across the border to win Muslim votes, despite the fact that these Islamists oppress Hindus in Bangladesh. The TMC say that the BJP national government has legislated against Muslims, and Begnalis in general, looking to homogenise the country to achieve their Hindutva dream. 7/10
Finally, on 25 April, Palestine will hold local elections. The State of Palestine consists of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, having both a tumultuous history and present. After the creation of Israel in 1948, the West Bank was controlled by Jordan and the Gaza Strip by Egypt, but was occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War of 1967. After the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), there were some deals with Israel for self-governance, through a PLO-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA). In 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza, but continues to blockade it. The PLO is controlled by the Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement) party, which was seen as a partner in dialogue with Israel and the wider international community. However, in 2006, elections were held, and the more radical, Islamist Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) won, leading to a deterioration of dialogue between the West and Hamas. Conflict deepened between Fatah and Hamas, and in a military campaign in 2007, Hamas took over Gaza in a brief civil war.
The Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 was a key flashpoint in Palestine’s foreign relations Thus, the Gaza Strip is controlled by Hamas, but under international blockade, and the West Bank is occupied by Israel but under limited administration from the PA. Israel has created settlements in the West Bank in a bid to colonise the area as part of a ‘Greater Israel’, and Palestinians generally have a low quality of life under both military occupation and Hamas rule in Gaza. In 2023, Hamas launched an attack on Israel, leading to war between the two and a brutal humanitarian crisis in Gaza, often described as the ‘Gaza genocide’ by many countries and experts. Though a ceasefire was signed in 2025, the war continues at a smaller scale.
Matters-o-Meter: Though local elections continue, national elections have not taken place since 2006. Though the vote will be watched closely by some observers, the fact is that not much will change for Palestinians as a result of them. If Israel had its way, there would be no Palestine, and no local elections will change that. Until there is some level of peace and accord between internal actors in Palestine, very little will change politically there. 3/10
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Why a victory in a seat in Texas had Democrats so excited, and why it spooked Donald Trump
On January 31, the second round of the Texas 9th Senate district special election was held, following the first round on 4 November 2025.
Texas’s 9th Senate district factfile:
- Population: 902,387
- Religions: No precise data, but majority are Christian, with unaffiliated the largest majority
- Ethnicity: 45.1% Non-Hispanic White, 33.8% Non-Black/Asian Hispanic, 12.3% Black, 6.0% Asian, 2.1% Non-Hispanic Mixed, 0.7% Non-Hispanic Other
- Type of government: State constituency in a federal presidential republic
- Freedom in the World 2026 score: N/A, United States score: 81/100 (Free)
The election was held on the same day as the second round of the election in the 18th congressional district, with the article available here:
The election used the ‘jungle primary’ system, where all candidates (including multiple from the same party) would enter the first round, and if no candidate won a majority then it would progress onto a second round with the top two.
The election was held due to the resignation of incumbent Kelly Hancock from the right-wing Republican Party of Texas, the state branch of the Republican Party. Hancock was first elected to the lower house (The Texas House of Representatives) for the 91st district in 2006, taking office in 2007. He served until 2013 when he took up his seat in the upper house. In 2023, he briefly had the ceremonial office of President pro tempore of the body. In 2025, he stepped down to become chief clerk of the office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts, allowing him to become Acting Comptroller of Texas (as he could not be appointed directly due to him being a sitting state senator).
In 2022, Hancock won 60.1% of the vote, and two Republicans ran this time. The first was John Huffman, previously the Mayor of Southlake.
The second was Leigh Wambsganss, a noted activist and CCO of the Patriot Mobile phone network operator.
Taylor Rehmet, a union leader, was the candidate from the liberal Texas Democratic Party (the state branch of the Democratic Party), which won 40.0% of the vote in 2022.
The district was seen as very Republican based on previous district elections (and its voting habits in other statewide and federal elections), having been won by twenty points by the party in 2022, and seventeen points in the 2024 presidential election. Huffman was endorsed by Fort Worth Mayor Mattie Parker, while Wambsganss was endorsed by President Donald Trump, federal Sen. Ted Cruz, and Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick. A large part of Rehmet’s support came from unions.
In the first round, Rehmet (D) won 56,565 votes (47.6%), and Wambsganss (R) won 42,739 (35.9%), advancing to the runoff. Huffman (R) on 19,608 (16.5%) was eliminated. This was already seen as a considerable overperformance by the Democrats, especially as both Republicans outspent him, and Wambsganss continued to do so in the runoff.
In the runoff, Rehmet (D) won 54,473 votes (57.3%) and Wambsganss (R) won 40,648 (42.7%).
The result was considered an upset that Rehmet won at all, especially by such a large margin. It should be noted that turnout (17.4% in the first round and 15.4% in the runoff) was very low, as is common in such special elections, although higher than usual for such votes despite a storm coinciding with the runoff, but there was no particular increase in Democratic areas. Notably, Rehmet won 3 in 10 Republicans and 7 in 10 independents (based on primary vote tally), and a high Hispanic vote share (4 in 5). This may have been due to Rehmet’s working-class credentials and a backlash against Wambsganss’ style of conservatism.
Analysis
This analysis will be split on the lessons for both parties, starting with the victorious Democrats. Texas has a sort of hypnotic power over Democrats and liberals in the US. It’s not so hard to see why. In 2024, Donald Trump won a landslide with all seven swing states: Pennsylvania, Georgia, North Carolina, Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Nevada. But if the Democrats held Texas, only one of those seven would have been needed for Kamala Harris to win. There was a feeling that one day, as the state became less white and younger, the Democrats could target it, and thus have a much easier path to power. As I wrote in the above article for the US House seat, Beto O’Rourke’s narrow Senate defeat against Ted Cruz in 2018 was the high point of this feeling in modern times.
Beto O’Rourke was seen by Democrats as incredibly hip in 2018 due to skateboarding This election should not be a big deal. It’s in a safe Republican area in northern Tarrant County, and the Republicans should have won. As they lost, it raises eyebrows. However, one can argue that it still probably isn’t that big a deal. Rehmet won’t actually serve active legislative days and will face re-election in November, which is the date of the midterms so turnout will be incredibly higher. On that day, a lot of voters who will be choosing seats like their federal Senator and Representative, and will not look into the individual candidates (indeed, many of them will not have bothered to vote this time). We’ve been here before, in the same county. In 2007, a Democrat called Dan Barrett won a special election, but was easily defeated in the 2008 general election. And nobody ever heard of Dan Barrett again.
Dan Barrett’s photo is taken from an Austin Chronicle article entitled “Stunner in District 97: Democrat Barrett Wins” A bit more from that article: Speaker of the House Tom Craddick surely must be breaking a sweat now. Last night, in a special election runoff to replace retiring Fort Worth Republican Rep. Anna Mowery, Democrat Dan Barrett defeated Republican Mark M. Shelton with 52% of the vote.
The win brings the Democrats within only five seats of retaking the majority in 150-seat Texas House”. However, even in what was a terrible year for Republicans nationwide due to Obamamania, the Republicans held on to Texas. Therefore, we can write this off as a response to the unpopularity of the current Republican administration in Washington and the fact that the Democrats clearly chose a better candidate than the Republicans (the Dallas Morning News endorsed Huffman in the first round, but then switched to Rehmet in the second). No need to overreact. But this is seen in the New York Times’ Opinion section:
The headline of an opinion piece in the New York Times by Michelle Cottle Taking the liberty of reading between the (head)lines, one might view Cottle as naturally sympathetic to the Democrats (in particular female ones), but mostly hating Trump, frustrated by the Democrats’ failures to win and praising anti-Trump Republicans. She was excited by then-candidate for Governor of Virginia Abigail Spanberger (D), with the headline simply: “‘Weak, Woke, and Whiny’ No More”. This line about Rehmet probably shows her instincts the best:
“Mr. Rehmet’s upset is yet another example of Democrats performing best when they embrace normie candidates who fit their districts. Mr. Rehmet kept things local. He spoke to voters about housing prices, the rising cost of health insurance and the turmoil in local school districts. He steered clear of culture-warring and partisan vitriol.”
To be fair to Copple, she is keen to temper her obvious excitement. Democrats can only win “if they avoid past mistakes”. “I worry national Democrats will do that thing where outside players get overexcited, roll into the state swinging their checkbooks, push priorities more appropriate to California or New York and lavish resources on the flashiest candidates in superlong-shot bids that fall flat and leave everyone even more demoralized”. Noted problems of the past included national donors and leaders (who Texas Dems are reliant on to some extent) being unfamiliar with the state’s inner politics and thus undermining their own candidate inadvertently.
Texas Democrats have sometimes been bemused by out-of-state supporters who they claim do not understand the state I have my own anecdote about a situation like this from London, where I live. In 2019, the UK was having an election, between incumbent Prime Minister Boris Johnson (Conservative Party) and Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn (Labour Party). Corbyn was, in many ways, this country’s Bernie Sanders, seen as remarkably left-wing even for his own party, but very popular amongst the youth and in constant grappling with his own party establishment. Unlike Sanders, Corbyn actually got to lead his party into an election, twice. Cue youngsters and previously apolitical people who had never voted before (and some who couldn’t because they weren’t old enough) suddenly knocking on doors and handing out leaflets. Many of them headed to Uxbridge and South Ruislip, which was Johnson’s own seat. Johnson’s own majority had halved in 2017, Corbyn’s first election, where everyone expected him to crash and burn but he shockingly deprived the Conservatives a majority. The Labour candidate, Ali Milani, was a dyed-in-the-wool Corbynite. London was rapidly becoming more and more Labour. And of course, going to try and topple Johnson was perfect for Instagram.
Ali Milani Johnson won the seat easily and clawed back some of the majority lost in 2017. And Labour lost sixty seats in the election, 54 of them to the Conservatives. Though now most would agree the Conservatives would have won the election no matter what, if the money and manpower had been sent to other seats across the country, some of them could have been saved. And like Barrett, the name Ali Milani has faded into history. I don’t think the time that Texas turns blue is nigh (anything is possible long-term). However, I do think the lesson that should be taken is that Democrats can win individual elections in Texas, including statewide ones, if the factors are right. A good candidate against a bad candidate. An unpopular Republican administration in Washington or Austin. Most famously, the Democrat Doug Jones won in Alabama (a state much redder than Texas) in a special election for US Senate in 2017 because Republican candidate Roy Moore was undergoing multiple allegations of sexual misconduct. This was a big win for Democrats, but it did not lead to a lasting ‘swing state’ and even with incumbency Jones lost the regular election in 2020 in a landslide.
Doug Jones Democrats shouldn’t at all write off the idea of nabbing the governor’s mansion or a Senate seat, if and only if the circumstances are right, but they shouldn’t be consumed by it and divert funds away from swing areas. There is obviously a message to Republicans as well, to not be complacent. I think that Huffman represented the Republican old guard, and Wambsganss the MAGA movement. Republicans chose Wambsganss in the first round, a figure who has very little support amongst independents and moderate Democrats. Of course, the gain is that such a candidate would be much more loyal to Trump in the event of victory. Perhaps the calculation is that, in a lot of places in the state, any Republican would win (including this place, at least in a general election). However, the result in part led to Trump demurring in the Republican primary for Texas’s US Senate seat. This seat is held by Sen. John Cornyn (R), who is running again after first being elected in 2002. A Bush-era conservative, he’s sometimes come to blows with Trump who considers him too moderate, especially around election time where he tries to show his distance from the President. His main rival is attorney-general Ken Paxton, known as a true MAGA Republican. Trump has not endorsed Paxton, stating that both candidates were good friends of his, and many think it was this special election result that alarmed Team Trump. Paxton has been impeached and there are various questions about his character hanging over him. Cornyn has claimed that Paxton would be an albatross on Texas Republicans up and down the ballot, and thanks to the entry of Rep. Wesley Hunt, who won 13.5% of the vote in the first round, a runoff is needed on 26 May. This has led to hope from many Texas Democrats that, especially if Paxton wins, the bitterly divided Republicans will give their candidate, James Talarico a shot.
Cottle’s view on Cornyn is also revealing Thus, the Republicans are learning that though Texas is red, it can be disloyal if the party takes too many liberties. It’s clear that Paxton is a very risky candidate to run and state Republicans would surely prefer a moderate Republican to a Democrat. I admit: I see Talarico as something of a second O’Rourke. Many Democrats are very excited against him because he’s an outspoken Christian, but a left-wing one. The thought of putting Christianity into their “column” is a similar ‘pipe dream’ (as Cottle put it) to putting Texas there, as it would take a huge chunk of the Republican coalition. He needs to perhaps emphasise the Christianity more than the left-wing part though in conservative Texas, with an old clip of him declaring that God is non-binary circulating after the fact. One can imagine him coming within 2% of beating Paxton (or Cornyn), getting lots of hype and then being in the same weird limbo as O’Rourke. Still, it’s not surprising that Democrats think: “imagine if this time, we did it”.
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March: Big Races in All Continents
March has big elections pretty much everywhere: too many to count! Let’s quickly summarise them all. Remember, if they were in my yearly preview article (below), they will get a prediction, but otherwise, there will instead be a score on the Matters-o-meter. Because there are so many elections, it took a while to get this out and many will have already happens. I will keep the predictions in in such cases for you to judge.
From 3-8 March, Iran held a Supreme Leader election. The election was held due to the death of the incumbent, Ali Khamenei. The office dates back to 1979, the year of the Iranian Revolution. Previously, there had been a monarchy in Iran, which was criticised by liberal and leftist opposition, as well as Islamists. The Revolution saw this unlikely alliance bring down the Shah (king), and the exiled cleric Ruhollah Khomeini took charge. After this, the liberals and leftists were purged, leading to a strongly Islamist government.
Iranian Supreme Leaders are generally known as the ‘Ayatollah’ in English, the above being Ayatollah Khomeini (in fact, this religious rank is not limited to one person or office, with about thousands existing) Khomeini died in 1989, and was replaced by Khamenei, who maintained his predecessor’s basic attitudes. Khomeini famously referred to the US as the Great Satan and Israel as the Little Satan. The West (the US and the UK) led a coup in 1953 which led to the end of constitutional monarchy and the Shah’s absolute rule, and this resentment was never forgotten from the clerics. In fact, when he took charge, Khomeini severed relations with both the US and Israel. Proxy conflicts between both sides have been sporadically occurring for the entire history of the Islamic Republic, with the US backing Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and in the 2020s the tension was at an even higher point than usual. A key sticking point is nuclear weapons. Though an agreement was signed by the liberal American administration of Barack Obama in 2015, after the election of right-winger Donald Trump the US withdrew from this, claiming that Iran was still developing some nuclear missiles. In 2026, Trump accused Iran of restarting its nuclear programme. There was a military build-up of troops, but also some negotiations.
Donald Trump began a war with Iran over nuclear weapons At the same time, the domestic situation was not rosy for Khamanei either. There were huge protests against him almost habitually, due to corruption, autocracy, human rights violations, especially against women, and economic crises. The US, Israel, and wider West would support the protesters, and sanctions made the economic situation even worse. Not only does Iran have terrible relations with the West, its relations with its neighbours are also bad, with many Arab states siding with the Americans over them. Eventually, the US and Israel struck on 28 February 2026, in what was called Operation Epic Fury by the US and Operation Roaring Lion by Iran (a reference to the Iranian monarchist opposition flag). Iran has attacked several countries hosting US or allied bases in countries like Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The war continues at the time of writing. However, Khamenei’s life does not, with Israeli strikes killing him, a massive success of Israeli and American intelligence.
Ali Khamenei ruled Iran from 1989 to his assassination by Israel in 2026 A direct consequence of this was the need to elect a new Supreme Leader. Iran has a President, but the office of Supreme Leader is above this, making it the only country that has a President who is not head of state. Although it is elected, on both previous occasions there was no actual competition. In 1979, Khomeini was mentioned in the constitution and there was no election. And he designated Khamenei as his successor, even changing the constitution because Khamenei had not reached a sufficiently high religious rank. With Khamenei at age 86 at the time of his death, speculation as to his successor for years. The position is elected by the Assembly of Experts, a de facto upper house where members are elected but candidates are strongly vetted by the Guardian Council, a body chosen by the Supreme Leader. In Iran, there is a ‘reformist’ political movement, but the odds are stacked against them and they are often disqualified from this position. Their mandate is conditional of the Guardian Council’s continued approval, but in practice they are basically a dictator for life. However, after Khamenei’s death the successor was not obvious. In fact, the Assembly of Experts actually had to consider their selection. Many complained of pressure from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Though Iran has a traditional military, the IRGC is a second military force protecting the Islamic republic specifically. This allows them to prevent foreign interference, but also internal political movements that deviate from the revolution’s principles. Because of this, they have an extreme amount of power and influence. The IRGC pressure on members to elect Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, who was a member of that body. His political position however was not senior, being his father’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs.
Matters-o-Meter: Given the way the war is going, there may not be a Supreme Leader or Islamic Republic at all for much longer. However, Mojtaba Khamenei was announced as the new Supreme Leader, and is considered even more hardline that his father. Israel immediately said that he was now a target (in fact, they said any successor would be). Trump said that he wants to choose the new leader. It should be noted that in Venezuela, where the US abducted rather than killed a leader, they have tried to get close to the regime’s constitutional successor instead of install a pro-Western one. Despite this, the Iran situation is different, with Israel in particular being completely opposed to the existence of the Islamic Republic. It is hard to see if this election will mean too many changes for Iran because they are in a wartime state in a war they cannot win with no state allies and it is quite hard to see what will happen that would let Mojtaba Khamenei have a tenure as long as either of his predecessors. 6/10
On 3 March, Arkansas’ 26th Senate District held a special election. The US has two major parties, the governing right-wing Republican Party and the liberal Democratic Party in opposition. Arkansas is a Republican stronghold, and the 26th District is no different. Gary Stubblefield (R), the incumbent, died. In the last election, he was elected unopposed.
Matters-o-Meter: This seat in the west of the state will not get much headlines. Businessmen Wade Dunn and Brad Simon came through the five-person Republican primary to a runoff, which Simon won. He only faced independent farmer Adam Watson because the Democrats did not even bother here, and won 69% of the vote. 2/10
On the same date, Arkansas’ 70th House District also held a special election. Incumbent Carlton Wing (R) resigned to become director of Arkansas TV, the state-run media. This election was close in 2024, with Wing defeating Democrat Alex Holladay with just 50.1% of the vote.
Matters-o-Meter: In the northern part of the Little Rock metropolitan area, this is a close seat with physical therapist Bo Renshaw the only Republican candidate, and Holladay easily winning the Democratic primary. I wrote before the vote: “Holladay definitely has a chance here, but even if he wins, the Republicans still hold eighty of the legislature’s 100 seats.” Indeed, it was a Democratic flip with Holladay winning 57.4% of the vote. 2/10
On the same date, Massachusetts’ 1st Middlesex Senate District had a special election. Massachusetts has long been a paragon of liberalism, not voting for a Democratic candidate for President until 1912 despite being an original colony. As the parties switched, it has voted for a Democrat for President in every election since 1988, and the Senate is dominated by Democrats. This election was caused by the death of incumbent Edward J. Kennedy (D). He won the last election easily with 63.4% of the vote.
Matters-o-Meter: The most interesting thing I learned about this election was that Massachusetts gives its constituencies actual names, a rarity in American politics. Vanna Howard, a member of the lower house, won the race for the Dems with 58.2%, with Republican Sam Meas (23.0%) and independent Joseph Espinola (18.6%) facing her. 2/10
On 5 March, there was a general election in Nepal. I already gave a history in the yearly preview article, but I will give a rundown as it is impossible to understand Nepal’s political forces without understanding the country’s modern history. Bouncing between constitutional and absolute monarchy, it had the latter Panchayat system from 1962 to 1990 banning political parties in the conventional sense, and this led to protests in the People’s Movement, made up of the democratic Nepali Congress and the left-wing United Left Front (ULF). The ULF’s various factions merged into the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN (UML)). The Panchayat system went, restoring constitutional monarchy, but hardliners wanted a full republic and went underground, forming the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (Maoist)). There was a civil war between the government and the Maoists, starting in 1996. The parliamentary system was unstable, especially with King Gyanendra continuing to intervene, and in 2005 he performed a self-coup, leading to protests, and the Seven Party Alliance which included both main parliamentary parties abolishing the monarchy and signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Maoists, leading to elections in 2008 for a Constituent Assembly. There was now a three-party system made up of the Congress, CPN (UML), and Maoists.
A bloke celebrating the republic being proclaimed in 2008 What seemed to happen after this was a sort of perpetual coalition between two of the three parties, like the three warring states in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Both communist parties have accepted democracy, using socialist language to explain why liberal democracy is actually great while keeping words like “Leninist” and “Maoist” in their name. The CPN (UML) called Nepal’s specific case a People’s Multiparty Democracy, while Maoist ideology, called Prachanda Path after its leader (real name Pushpa Kamal Dahal, meaning ‘fierce’), notes that Nepal should be a “21st century democracy” instead of a “bourgeois” one. The first Constituent Assembly failed to get a constitution passed but they finally managed in 2015. The three-party system leads to various forms of chaos, where an elected parliament will often have four or five different governments in its term as one of the parties changes ally. The CPN (Maoist) hoovered up smaller parties, becoming the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and then the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). After the 2017 election, the Maoist Centre and CPN (UML) formed a coalition, and then merged into the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), with Dahal and CPN (UML) leader K. P. Sharma Oli as co-leaders of the new party, with the latter as PM. This, predictably, led to fallings-out: Dahal accused Oli of insubordination to the party, while Oli said Dahal was interfering in the running of his government. In 2021, a procedural issue meant that the parties merger was annulled anyway, and they didn’t resume the merger.
Chinese state-media and communists the world over excitedly reacted to the formation of the NCP, but it didn’t last The last election was held in 2022. Twelve parties won seats in the 275-member Parliament. The Congress won 89, with the CPN (UML) on 78 and an alliance between the Maoist Centre and the Nepal Socialist Party (NSP) won 32. The NSP was a splinter from the People’s Socialist Party, Nepal (PSP-N), which mostly stands for the Madheshi population, that being Nepal’s minorities. The centrist Rastriya Swatantra Party (National Independence Party, RSP) won twenty seats with the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (National Democratic Party, RPP), representing the monarchist and Hindu nationalist forces, winning fourteen seats, and the PSP-N winning twelve. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist) (CPN (US)), a CPN (UML) split led by former PM Madhav Kumar Nepal, who was closer to Dahal during the NCP days causing a rift between him and Oli. Another Madheshi party, the Janamat Party (Public Opinion Party) won six seats, while the Loktantrik Samajwadi Party, Nepal (Democratic Socialist Party, Nepal, LSP-N), a PSP-N split, won four. Another PSP-N split, the Nagrik Unmukti Party (People’s Freedom Party, NUP) won three, while two parties won one seat. The Nepal Workers Peasants Party (NWPP) follows Juche (the ideology of North Korea), while a different communist party, the Rastriya Janamorcha (National People’s Front) also won a seat. Add five independents and you have a crowded parliament.
A splintered parliament in Nepal To be fair, there were pre-election alliances, and only two governments before the 2025 revolution. A national unity government led by Dahal took power, but the coalition changed hands a few time. Initially, it was made up of the CPN (UML), the Maoist Centre, the RSP, RPP, the PSP-N, the Janamat Party, and the NUP. In 2023, the Maoists supported the Congress candidate for the ceremonial presidency, thus leading to the CPN (UML) and RPP leaving the government, with a Congress/Maoist Centre/PSP-N/CPN (US)/Janamat/LSP-N/NUP/Rastriya Janamorcha alliance being formed for the presidential election, and those eight plus the RSP forming the new government. However, the Janamat Party soon left because they thought they had an insufficient amount of portfolios (but then rejoined). These parties do not share an ideology, and all sorts of compromises were made to keep everyone happy. It shows that in Nepal, the important thing is securing the support of various patronage networks, and thus despite many having revolutionary names, it has felt like something of a cartel. In 2024, the Congress abandoned Dahal, and agreed a rotation government for the rest of the term between Oli and Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba. However, this government would not last long enough for Deuba to get his sixth go at the premiership, because of a protest movement in 2025.
Student demonstrations started peacefully but led to the overthrow of the government Oli’s government decided to force various multinational social networks to register under new rules, ostensibly to raise taxes on them. However, this just so happened to be when a trend criticising “nepo babies”, those relatives of politicians who had obscene wealth in an impoverished country and were happy to flex it. Not only that, but because of the state of the country, which relies on remittances from abroad, many young Nepalis relied on social media to find this work (which was often informal), in a country where the median age is 25. This led to big protests against the government. The protesters did not have a leader and decided on an online chatroom that, after Oli had resigned due to the chaos, that former Chief Justice Sushila Karki should form an interim government. She did so (becoming the first female PM) and the House was dissolved leading to new elections.
Interim PM Sushila Karki was chosen by a Discord poll Those who read the February article will feel this is very familiar. After all, Bangladesh’s government was also overthrown by “Gen Z protests”. However, there are some key differences with Bangladesh. Bangladesh was a dictatorship, with the same woman and party ruling the country with an iron fist since 2008. Nepal could be described as a cartel, a gerontocracy, corrupt, and so on, but it was not a dictatorship. Also, in Bangladesh, the PM was exiled (and sentenced to death in absentia), while the ruling party was banned. In Nepal, no such thing has happened. The old party system is still there. The Congress is still there, but Deuba is gone, handing power to longtime rival Gagan Thapa (who is a sprightly 49). However, Oli is still there for the CPN (UML). The Maoist Centre and NSP which ran together in 2022 formally merged in 2025, forming the Nepali Communist Party (not to be confused with the 2018-21 Nepal Communist Party, but with the same initials: NCP). Unsurprisingly, it took the CPN (US) with it, and is still led by Dahal. The RSP is expected to become a major force as well. It is led by Rabi Lamichhane, the former Deputy PM, but then-Mayor of Kathmandu Balen Shah was a major part of the protests and has huge support. Audaciously, he ran in Oli’s constituency.
Balen Shah The RPP and PSP-N are still there as well, as are the Janamat Party, but the LSP-N merged back into the PSP-N. It seems that the bulk of the NUP has formed a new Nagrik Unmukti Party, Nepal (NUP-N, People’s Liberation Party, Nepal) and has formed an alliance with other Madheshi parties. The Rastriya Janamorcha is also running.
Prediction: This is what I wrote before the election: “This election is almost impossible to predict. There aren’t polls, only vibes, but the international media seems to think it’s a three-way contest between the Congress, CPN (UML) and RSP, which would be a huge change as one of the three big parties is different (with the NCP being the big losers), but still not an overhaul of the system. To be honest, I could see, for instance, an RSP majority, but I’ll predict a hung Parliament. The three parties each represent something different. CPN (UML), led by Oli, who was accused of leading suppression to the protests as PM, represents centralised strong leadership and the old networks. The new Congress of Thapa represents gradually reforming the country. Finally, the RSP represents throwing everything out and starting from scratch. Subplots include the various minor and regional parties, and a rift in the RSP. Leader Lamichhane will struggle to keep a leash on Balen who is a rapper by trade and still speaks like one, being Nepal’s very own populist. This is a big one in a country whose geography makes it impossible for the big powers to ignore.”
In fact, I was wrong, with the RSP winning a majority, something I merely said I “could see” happening. They won 182 of 275 seats. The Congress was down to 38, the CPN (UML) down to 25, and the NCP down to seventeen. For minor parties, there was a new Shram Sanskriti Party (SSP, Labour Culture Party), formed by the former independent mayor of Dharan Harka Sampang who rose to prominence during the protests as a key leader. It won seven seats while the RPP won five and there was one independent (backed by the RSP). The PSP-N, Janamat Party, NWPP, and Rastriya Janamorcha lost all their seats. Thus, Balen Shah, a populist rapper known for his big mouth, has the keys to Nepal in a way that no man has since the days of monarchy: in a majority government.
On 7 March, the constituency of Nightcliff in Australia’s Northern Territory held a by-election. Australia, previously a collection of British colonies, federated in 1901, becoming an independent country within the British Empire (and then the Commonwealth). It inherited many parts of the old country’s political system, and federally, there was initially a Labor, Protectionist, and Free Trade party, somewhat analogous to the UK’s Labour, Liberal, and Conservative. The Protectionist Party split in the late 1900s, with the right merging into the Free Trade Party to form the Commonwealth Liberal Party (today, simply the Liberal Party), and the left merging into Labor. Australia’s two-party system was finalised by the emergence of the rural-based Country Party (today the National Party) in the 1920s, which has been in perpetual Coalition with the Liberals, and with the Liberals always as the senior member, at least at the federal level. After twelve years of Coalition rule, Australia has been led since 2022 by Labor PM Anthony Albanese, who was re-elected in 2025. Labor won a huge landslide with 94 seats of 150, the Coalition won 43, the left-wing Greens won one, the regional Katter’s Australian Party (Queensland) and Centre Alliance (South Australia) also won one each and independents won ten.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese The Northern Territory is not a state, being a federally-controlled territory since 1911, and this was mainly because it was mostly populated by Aboriginal Australians at that time, who were basically considered unworthy of self-governance. Today, most powers have been devolved anyway so it is functionally similar for a state. Still, it is noted for its high Aboriginal population, although with about 17.5% of the area of Australia it has less than 1% of the total population, with the capital city of Darwin being linked to the state of South Australia by the “Stuart Highway”, which pretty much any relevant urban settlement needs to be near to survive. The majority of the population live in Darwin. A colonial-style semi-elected legislature without many powers existed for many years, before the federal government allowed proper elections in 1974 and self-government in 1978. Thus, despite there being some legal and stylistic differences (for instance, the leader is the Chief Minister instead of the Premier), it is not so different from a state in practice. The party system is a bit different in the Territory. Labor had always contested elections there, but the Country Party sprung up when elections became more serious in the 1960s. Whatever did exist of the Liberals were weak, but the parties “merged” in the Territory when the Territory’s Country Party renamed itself to the Country Liberal Party (CLP). They are still part of the federal Coalition, and elected representatives can choose to be part of the Liberal or National caucus. For the rest of the 20th century, the CLP was completely dominant in the Territory, dominating Labor in every election. With their dominance, there was a sentiment of arrogance. In 1998, the territory shockingly voted down a proposal to become a full state in a rebuke to both the CLP government and the federal one, because despite supporting the statehood the exact terms of it were considered disrespectful. This was followed by Labor winning power for the first time in 2001. Since then, it’s fair to say Labor has actually been the dominant party in the Northern Territory. They lost power in 2012 but won it straight back in 2016, winning re-election in 2020. However, in the latest election in 2024 they lost power for only the second time in their history after a chaotic term where elected CM Michael Gunner retired in 2022 and his replacement Natasha Fyles was brought down by a conflict-of-interest scandal. The CLP won seventeen seats of 25 and Labor were brought down to just four, with the Greens getting their first seat there and independents winning three. Eva Lawler was replaced by Lia Finocchiaro as Chief Minister.
Lia Fioncchiaro Despite this, the national picture seems rosy for Labor, and in the 2025 federal election both NT seats went to them. It is fair to say that the place is not somewhere that national politicians particularly care about that much anyway. This is the first by-election of the 2024 to 2028 parliamentary term. The Nightcliff constituency has existed from the start, and historically was quite close. In the 1974 vote where Labor failed to win a seat, an independent named Dawn Lawrie beat both a CLP and Labor candidate in a tight three-way race. She lost her seat to the CLP’s Stephen Hatton in 1983. Hatton was CM from 1986 to 1988, and generally didn’t have too much trouble keeping his seat. In 2001 Hatton retired, and in an upset his son Jason Hatton lost it to Labor’s Jane Aagaard as the party took power for the first time, with Aagaard serving as speaker from 2005 to 2012. In 2012 (the election the CLP won power again), Fyles held on pretty easily, showing the place as a pretty safe Labor seat. After their landslide win in 2016, Fyles was made Health Minister and Attorney-General, reprising the former role after their win in 2020. As previously noted, she became CM in 2022 before resigning in 2023 because of undeclared shareholdings leading to conflict-of-interest, which was embarrassing for both her and Labor. Despite this, she ran again in 2024.
Former CM and Labor MLA Natasha Fyles At the 2024 election, there was a close four-way race in the constituency between Fyles, the CLP’s Helen Secretary, the Greens’ Kat McNamara, and independent Mililma May, and indigenous rights activists. Though they went in that order on the first-preference vote, May’s preferences shifted to McNamara who beat Fyles by 36 votes in a big upset. It is true that the Green presence had been growing for some time with the party getting at least 15% of the vote in every election since 2016. However, she resigned in 2026 due to health issues. The Green candidate this time is Suki Dorras-Walker, a former teacher, while Labor have gone with Darwin Cllr. Ed Smelt, and the CLP have selected Anjan Paudel. Finally, “teal independent” Phil Scott is running. If you wondered why there were so many independents in the federal parliament, it is mostly because of the teals, which target urban and suburban Liberal seats as sort of progressive centrists (notably, Scott is something of an outsider by being male), combining environmentalist green with Liberal blue to make their colour. Dorras-Walker ran for the bordering Fannie Bay constituency in 2024 and lost to a CLP candidate by 37 votes. Scott ran for the Solomon seat in the 2024 federal election, which covers the whole Darwin area and garnered an eighth of the vote, coming third ahead of the Greens, something not to be sniffed at. Nightcliff itself is a suburb of Darwin and considered a relatively well-of and prosperous one.
Matters-o-Meter: I wrote that:
“The CLP won a huge majority in 2024, and I suppose its an interesting mid-term test. But this electorate ultimately has just 6,000 people in one of the most forgotten parts of the country. Australia’s federal politics are having a huge upheaval as the right-wing populist party Pauline Hanson’s One Nation attempts to overtake the Coalition as the main party of the right. That will get the headlines while the by-election will only really matter to people in the Territory (indeed, even general elections aren’t a big deal outside it, especially compared with state votes). Still, it’s a competitive seat which will be interesting to crunch the numbers on.”
In fact, the Greens gained primary vote share with Dorras-Walker on 34.0%, perhaps due to the absence of a left-wing independent like May, while Labor (28.6%) and the CLP (20.0%) had small losses of around 4% each. The teal independent Scott won 17.5%. However, as the preferences flowed in favour of Smelt, he won with 51.6%, a gain for Labor and a big setback for the territory Greens, who lost their only seat that they had won in 2024. 3/10
On 8 March, Colombia held its parliamentary election. Through the long twentieth century, Colombian politics has been dominated by the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, including a civil war between the two in 1948 known as La Violencia (The Violence). Even after this, there has always been some level of insurgency involving drug cartels and all sorts of left- and right-wing paramilitaries (some of which also are cartels). The most important one, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was left-wing, founded by communists and also some Liberals opposed to reconciliation with the Conservatives after La Violencia. After a peace process failed, Álvaro Uribe split from the Liberals and was elected President in 2002 on a platform of a hard line against FARC. This killed the two-party system. Uribe was re-elected in 2006, but term-limited in 2010, leading to his successor Juan Manuel Santos being elected. Santos preferred negotiation with FARC, and leading to criticism from Uribe, who founded his own “Democratic Centre” party, which won power in 2018 under Iván Duque.
Álvaro Uribe, and some sort of protégé of his won every election from 2002 to 2018 There is an oddity of the Colombian system that the parliamentary election is held late into a presidential term, and thus the last one was in the dying days of the Duque presidency. Because of newly-strengthened term limits, Duque couldn’t run again, and the Democratic Centre endorsed the more moderate Federico Gutiérrez (even though Uribe was an ex-Liberal, it is clearly a right-wing party). Gutiérrez didn’t even make the runoff, behind the eccentric businessman Rodolfo Hernández Suárez who became the main right-wing candidate because of a spirited campaign that earned him the moniker “King of TikTok”. The leader was the left-winger Gustavo Petro, who lost to Duque in 2018 but won a close race in 2022. He has relied on the Liberals and Santos’ Party of the U, meaning his Humane Colombia has had to moderate somewhat. Anyway, he is term-limited, so this election will mark a “lame duck” period with the presidential race in May.
Gustavo Petro’s official portrait There are only 172 seats in the Colombian lower house, and five were given to FARC’s successor, the Commons party, as part of the peace agreement, plus the speaker. There were also two seats each for Afro-Colombians and expatriates, and one for the indigenous, meaning 161 MPs get ‘normal’ seats. Despite this, seven parties registered in the double figures, making a fractured parliament. 32 MPs are Liberals, and 28 are from Petro’s Historic Pact for Colombia, with 25 Conservatives. Sixteen each are from the Democratic Centre and the right-wing Radical Change party, seen as allies of Uribe. Fifteen are from the Union Party for the People, the official name of the Party of the U since Uribe left, and eleven for the Green Alliance, an alternative left-wing party.
Prediction: I wrote that:
“Most are focused on the presidential vote in two months, but the Historic Pact will be the largest party is my nod. Their candidate, Iván Cepeda won his parties primary and is ahead in May polls, which should translate to support for the party here.”
This did happen, with 33 seats for the Historic Pact, 26 for the Liberals, 24 for the Democratic Centre, eighteen for the Conservatives, twelve for the Party of the U and nine for Radical Change. It should be noted that the actual numbers will be a bit higher as some local coalitions are tallied separately (such as four seats for a Historic Pact-Green Alliance coalition). The focus now will be squarely on May.
On the same date, Switzerland held a set of four referendums. Switzerland has held referenda regularly every year, and they are not always considered a party political event. The Swiss Parliament has ten parties, with the largest being the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party (SVP), and the centre-left Socialist Party is second. The Centre, a conservative party, is third, with The Liberals in fourth, and then the Green Party of Switzerland (GPS), with the centre-right Green Liberal Party (GLP) in sixth and four parties on one or two seats. However, in Switzerland, there is a permanent coalition known as the ‘magic formula’, with a seven-person Federal Council, which is meant to represent both the parties and also the different linguistic regions of a country with four official languages. Currently, the SVP, Socialists, and Liberals get two seats each, with The Centre on one seat. The Federal Council is basically the prime minister as a collective, with a rotating President to be head of state of the country. Despite this unique system, politics is still tightly contested.
A famous Internet meme comparing Switzerland to Brazil, with the Swiss political system confusing compared to Brazil, even though Switzerland is a more developed country As well as being mandates for some important things like changes to the constitution, referendums can be triggered by getting 50,000 signatures against the law, or 100,000 in favour of whatever you want. There are four referenda here:
- Capping the license fee at CHF 200 and exempting other companies than the state channel from it
- Requiring married couples to file separate tax returns
- Creating a federal climate fund
- Guaranteeing cash remains in circulation
Matters-o-Meter: These are hardly fundamental things which will change Switzerland, but these are obviously quite important domestic issues. Despite this, they perhaps do not have too much relevance on the world stage. The constitutional referendum on guaranteeing cash failed (45.6%), but a counterproposal from the government which guaranteed cash but did not enshrine it in the constitution, to keep policy more flexible, did pass (73.4%). The climate fund (29.2%) and license fee (38.1%) referenda failed, while the individual taxation initiative passed (54.3%). 3/10
On the same date, the state of Baden-Württemberg in Germany held its election. Germany’s current political system ultimately dates back to 1949, when after defeat in World War II the country was split into West Germany, with a liberal system, and communist East Germany. BW ended up in West Germany. Given Germany’s history with splits between Catholicism and Protestantism, a new non-denominational Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) was formed as the main conservative party in most of the country, while Bavaria, which has an autonomous streak, instead had the slightly more conservative Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU). They are two separate parties, with the CDU running in BW, but in federal elections their seat totals are added together (sometimes known as the Union). Meanwhile, the pre-war Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) was reformed as the main centre-left party. The CDU and SPD both moved towards the centre in their history. The classical liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) was a kingmaker in Germany. In general, the Union were the ‘natural governing party’ with the SPD still having periods of governance federally, but the CDU were completely dominant in BW, sometimes having a majority on their own. Every Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg from 1953 to 2011 was from the CDU party, including Kurt Georg Kiesinger who served from 1958 to 1966, and then stepped down to become the country’s Chancellor (PM) from 1966 to 1969.
Kurt Georg Keisinger was leader of both the state and the country In this time, there were still changes in the West German system. The Greens got seats in BW in their debut in 1980, and federally in 1983. Now known as Alliance 90/The Greens after an alliance with an East German opposition party, they were originally very radical in both style and substance (being in opposition to nuclear power), but are now seen as a party of the moderate left, in a similar position to the SPD. East Germany was led by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), and that system fell in 1989 and 1990, with free elections in 1990. Most voted for East German versions of the CDU and SPD, but the SED rebranded to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), which was now going to use democratic methods to achieve goals to the left of the SPD and Greens. This party came third and remained a force in East Germany, and also had representation in the federal parliament after reunification. Thus, Germany had five main parties (counting the Union together). Though the PDS was irrelevant in former West Germany, the mid-2000s saw those to the left of the SPD-Green coalition break away and form Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (WASG). They formed a federal alliance with the PDS and then merged, leading to a more national party called simply Die Linke (The Left). There had always been parties to the right of the Union, but after the early years they fell away in West Germany. The Republicans was one post-reunification example, winning seats in the state parliament of BW in 1992 but being beset by eternal strife and falling out in 2001. However, after the migration crisis of 2015, the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) won seats, thus creating a six-party system (counting the CDU and CSU together).
Alternative for Germany is the most right-wing party in the federal parliament Despite the new parties, the Union and SPD remained the strongest two and the only ones who could lead the government. After a period out of power federally, Angela Merkel (CDU) took charge in the 2005 election in a ‘grand coalition’ with the defeated SPD. Merkel would govern until 2021, mostly with the SPD but with the FDP from 2009 to 2013. In BW, there were only four parties with the WASG missing out on the threshold. From 1996 to 2011 there was a CDU-FDP coalition, but a controversial redevelopment of a station, a project called Stuttgart 21 led to the rising popularity of The Greens and they overtook the SPD to be the second party in 2011. Even better for them, a Green-SPD coalition had a majority to install Winfried Kretschmann as Minister-President (the first Green to be in charge of any German state). Kretschmann was popular and the Greens were the leading party in 2016, but the AfD entered the state parliament and came third (ahead of the SPD and FDP), with large losses for the CDU and SPD costing the coalition its majority despite gains for the Greens. Thus, a Green-CDU coalition was formed. In 2021, the Greens were winners again as the AfD slid to fifth, and the coalition was reformed. The results were: Green 58, CDU 42, SPD nineteen, FDP eighteen, AfD seventeen. It may feel strange that he chose the CDU over the SPD and FDP, but the state Greens are more conservative than the progressive federal party: Kretschmann considers himself a ‘green conservative’ and has sometimes been at odds with the federal party.
Merkel retired at the 2021 federal election leading to a decline for the Union and the SPD coming first under Olaf Scholz, who was seen to have performed well as Finance Minister during COVID-19. At that election, the Greens were seen as a genuine force to win, but their campaign underperformed. However, they still made big gains to come third, leading to an SPD-Green-FDP ‘traffic light’ coalition. The traffic-light coalition struggled somewhat with the recovery from COVID-19 and the rise in energy costs due to the Ukraine War. This led to significant losses for all parties in the federal election: the Union rose to first with 208 seats (164 for the CDU and 44 for the CSU), with the AfD overtaking the SPD to second, on 152 seats to 120 for the SPD. The Greens won 85, with Die Linke on 64, a good performance for them. A split from Die Linke known as the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), representing the radical left’s more conservative impulses, narrowly failed to meet the threshold, while the FDP were trounced and lost all seats. Friedrich Merz formed a grand coalition between the Union and SPD. Generally, federal polling has the Union narrowly ahead of the AfD, with the SPD in third, the Greens and Left battling for fourth, and the BSW and FDP still out.
Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) Kretschmann retired at the election, and The Greens have gone with Cem Özdemir as leader, who was Minister of Food and Agriculture in the Scholz cabinet. Özdemir also served as federal Green co-leader from 2008 to 2018 (the party has two leaders, one of each gender), and is a prominent state and federal figure. He is generally quite popular and has kept Kretschmann’s tradition as a conservative green up, saying the market must be an ally in the fight against climate change. That said, the end of such a popular figure as Kretschmann gave the CDU an opportunity, with Manuel Hagel as its candidate. Hagel has been in the Landtag since 2016 and has led the state party since 2023, also leading negotiations for the federal grand coalition with the SPD regarding digital policy. Andreas Stoch will try to lead the SPD out of its malaise, with Hans-Ulrich Rülke the leader of the FDP. The main thing these parties are hoping for is survival and a coalition. Meanwhile, the AfD is led by Markus Frohnmaier, seen as a right-wing firebrand even for the party’s standards and known for his links to Russia.
Matters-o-Meter: I wrote: “This is a key test for the main German parties in both the state and the country as a whole. The Greens will find it tough to stay ahead of the CDU this time, with polls suggesting the two are neck-and-neck with a slight lead for the latter. Meanwhile, the AfD could double their 2021 vote share with the SPD expected to make modest losses. The FDP should stay above the 5% threshold but if they don’t it would be catastrophic. Also, The Left should enter the Landtag for the first time. Özdemir is more popular than Hagel, which makes me think that even if the CDU come first, the same coalition will be activated, even if an alternative such as CDU-SPD-FDP is mathematically possible. Though other countries have eased opposition to the far-right, Germany’s history means the firewall with the AfD, though debated, remains in tact: no party will do a deal with them. Overall, the main stories will be expected to be the win for the CDU (or disappointment if they lose) and the loss of the first Green Minister-Presidency, the rise for the AfD, the entry of The Left (or not) and the unlikely event of the FDP dropping out. I actually think the last one, though unlikely is the most important, because if the states begin to fall then the party could genuinely risk losing its place as one of the relevant parties in German politics.”
In fact, the Greens narrowly had a higher PR vote share, and both them and the CDU won the same 56 seats. The AfD won 35, and the SPD ten, with Die Linke falling short and the FDP also missing out. Because all the other parties have a policy of no business with the AfD, the only mathematically feasible coalition is Green-CDU. It was a pretty good result for The Greens as most polls suggested the CDU would be slightly bigger, and it allows Özdemir to become Minister-President (the first German Turk to do so), while Hagel will presumably get a big portfolio. Though this is the best result for the AfD in ex-West Germany, they may be a bit disappointed not to meet the 20% mark as it became a battle between the Greens and CDU. The SPD is struggling to stay relevant, but it should be noted that they never led this state. The Left failed to make a breakthrough, and as I said previously it is very worrying times for the FDP. 6/10
On 10 March, Georgia’s 14th congressional district in the US held what turned out to be the first round in a special election (for the federal lower house). As previously stated on this blog, Georgia like many Southern states was traditionally blue (Democratic), and then red (Republican). However, due to an increase in the urban population moving to the Democrats, and an increasing black population, the state is now considered a red-leaning purple state, which dramatically voted for Joe Biden in 2020. The 14th district though is in deep red Northwest Georgia, and incumbent Marjorie Taylor Greene won with 64.4% of the vote in 2024. Greene was considered the closest thing to the anti-Christ by Democrats (in fact, many probably hated her more than the actual anti-Christ) due to being on the extreme right of politics. This included certain conspiracy theories, which turned her against President Donald Trump (R) when Trump was connected to the Epstein files, which showed various elites in contact with convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. Greene also turned against Trump’s interventionist foreign policy. Knowing that Trump would pick a primary opponent to try and have a more loyal Republican in the upcoming election, Greene resigned in 2026.
Marjorie Taylor Greene was considered one of the most right-wing members of Congress and even turned against President Donald Trump This election used the jungle primary system, there were twelve Republicans, three Democrats, and two others in the election, with the top two candidates advancing unless one got a majority.
Matters-o-Meter: Trump endorsed state attorney Clayton Fuller, and despite there being some murmurs that voters may want to go with Greene’s maverick streak, Fuller (34.9%) clearly advanced alongside Shawn Harris (37.3%), the 2024 Democratic candidate and by far the most prominent. Although Harris came first in this round, it will be tough for him to win because his margin was narrow and nearly all the other candidates are Republicans who should vote for Fuller in the general. 3/10
On the same day, Georgia’s 53rd Senate District held the first round of a special election. Incumbent Colton Moore (R) was elected with 78.8% of the vote last time in this Northwest Georgia seat. Moore was somewhat similar to Greene in his tendency to cause controversy for his radical opinions, even amongst Republicans. Moore ran to replace Greene, and was seen as basically the candidate for those who wanted another Greene. He came third but got about one third of the vote as the Trump-endorsed Fuller.
Matters-o-Meter: Anyway, three Republicans (Denise Pierce Burns, Blake Elsberry, and Lanny Thomas) and one Democrat (Jack Zibluck) ran, and Thomas and Zibluck advanced, with Thomas going to clearly win next month’s runoff. 2/10
On the same date, Georgia’s 94th House District held the first round of a special election. This black-majority district had elected Karen Bennett (D) in every race since 2012, and she was opposed in 2024. However, she resigned after moving away from the area.
Matters-o-Meter: There were four candidates here, but all were Democrats: Kelly Kautz, Audrey Taylor Lux, Venola Mason, and Ikenna Emmanuel Ugwumandu. Therefore, the party was guaranteed to win. Kautz and Mason advanced to the runoff. 2/10
On the same date, Georgia’s 130th House District also held a special election. This is a diverse seat in the Augusta area, and incumbent Lynn Gladney (D), now Lynn Heffner, did not face opposition in 2024.
Matters-o-Meter: There were four Democrats (Sha’qunta “Q” Calles, Karen Gordon, Sheila Nelson, and Lafawn S. Pinkley-Mealing) and two Republicans (David Carson and Thomas McAdams) here. Nelson is the previous representative but did not run for re-election in 2022, being replaced by Gladney. Anyway, this will be a Democratic hold; even with no incumbent Gladney won with 67.3% of the vote in 2022. Nelson and McAdams advanced to the runoff. 2/10
On the same date, New Hampshire’s House District Carroll 7 held a special election. New Hampshire has a massive, 400-member House for some reason, with a mix of single-member and multi-member district, Carroll 7 is the former. New Hampshire was a Republican stronghold from the start, voting for them in every election from their 1856 debut until the 1912 election, when the party was split. It became a Republican-leaning bellwether, voting for Gerald Ford in 1976 but then choosing the winner in every race from 1980 to 2004, where it chose losing Democrat John Kerry. It has been blue ever since, but not deep blue, and in fact Republicans control the state house. Incumbent Glenn Cordelli (R) is moving out of state after serving since 2012.
Matters-o-Meter: Republican Dale Fincher was expected to beat Democrat Bobbi Boudman. However, in an upset, Boudman won with 51.9% of the vote, a win by just 165 ballots. 2/10
On 14 March, Antipolo’s 2nd congressional district in the Philippines had a special election. The Philippines is a country where political party is less important than force of personality. The country has had democracy since 1986, when dictator Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown in the People Power Revolution. Marcos was elected President in 1965 but had ruled as a dictator since 1972. Despite being a dictator, he was challenged by Corazon Aquino in 1986, the widow of an opposition senator, Ninoy Aquino, who had been assassinated in 1983 and who had his fight taken up by his wife. Aquino was initially reported to have lost by the electoral commission (albeit narrowly) but after the revolution the opposition-reported results were taken as legitimate and Aquino became President. After parliamentary elections, Aquino’s party vehicle formed for the elections was dissolved and split up into various groups. Every president since has been from a different party, and prominent figures reshape parties. In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte from PDP-Laban, (Philippine Democratic Party-People’s Power, they dropped the Laban in 2024 and are now just the PDP or Partido Demokratiko Pilipino) was elected President. The PDP-Laban was considered somewhat left of centre, but Duterte was a populist whose ideology was hard to define on the left-right spectrum, but was probably more to the right in many ways. PDP-Laban, overnight, became the Duterte party.
Rodrigo Duterte served as president from 2016 to 2022 Bongbong Marcos, son of Ferdinand Marcos, was elected President in 2022 (Presidents cannot run for re-election in the Philippines, to try and prevent a repeat of strongmen), from the Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (Federal Party of the Philippines, PFP). They managed to tap up Marcos to be their candidate even though he wasn’t a party member, and he swapped sides. Again, the PFP basically became the Marcos party. This type of thing is not uncommon at all, as politicians swap parties constantly. Duterte’s daughter Sara Duterte was Marcos’ running mate in 2022, and has her own Lakas-CMD (People Power-Christian and Muslim Democrats) party. The PFP and Lakas-CMD formed an alliance called UniTeam for the election. In 2025, the mid-term election was held, and indeed most voters switched from the PDP to the PFP or Lakas-CMD.
President Bongbong Marcos (PFP) Because of this, and the fact that both Dutertes and Marcos are quite popular, most MPs who probably owe their election to family ties and geographic history side with the government, leading to a very small opposition. Five parties formed the Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas (Alliance for a new Philippines) for the midterm election in 2025, and they were the top five. This included both Lakas-CMD and the PFP, as well as the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), National Unity Party (NUP), and Nacionalista Party (Nationalist Party). In 2010, the ex-police higher-up Romeo Acop was elected as an independent in a tight race, but never found it hard again. He joined the Liberal Party, PDP-Laban, and NUP, and voters stayed with him, more proof that voters pick surname over party name there, and he was elected unopposed in 2025. He served from 2010 to his death in 2025, except 2019 to 2022 where he was term-limited and his wife Resurreccion Acop held the seat.
Matters-o-Meter: The NUP candidate is the Acops’ son Bong Acop, a former councillor. Because of this, I couldn’t see it being competitive, and the government has a huge majority anyway. Indeed, Acop won with 71.9% of the vote against five independents. 2/10
On the same date, Louisiana’s 3rd Senate district held the second round of a special election. Louisiana is another Southern ex-blue state that never voted Republican in any vote from 1880 until finally doing so in 1956. However, it voted for segregationist candidates in 1948 and 1968, and turned red with the party switch, voting Republican every time from 2000, being considered safe Republican. However, this seat is in the blue city of New Orleans, and is regularly held by Democrats. Joseph Bouie (D) was elected unopposed as an incumbent in 2023 but stepped down to become Chancellor of Southern University at New Orleans.
Matters-o-Meter: Only Democrats filed for the election with Sidney J. Barthelemy II and Kenn Barnes going to a runoff ahead of Chad Lauga and Jon Johnson. The party was guaranteed to hold the seat but remain a minority in the state. In the end, Barthelemy II won with 63.8% of the vote. 2/10
On the same day, Louisiana’s 69th House District held a special election. Incumbent Paula Davis (R) decided to call it a day after a decade representing the East Baton Rouge district, having been elected unopposed in 2023.
Matters-o-Meter: We knew that one of the three Republicans (Adam Beach, Lynn Coxe Graham, and Paul Sawyer) will be elected, with Democrat Angela Roberts in unfriendly territory. It was Sawyer, who managed to carve out a majority and avoid a runoff, with the other two Republicans getting small sums. 2/10
On the same day, Louisiana’s 100th House District had the second round of a special election. Incumbent Jason Hughes (D) resigned to join the New Orleans City Council.
Matters-o-Meter: Five Democrats ran here, with Kenya Rounds and Dana Henry advancing to the runoff ahead of Patricia Boyd Robertson, Aeisha Kelly, and Candice Taylor. Henry won a close race with 53.5% of the vote. 2/10
On 15 March, Kazakhstan held a constitutional referendum. Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union until 1991, when it became independent. The Soviet Union had one-party rule led by the Communist Party, and each individual part of the country had its own ruler. The last of these, Nursultan Nazarbayev, became a dictatorial leader of independent Kazakhstan too. Despite this, the opposition to his rule was never truly dealt with, especially when the economy was bad and in 2019 protests convinced him to resign. At first, it was unclear whether him leaving office meant he left power, with the new leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s first act to rename the capital city of Astana Nur-Sultan in his honour. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising little changed. Massive protests began in 2022 because the government lifted a fuel price cap, leading to huge inflation of the resource. These were put down after a request to deploy CSTO (a Russian-led equivalent of NATO of which Kazakhstan is a member) troops, but after this Tokayev changed course. He sidelined Nazarbayev (changing the capital’s name back) and declared himself a great reformer making changes to the constitution in a referendum in 2022.
Kassym Jomart-Tokayev has attempted to change his image from post-Soviet oligarch to democratic reformer, but not everyone is convinced for some reason! Tokayev’s reforms have not led to a vibrant democratic system. One can be generous and say that this is because it has no history of genuine parliamentarianism or similar, it is a country where most people in real opposition are outside the system. Therefore, it would take time for this type of thing to develop and grow. But there are signs of Russian-style politics, where there is a democratic system but no actual democracy, such as opposition parties that aren’t really in opposition, and candidates being disqualified for debatable procedural violations.
Matters-o-Meter: Still, it is interesting that Tokayev puts his reforms in liberal terms such as gender equality, judicial independence and environmentalism. I think the reason for this is that it is more likely to placate and give a sense of optimism for those hoping for a democratic Kazkhastan, not just domestically but in the West. Though in the post-Soviet world Kazakhstan has still been very close to Russia, Tokayev obviously will want to hedge his bets and give sops to Western countries which would also boost trade. This referendum may change Kazakhstan into a democratic country on par with Denmark or Germany, but it probably won’t. It passed easily with 89.9%. 4/10
On the same date, North Korea held a parliamentary election. North Korea is the one country that is used more than any as a by-word for dictatorship, and sometimes other ones, such as Eritrea or Turkmenistan, are called “the North Korea of Africa” or similar. The country’s creation was due to a postwar agreement between the US and Soviet Union, where both countries would control half of Korea (which had been annexed by Japan) until there could be a mutually agreed united government. However, the Soviet northern side boycotted UN-led elections, and held their own. The UN went ahead, and formed the Republic of Korea (South Korea), with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea being formed by the North. These two fought the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, but it landed in a stalemate which cemented the current borders, and despite some negotiations now and again North Korea remains an independent country, and one that formally dropped the aspiration of unification. The Soviets installed Kim Il Sung as the leader of the country, and, playing the Soviet Union and China against each other during the Sino-Soviet split, was able to gain complete control over the country, to the extent that the dictatorship became hereditary, being succeeded by his son Kim Jong Il in 1994 upon his death, and then Kim Jong Il in 2011.
Kim Il Sung set up a hereditary dictatorship No dictatorship in the world is more total than North Korea, where the entire country is set up to the religious cause of the ‘Great Leader’. There are still elections, which are considered a propaganda exercise, where every candidate is approved by the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), the ruling party which uses a modified form of Marxism-Leninism known as Juche. There are actually two allied parties, a legacy of the brief period between the end of the war and total control by the communists, which were then co-opted as allies. These are the Korean Social Democratic Party (KSDP) and the Chondoist Chongu Party (Party of the Young Friends of Chondoism, which is a religious movement), but their existence is mere trivia. They were united in the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea (DFRK), which was similar to other communist countries which allowed minor parties (including modern-day China). However, Kim Jong Un’s announcement that he would cease aspiring to a unified Korea meant the DFRK went. Despite this, all the organisations still exist without this unified alliance.
Matters-o-Meter: The WPK already had a party conference earlier this year, with the Parliament basically existing to rubber-stamp its decisions. The most information you will get is that “the composition of SPA deputies offers a window into the country’s political priorities based on the sectors represented” (SPA is the Supreme People’s Assembly, the parliament). This is interesting to North Korea analysts and experts, but no-one else. Results showed 99.9% of the vote in favour. 2/10
On the same date, the Republic of the Congo held a presidential election. This country achieved independence from France in 1960, and after a coup in 1968 it became the People’s Republic of Congo, with a one-party communist system under the Congolese Party of Labour (PCT) and President Marien Ngouabi. He was assassinated in 1977, and the designated successor Joachim Yhombi-Opango was pressured into resigning in 1979 by his own Vice President and Minister of Defence Denis Sassou Nguesso. However, seeing the writing on the wall with the fall of communism in Europe, he allowed multi-party elections in 1992 (and changed the country’s name back), which he lost. The new President, Pascal Lissouba, was worried of a coup by Sassou Nguessou, and had him arrested in 1997. Both men had founded militias, but Sassou Nguessou was backed by Angola because Lissouba supported the opposition in that country’s civil war, capturing the capital. Since then, Sassou Nguessou has ruled as a dictator again, winning 88.4% of the vote in the 2021 election.
Prediction: There is little to say here because it is not a competitive election. The main interest is whether Sassou Nguessou would run, because he is 82 and wants his son, Denis-Christel Sassou Nguessou to replace him. However, Denis decided to run, and he will win in the first round (big shock: this prediction was correct).
On the same date, Vietnam held parliamentary elections. Similar to North Korea, it is a communist system, with the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) above the state. However, the dictatorship is not as total as North Korea’s, and it is more of a party-based system than a dictatorial one. Different leaders have come and gone, varying somewhat in their attitude to the state’s role in the economy, but like China, never supporting political reform. Tô Lâm became the country’s leader in 2024 on the death of Nguyễn Phú Trọng who took charge in 2011.
Prediction: Similar to the DFRK, the CPV has its own united front called the Vietnamese Fatherland Front. This will win the election, obviously. There are interesting things happening in Tô Lâm’s Vietnam, such as the declining power of the military, but this election is not one of them, as it will mostly rubber-stamp what occurred in January’s Party Congress (this prediction was also shockingly correct).
On the same date, France held the first round of municipal elections. As previously stated on this blog, French politics is vaguely split into three groups. The government is the centre (or more strictly, centre-right) of President Emmanuel Macron, his Renaissance party, and its allies in the Ensemble (Together) coalition. To the right of this, there is the National Rally (RN) party, which has far-right origins but has moderated somewhat during the 2010s and 2020s as it gets closer to power. On the left, there is the New Popular Front (NFP), made up of several parties split into four ‘poles’ (with others that are not part of any pole): the populist left party La France Insoumise (LFI, France Unbowed) of Jean-Luc Mélénchon, the centre-left Socialist Party (PS), the French Communist Party (PCF) and The Ecologists, the country’s green party. There is also the conservative party The Republicans (LR), which was once very powerful but is squeezed between Renaissance and the RN. Macron won a landslide in 2017, but in being re-elected in 2022 he lost his parliamentary majority, and this has led to a political crisis where they rely on LR, and the occasional vote of the RN or NPF, to get anything through, leading to frequently changing Prime Ministers.
Matters-o-Meter: The national results will be somewhat confusing, because a lot of politicians in local government, as everywhere else, will not belong to any party or belong to local associations. Because of this, I will treat several major local elections to their own section in this article. However, the national result will be eagerly awaited by all of the major blocs. 5/10
On this date, the Metropolis of Lyon, which contains Lyon and its surrounding areas, had the first round of its local election. In 2020, the first direct election, the Ecologist Bruno Bernard defeated the Macronist incumbent David Kimelfeld and a Republican. This time, Bernard has the endorsement of the Communist and Socialist parties, but not LFI. He has a tough fight against the Republican candidate Véronique Sarselli, Mayor of Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyon, an example of an area in the Metropolis but not Lyon proper. National Rally candidate Tiffany Joncour MP is expected to come third, and LFI’s Florestan Groult should also do so.
Matters-o-Meter: Sarselli was the favourite here, which would be a boost for the moderate right and a blow to the left. I wrote that “if Groult makes the runoff, and runs against Bernard, it will scupper any chance of his re-election”, and in fact all four main candidates managed to reach the 10% mark. 4/10
On the same date, Lyon had the first round of its local election. There is a unique situation where Lyon basically has two bodies, but this is strictly for the city itself. In 2020, the Ecologist candidate, Grégory Doucet, was elected mayor, and the city before that elected a Socialist every time since 2001. However, it may have its first right-leaning mayor since then. Jean-Michel Aulas, the President of the city’s football club from 1987 to 2023 is running as an independent but is backed by both Renaissance and The Republicans. Meanwhile, though Doucet is supported by his own party, the Socialists, and the Communists, LFI have put forward their own candidate, Anaïs Belouassa-Cherifi, an MP.
Matters-o-Meter: I stated that “Despite this, it is unlikely Belouassa-Cherifi makes the second round, although Aulas will be very happy if she does, and the same is true of Alexandre Dupalais of the Union of the Right for the Republic (UDR), a Republicans splinter which is an ally of the RN. Even if Belouassa-Cherifi doesn’t, and Dupalais does, Aulas is expected to beat Mayor Doucet, in what will be a blow for the left. There is clear tension in the NPF alliance and expect the finger-pointing to begin before the polls even close.” The bad news for Doucet is that Belouassa-Cherifi did squeeze into the third round, and Dupalais did not make it, thus putting Aulas in prime position. 4/10
On the same date, Marseille had the first round of its local election. The election in 2020 saw a win for Michèle Rubirola, an Ecologist who broke with her party to form an alliance with the Socialists and Communists, winning the election and breaking the 25-year conservative rule under Republican Jean-Claude Gaudin, who was retiring. This progressive coalition (before the days of the NPF) and the Republicans were the main parties. However, Rubirola lasted just months before resigning for health reasons and was replaced by the ex-Socialist independent Benoît Payan.
Matters-o-Meter: “Again, LFI have not supported Payan’s re-election, instead backing MP Sébastien Delogu. However, Payan’s main opposition is the RN MP Franck Allisio. Martine Vassal, the Republican President of the Bouches-du-Rhône Departmental Council and the Aix-Marseille-Provence Metropolis, who is also supported by Renaissance and its allies, will probably make the second round but come third, with an outside shot Delogu also makes it. Polls have Payan slightly ahead of Allisio at the moment, but it’s a close race.” Again, the LFI candidate surprisingly did make it (as did Vassal), but because the left’s opposition here was from the RN, he withdrew after Payan rejected an alliance. Vassal rejected an alliance with Alissio, so there will be three candidates in the second round. 4/10
On the same date, Nice had the first round of its local election. 2020 saw a landslide win for Republican Christian Estrosi, but in 2021 he defected to Horizons, a centre-right party led by former Prime Minister Édouard Philippe which looks to attract moderate conservatives to the Macronist camp as a member of Ensemble. Notably, his opponent is Éric Ciotti, who became Republicans leader in 2024 but was kicked out of the party for forming an alliance with the RN, and then formed the UDR.
Matters-o-Meter: I stated that two left-wing candidates, Juliette Chesnel-Le Roux of The Ecologists and Mireille Damiano of LFI could make the runoff but if either does they will come third (in the end, Chensel-Le Roux did). Ciotti is expected to handily beat Estrosi in a big win for a right which is gaining momentum ahead of presidential elections in 2027. I noted that Estrosi’s only hope is if Chesnel-Le Roux and Damiano both miss the runoff and the left support him (which didn’t happen on either count). 4/10
On the same date, Paris will hold the first round of a municipal election. The capital has been led by the Socialist Anne Hidalgo since 2014, and she won easily last time with Communist support. She did not run again, and as will be no surprise to those paying attention, Socialist candidate Emmanuel Grégoire, an MP and former Deputy Mayor, has been endorsed by the Ecologists and Communists but not LFI, who nominated Sophia Chikirou MP. Grégoire’s main rival is the Republican Rachida Dati, who is Mayor of the city’s 7th arrondissement. However, Chikirou was considered likely to reach the 10% margin needed to get to the second round. Horizons candidate Cllr Pierre-Yves Bournazel is endorsed by Renaissance and also expected to get there, as is Sarah Knafo MEP from the Reconquête (Reconquest) party considered on the far-right.
Matters-o-Meter: A five-person runoff is a situation uniquely French, but I considered it quite likely. In it, Grégoire will probably win, but Dati has a shot. I was right in considering it likely in a way, because all five qualified. However, both Bournazel and Knafo withdrew to back Dati in a grand right-wing tent, Grégoire gambled and rejected an alliance with Chikirou. Of course, it is crucial for the Socialist Party to win this election. Due to Mélénchon’s somewhat erratic behaviour, they are hoping to wrest control of the left-wing coalition to make it more moderate, and thus, they believe, more electable. A win here would provide momentum, and it is a big deal for them. However, its importance should not be overstated because like most local and by-elections in Europe, it will be forgotten within a couple of months (the words ‘Gorton and Denton’ were impossible to avoid for weeks and have never been heard of since). 4/10
On the same day, Toulouse held the first round of local elections. In 2020, Jean-Luc Moundenc, a Republican also endorsed by Renaissance, won against a left-wing candidate. Again, he has picked up the support of the presidential parties. His closest rival is the Socialist Cllr François Briançon, endorsed by the Ecologists and Communists, but again, LFI have ran their own candidate, François Piquemal MP. There is an off-chance the RN’s Julien Leonardelli MEP makes the runoff too.
Matters-o-Meter: I stated that “this is one place where the left’s split is costing them the most, because Piquemal is running a strong third”. In fact, Piquemal actually was running so strongly he beat Briançon to second. Polling suggests in a runoff Moundenc will beat Briançon by 6% of the vote, while Piquemal wins 24%! Again, one can only imagine the left-wing infighting as a result. 4/10
On the same date, Castile and León held its regional election. Castile and León is an autonomous community, which is Spain’s alternative for states as it is not a federal country. The country’s national politics is split into five blocs. There are two main traditional parties, these being the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) on the centre-left, and the People’s Party (PP) on the centre-right. To the right of the PP is the populist Vox (Voice). To the left, a slightly more confusing situation. The populist left was represented by Podemos (We Can), which formed an alliance with other parties called Unidas Podemos (Together We Can), including the United Left (IU), a front dominated by the Communist Party of Spain (PCE). However, the PCE led a new coalition called Sumar (Unite), which soon split from Podemos and this leads to two parties on the alternative left, with Sumar in the ascendancy and planning a new coalition provisionally known as Un Paso al Frente (A Step Forward). Finally, there are various regionalist parties in a country which is known for the strength of various peripheral nationalisms. The current national government is a coalition between the PSOE and Sumar, propped up by Podemos and regionalist parties in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, the Canary Islands and the Valencian Community, led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE).
Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez leads one of Europe’s most left-wing governments After the fall of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, the autonomous communities were set up and Castile and Léon had its first election in 1983. The election was won by the PSOE, with a three-party People’s Coalition winning nearly all the other seats (two minor parties shared three). However, the President Demetrio Madrid was involved in a judicial investigation into fraud and resigned in 1986, and the 1987 election saw a tie between the PSOE and the People’s Alliance (AP), the largest party in the People’s Coalition which had split up. This was due to the rise in the centrist Democratic and Social Centre (CDS) which had won just two seats in 1983. The CDS abstained and two minor parties voted to install José María Aznar as President. The AP were worried about the rise in the CDS and rebranded as the PP in 1989 to try to moderate the image of a party that had some heritage of Francoism. Ever since then, the party has controlled this region. Also that year, Aznar became the leader of the national PP (and thus Leader of the Opposition), becoming Prime Minister of Spain in 1996.
José María Aznar served as leader of both region (1987-89) and country (1996-2004) The PP had formed a coalition with the CDS after the rebrand, and it continued under Jesús Posada, but for the 1991 election Aznar selected Juan José Lucas as candidate instead, and a decline in the CDS led the PP to an absolute majority on its own. That party was dying and did not even contest the 1995 election, where the PP won a landslide. Still, there was a clear two party system. Lucas won another landslide in 1999 and retired to become a minister in the Aznar government in 2001, while replacement Juan Vicente Herrera won further landslides in 2003, 2007, and 2011. 2015 saw the rise of Podemos and the Citizens (C’s), with the latter being a liberal party that was strong in pro-Europeanism and opposing any regional separation. The PP was denuded of their majority but the C’s abstained to allow Herrera to continue. In 2019, there were big gains for the PSOE and Cs (they changed their acronym) at the expense of the PP and Podemos. The PSOE became the largest party for the first time in over three decades. However, the PP and Cs had a majority of one together, and decided to continue their coalition under a new leader, Alfonso Fernández Mañueco.
Alfonso Fernández Mañueco (PP) has been President of Castile and Léon’s government since 2019 However, with a slim majority and COVID-19, the parties did not gel well, leading to new elections in 2022. The PP did come first but won just 31 seats of 81, a bare improvement and their worst ever vote share. The PSOE fell to 28 as Vox went up to thirteen, at the time seen as a huge result for the still relatively fledgling party (in 2019, they won just one). Two parties won three seats. First was the Leonese People’s Union (UPL), which seeks a separate autonomous community for León and is otherwise vaguely progressive. The Empty Spain movement, which seeks to develop rural, “forgotten” areas did not win a seat itself, but its ally Soria ¡Ya! (Soria Now) won three. The local Unidas Podemos alliance of Podemos, IU, and the Green Alliance (AV, an always-ally of Podemos) took a seat, as did the Cs which was facing a national collapse as it slid somewhat to the right and became hard to distinguish from the PP. Finally, another regionalist party called For Ávila, a split from the local PP, won one seat. This led to a PP-Vox coalition.
The seats in 2022, from L-R: Unidas Podemos (1), PSOE (28), UPL (3), Soria ¡Ya! (3), For Ávila (1), Cs (1), PP (31), Vox (13) Initially, the PP-Vox coalition was controversial both in theory and in practice, but in 2024 it ended because the PP-controlled regions supported a plan of distributing migrant children without accompaniment across the country, and Vox terminated all coalitions with the PP. This was not well-received in the Castile and Léon branch of Vox and led to turnover of key members either. Polls suggested that the two main parties were still the PP, led by Mañueco, and the PSOE, led since 2025 by Mayor of Soria Carlos Martínez Mínguez after previous long-term leader Luis Tudanca fell out with the national party. They would more or less hold their existing positions, with the PP slightly ahead of the PSOE, and Vox, led by Speaker Carlos Pollán, would make modest gains. No other party would move off double digits, with the UPL, Soria ¡Ya!, and For Ávila keeping their modest representation. Podemos and the Cs were as good as dead, with the IU/Sumar’s chances of keeping a seat up in the air.
Matters-o-Meter: The election came at a time where the Sánchez government is in trouble ahead of national elections in 2027, with the alternative left doing even worse and the right in ascendancy. However, there was some criticism of the Mañueco government due to the unwiedly coalition with Vox and slow responses to wildfires in 2022 and 2025. At the time of writing (with other 99% of the vote in), the PP won 33 seats, the PSOE thirty, and Vox fourteen, so modest gains for all (a small disappointment for Vox). This will keep the right in majority, but it depends whether Vox are happy to prop up a Fernández-led government. The UPL held up on three seats, For Ávila kep its seat, and Soria ¡Ya! fell to one. Both IU/Sumar and Podemos failed to win a seat, as did the Cs, being the last seat to go in any autonomous community for a party that was once leading national polls. What was expected was a boost for Vox as they looked to put pressure on PP, and that not happening is a big story in an important country. 5/10
On 16 March, India held elections to its upper house, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States). Like most Westminster system countries, India’s lower house, the Lok Sabha (House of the People) is more powerful. This is a staggered, indirect election with members chosen by members of state (and equivalent) parliaments. Since 2014, India has been led by the Hindu nationalist and right-wing populist Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party, BJP) and their electoral bloc, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. They won a landslide in 2014 and 2019, but lost their standalone majority in 2024 due to a resurgence of the Indian National Congress (INC), the once-dominant and still major party known for leading India to independence from the UK, and its own Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). Most parties are part of one or the other, leading to a two-party system.
Matters-o-Meter: The importance of this election should not be overstated, as it is indirect and most MLAs will simply vote based on their party allegiance. Thus, even in a powerful country like India, most outlets will not pay too much attention, and the BJP will stay in charge whatever happens. 2/10
On 17 March, Pennsylvania’s 79th House District held a special election. Pennslyvania is one of the American swing states, but the 79th, located in the central parts of the state, is strongly Republican. Incumbent Louis Schmitt Jr. was elected unopposed in 2024 and resigned after being elected to a judicial position.
Matters-o-Meter: In this safe red seat, congressional staffer Andrea Verobish held on for the party with 57.6% against Democratic nurse Caleb McCoy. 2/10
On the same date, Pennsylvania’s 193rd House District held a special election. This is another safe Republican seat, in the south of the state, and incumbent Torren Ecker also left after being elected as a judge.
Matters-o-Meter: Ecker was elected unopposed last time, and his staffer Catherine Waller (R) defeated former college official Todd Crawley (D) with 59.7% of the vote. 2/10
On the same date, Virginia’s 98th House District held a special election. Virginia is a blue state (but not a deep blue one), and this is the most south-eastern district in Virginia Beach (and the state as a whole). Incumbent Barry Knight (R) died in February triggering this race.
Matters-o-Meter: This is a red-leaning district but Knight’s win as an incumbent with 56.6% of the vote over former teacher Cheryl Smith (D) in 2025 showed that there is scope for competitiveness. Smith is running again, with attorney Andrew Rice for the incumbent party. Even if there wa a flip, it will show the Republicans’ unprecedented weakness in Virginia in modern times, but not make much impact in the grand scheme of things in a very blue state legislature. Anyway, Rice ended up winning with an increased share of 59.4%. 2/10
On 18 March, the Netherlands held municipal elections. Like in France, the elections are perhaps hard to read because of the importance of local parties, which won 31% of the vote in 2022 (the largest national party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy or VVD won 11.7%). The Netherlands is known for its pure PR system, with no electoral threshold, with the last national election in 2025. This was won by the liberal Democrats 66 (D66) party, which won 26 of 150 seats. The party was formed as a progressive movement against pillarisation, where society was split up into Catholics, Protestants, socialists, and liberals, each with parallel societies. This was already in decline and now its legacy can only be seen in a few segments of society. Under Rob Jetten, it received its best-ever result and the millennial was credited by the young for a positive, progressive campaign.
Prime Minister Rob Jetten led the Democrats 66 to their best ever result in 2025 26 seats was tied with the Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders since its inception, who left the VVD in 2004 as he became a more radical, right-wing populist leader. The VVD, meanwhile won 22 seats. This party was founded by liberals who left after the liberal party merged with the Labour Party (PvdA), and ruled under PM Mark Rutte from 2010 to 2024. Without Rutte, Dilan Yeşilgöz led the party and managed to hold up support. Meanwhile, the GroenLinks-PvdA (GL-PvdA) alliance won twenty seats. The PvdA was conceptualised during the war and occupation of the Netherlands by Nazi Germany, believing pillarisation was a problem and supporting a post-war “breakthrough”. The idea was the liberals, socialists, and left-leaning Christian democrats (of both denominations) would merge into one Labour Party, but this failed as other Christian parties popped up post-war, and the VVD broke away from it, thus leading the PvdA to remain in the socialist ‘pillar’ until this faded away. Still, it is considered a centre-left party. GroenLinks (Green Left) was formed by the merger of various parties (including the Communist Party, which abandoned Marxism-Leninism after the adoption of ‘eurocommunism’) considered to the left of Labour. However, GroenLinks cannot really be considered a radical party, more similar to the German Greens than the British or American ones. Labour had a dominant position on the left, but after their decline in 2021 as punishment for a grand coalition with the VVD, calls for an alliance grew to restore a left-wing party which could challenge to win elections rather than having (as we will see) about seven or eight parties each winning totals in the single digits. The Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) won sixteen seats. This party was a merger of the major Catholic and Protestant parties once pillarisation had weakened the Christian voter base and the Second Vatican Council allowed more cross-denominational dialogue for Catholics, and reversed a downturn for being a junior partner in several coalitions as a moderate conservative party. These five parties were supplemented by ten others, which I will give a brief overview of in table form:
Name Position Seats JA21 (Yes21, but also stands for Right Answer 2021) Right-wing populist, but ‘less extreme’ than the PVV Nine Forum for Democracy (FvD) Far-right Seven Farmer-Citizens-Movement (BBB) Right-wing focusing on farming communities Four Denk (‘Think’ in Dutch and ‘Equal’ in Turkish) Focusing mostly on Muslim voters, left-conservative Three Reformed Political Party (SGP) Conservative and more-or-less theocratic Three Party for the Animals (PvdD) Left-wing and animal rights-based Three Christian Union (CU) Progressive economically, conservative socially Three Socialist Party (SP) Left-conservative Two 50Plus (50+) Pensioners’ interests Two Volt Netherlands Liberal, European federalist One Some of these parties have had their time in the sun and others have had relevance over the years. The election was held in the aftermath of an unwieldy coalition between the PVV, VVD, BBB, and New Social Contract (NSC), a split from the CDA which did very well in 2023 (but would die due to the chaotic coalition). It was led by civil servant Dick Schoof, but fell apart. After the 2025 election, a D66-VVD-CDA minority coalition led by Jetten was formed.
Matters-o-Meter: It’s early days for Jetten, in the first month of his premiership. The main thing that has happened (apart from his appointment) since the last election is a split in the PVV, which is tightly controlled by Wilders and led to an uptick in polling for JA21 and the FvD. Some parties have changed leaders too. It was an early test, but as this is the third level of bodies (below the national and regional level) the main interest was in the Netherlands’ big cities and control of the councils there, which like the national parliament are destined to be in perpetual coalition nearly everywhere. However, the national results did show a strong uptick for the FvD. 4/10
As part of this election, there is a municipal election in the city of The Hague. In 2022, the largest party was the right-wing populist Hart voor Den Hag (HvdH, Heart for The Hague) which won nine of 45 seats, led by the former PVV MP Richard de Mos. D66 won eight, while the VVD won seven. GroenLinks won five, while the PvdD, PvdA, and CDA won three, while Denk won two. The left-wing Haagse Stadtpartij (The Hague City Party, HSP), the SP, the PVV, the Christian Union-SGP alliance, and the FvD won one seat each. At the time, de Mos was under investigation for corruption, so the other parties did not work with him and a D66-VVD-GL-PvdA-CDA coalition was formed. After de Mos was acquitted, GroenLinks and the PvdA said they would still not include HvdH as it was too right-wing, prompting the VVD to leave. This led them to add the PvdD and Denk instead.
Matters-o-Meter: I wrote that “As HvdH won the most seats while under investigation, he will get an uptick now he is cleared, and it seems like the VVD will take a hit as a result. It’s the first election for the GL-PvdA alliance here. It seems that de Mos’ forays into national politics since leaving the PVV have not always fared the best. Therefore, even though the main story is whether he gets in or not, it won’t matter too much.”
I definitely underestimated just how well HvdH would do though, as they went up to sixteen seats. The D66 won eight, GL-PvdA won seven, while the VVD were the main losers on three, the same as Denk. The PvdD and CDA fell to two, while the Socialist Party and FvD kept their seat, and Volt won a seat for the first time, with the last seat going to the CU-SGP alliance. The PVV and HSP both lost their sole seat. 3/10
On 21 March, South Australia held a general election. This is one of Australia’s states. We have gone over the national system in the section on Nightcliff above, but unlike the Northern Territory, this election will receive important national interest. As previously noted, Australia has two main forces: the nationally governing Labor Party on the centre-left, and a coalition between the Liberal Party and rural-based National Party on the centre-right. South Australia existed as a British colony before the country did, and joined in the federation in 1901. Like the UK, there were initially no parties and the system developed independently from the national one. The United Labor Party was formed in 1891, before the federal one, but dropped ‘United’ from its name in 1917. This led to a conservative reaction called the National Defence League (NDL) which the state’s Liberal Party can trace its heritage to, and after several mergers, including with the state’s Country Party (the precursor to the Nationals) became the “Liberal and Country League” (LCL), and changing its name to simply the South Australian Liberal Party to match the federal party in 1974. Because of this, the Nationals (who did get revived in the 1960s) have always been weak here: it’s a state where three-quarters live in the capital Adelaide, and even rural conservatives vote Liberal; the party may well as not exist, and there is ‘orthodox’ two-party politics in South Australia, with the occasional instance of third parties and independents (including the Nationals, who are not in Coalition here) winning the odd seat. In 2018, a challenge to the two-party system by the influential centrist populist Nick Xenophon was put down as his party, SA-Best won a substantial vote share but no seats in the lower house. The last election, in 2022, saw the incumbent Liberal government of Steven Marshall lose to Peter Malinauskas and Labor, as SA-Best basically declined as a force. Labor won 27 seats to sixteen for the Liberals, and four independents also won seats. The Greens and One Nation won upper house seats, while SA-Best retained some from 2018.
Premier Peter Malinauskas hopes to lead Labor to victory again There was expected to be a healthy vote share for Labor, although polling suggested they may lose a small amount of support to the Greens. On the right, the situation is more juicy. As the Liberals fall apart nationally due to the growth of One Nation, the same is happening in the state. Marshall resigned as leader after his 2022 defeat, and was replaced by David Spiers, who stepped down amidst little progress in 2024, and was later sensationally convicted of drug dealing. Replacement Vincent Tarzia also couldn’t fix the polling drop, and his replacement, Ashton Hurn, was elected unopposed. Hurn is a first-term MP who has been party leader for just three months. It was considered likely, in terms of primary vote share, Hurn’s Liberals will come third behind Labor and One Nation. The good news is that the preferential voting system means that a split on the right won’t hurt them in the same way it would in other countries that use first-past-the-post, such as the UK or Canada.
Matters-o-Meter: I wrote “Malinauskas is very popular and there is no doubt, he will win. The Australian Labor Party is becoming the English-speaking world’s version of the Japanese LDP because as long as the right keeps being useless, it will continue to win election after election. I remind you that Prime Minister Anthony Albanese took power in 2022 and won a landslide in 2025, and since then the Liberals have been a mess. Their hard-right leader Peter Dutton lost his seat and resigned, and his replacement Sussan Ley, considered a moderate, was seen as ineffectual in standing up to Albanese, and angered the Nationals on a few occasions. In the end, the more right-wing Angus Taylor successfully replaced her last month. In the time since the 2025 vote, just like in the state, the federal primary vote share has fallen below One Nation. One Nation is basically the personal project of longtime leader Pauline Hanson (indeed the full party name is Pauline Hanson’s One Nation), but their state leader, Cory Bernardi, is a former Liberal senator who left the party to become a right-wing commentator on Sky News (Australian Sky News is the equivalent of TalkTV in the UK, not the British Sky News, and has a decidedly right-wing bent, enough so that the owners of Sky UK are withdrawing the license and forcing them to change the name soon). Still, even if they beat the Liberals, there is no chance that he will take power, and it will be a landslide for Labor. This will put pressure on Taylor and probably cause more right-leaning voters to swap Coalition for One Nation. This will be even more disastrous as moderates have already left the party in droves for Labor or teal independents.”
This result is an absolute bloodbath. At the time of writing, the ABC have been confident enough to decisively call 38 of 47 seats, and 32 have gone to Labor, including four gains from the Liberals (which includes ex-leader Tarzia’s seat). Only four seats have gone to the Liberals, as they have also lost one to One Nation, the first lower house seat for the party in the state. One Nation also got a higher primary vote share. An independent also won a seat. Of the remaining nine, it is often because it is unclear which two candidates will contest the seat. There are two main things we should learn about Australia. Firstly, due to the realignment away from class politics and to other cleavages, it is very hard for the right to win in Australia. Though perhaps the rather sparsely-populated country is known for its outback, the fact is that much of it is empty and the vast majority of the population live in big cities or suburbs, which are turning away from right-wing politics. This is why (in states that have them) the Nationals don’t suffer like the Liberals do. It is also the case that the preferential voting system makes it harder for One Nation to win than in PR countries or even FPTP ones, because Labor, Green, and teal voters will always pick the Liberals/Nationals over them. 6/10
On the same day, South Australia held elections to its First Nations Voice. The First Nations Voice is an advisory body representing indigenous Australians, and a project of the Malinauskas government. The federal Labor government put the same idea to a referendum, which was rejected in a blow to Albanese (although, as it proved, not a lasting one).
Matters-o-Meter: This sort of quango is probably more powerful than the low turnout suggests, but the fact is not many people will pay attention to it. This is especially the case as hardly any candidate is attached to a party, and one can be elected with, in one case, six primary votes. 2/10
On 22 March, Slovenia holds a general election. Slovenia was an ex-Yugoslav country, where the various (modern-day countries) were “republics” in a communist federation, but they achieved independence with the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They escaped most of the bloodshed of other Yugoslav countries because the Serb nationalists had no interest in Slovenia, where few Serbs lived, and Yugoslavia gave up in the Ten-Day War of 1991. The first elections after this were held in 1992, and showed a fractured parliament but the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), led by Janez Drnovšek formed one coalition or the other from 1992 to 2004. Drnovšek retired to the ceremonial presidency in 2002, and his party soon died without it. Instead, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) of Janez Janša took power. Janša was a Defence Minister during the Ten-Day war and then in coalition under Drnovšek, but was removed in 1994 for abuse of power, which had the effect of raising his profile, and he was PM from 2004 to 2008. However, in 2008 they lost power to the Social Democrats, which was a rebrand of the Communist Party which moderated significantly, including by welcoming several members of the dead LDS. However, the financial crisis hurt this government, and allowed an alternative left-wing party called Positive Slovenia to win in 2011, though Janša formed a coalition with every party bar Postive Slovenia and the Social Democrats. This fell apart in 2013 due to corruption allegations which put Janša in jail before the conviction was overturned.
Former Prime Minister Janez Janša is considered a big part of right-wing populism in Europe, and has changed his spots multiple times In the resulting 2014 election, there was again a new force (as Positive Slovenia died because of its own corruption problems and a split), the Party of Miro Cerar (SMC). Cerar, a legal expert, won the election easily and renamed his party to the Party of the Modern Centre, keeping the acronym. New parties were popping up all the time. In 2017, the TV personality Marjan Šarec ran for president and nearly won, leading him to form the List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ). In the 2018 election there was a very fractured parliament with double-digit tallies for the SDS, LMŠ, Social Democrats and SMC. With Janša trying to make himself out to be a Slovenian Donald Trump, an “everyone but Janša coalition was formed” until it fell apart in 2020 and Janša became PM. The latest election was in 2022, won by another all-new party, the Freedom Movement of Robert Golob.
Prime Minister Robert Golob Golob had been part of politics before, and was in the LDS and Positive Slovenia movement, but was also known for his business career. The Freedom Movement is considered a progressive liberal party and won 41 of ninety seats, a crushing victory. The SDS, by now a right-wing populist party and still led by Janša. In many ways, Janša feels like a wannabe Viktor Orbán, and he clearly loves Donald Trump. However, he is less willing to go to a rhetorical war with the EU (the SDS is still part of the European People’s Party, for one) and is a supporter of Ukraine. Therefore, he is the type of pro-Western right-wing populist perhaps more represented by the likes of Giorgia Meloni. Both major parties clearly are the vehicles of their leader; it is unclear whether they would go on if Golob or Janša left. There are three other parties who won seats in 2022. New Slovenia (NSi) won eight seats, and is a centre-right party. It perpetually wins an amount of seats in the high single-digits, being formed in 2000 as a Christian democratic force. The Social Democrats won seven seats, which is a low ebb but apart from their victory in 2008 not particularly remarkably bad. Finally, The Left won five seats, being the most left-wing party in the parliament and stepping back from its highs from 2010s-era protests. (The mathemticians among you will wonder who the other two seats went to – the answer is unelected ethnic minority seats). You will note that neither the SMC or LMŠ managed to win seats, with centrist parties losing to tactical voting as Janša was seen as their enemy. Golob leads a Freedom Movement-Social Democrats-Left coalition.
2022 election diagram: L-R: The Left (5 seats), Social Democrats (7), Freedom Movement (41), Hungarian/Italian minorities (2), NSi (8), SDS (27) Golob’s party has not had the easiest time of it and there has been high turnover of ministers. They are behind the SDS, still led by Janša after 33 years, although the gap has narrowed as the campaign began. Still, it is a clear choice between two parties. NSi, the Social Democrats and The Left are all expected to clear the 4% threshold, but hardly rock the boat. Two new parties should appear, the first being the Democrats. This is a split from the SDS led by Anže Logar, who narrowly lost the presidential election in 2022 and out-performed his party in the parliamentary election, getting his own aspirations. It is a more moderate right-wing party than the SDS. More in the air is Resni.ca (as well as making a URL, it splits ‘truth’ and ‘serious’), a right-wing party known for its anti-lockdown views during the COVID-19 pandemic and support for Russia.
Prediction: At this stage I would suggest the SDS is the largest party in a hung parliament. That is the most likely outcome by far, but a world in which the Freedom Movement is still largest is possible. There is a path to power for both Golob and Janša, although the situation favours Janša as the incumbent coalition will not have a majority. If I had to guess, an SDS-NSi-Democrats coalition is in order.
On the same date, France has the second round of its council elections.
Matters-o-Meter: It’s the same election as the first round, so let’s give it the same score. 5/10
As part of this, the Metropolis of Lyon will have its second round. Republican Véronique Sarselli, backed by Renaissance, won the first round with 39.1%, while Ecologist Bruno Bernard, backed by the Socialists and Communists won 28.2%. Crucially, both the National Rally’s Tiffany Joncour (11.8%) and LFI’s Florestan Groult (11.6%) cleared the threshold to compete.
Matters-o-Meter: Joncour underperformed polls substantially and it’s unclear where it went (Bernard did get an uptick of votes compared to polls). However, even without Groult, three-way runoff polls had Sarselli winning easily. Now it’s a four-way race, there’s no real chance Sarselli will lose. 4/10
On the same date, Lyon has its election’s second round. In a surprise, the Ecologist Grégory Doucet (37.3%), backed by the Socialists and Communists, won the first round ahead of Jean-Michel Aulas (36.8%), from no major party but backed by Renaissance and The Republicans.
Matters-o-Meter: The bad news for Doucet is that the LFI candidate Anaïs Belouassa-Cherifi (10.4%) cleared the 10% hurdle to make the second round. The left-wing votes taken away will probably hand the election to Aulas. 4/10
On the same date, Marseille holds the second round of a local election. As expected, the main candidates were Benoît Payan (36.7%), who is from no major party but backed by the Socialists, Communists, and Ecologists, and Franck Alissio (35.0%) from the RN. However, Martine Vassal (12.4%) from no major party but backed by Renaissance and The Republicans, and Sébastien Delogu (11.9%) from the LFI made the runoff.
Matters-o-Meter: Delogu has withdrawn from the second round in an attempt to stop Alissio. However, Vassal has said that she will contest the second round. This is to Payan’s benefit and will surely mean victory for him here. 4/10
On the same date, Nice has the second round of its election. Éric Ciotti from the UDR (an RN ally) won 43.4% ahead of Christian Estrosi from Horizons (a Renaissance ally), also backed by The Republicans on 30.9%. The Ecologist candidate Juliette Chesnel-Le Roux, backed by the Socialists and Communists also made it (11.9%), but LFI’s Mireille Damiano missed out (9.0%).
Matters-o-Meter: The position of Chesnel-Le Roux is good news for Ciotti, as the around 20% of left-wing voters will not go to Estrosi, which would have given him a chance. 4/10
On the same date, Paris has the second round of its municipal election. Socialist Emmanuel Grégoire, backed by the Ecologists and Communists won 38.0% of the vote, while Republican Rachida Dati won 25.5%. Three others made it: LFI’s Sophia Chikirou (11.7%), Horizons candidate Pierre-Yves Bournazel (11.3%), and Reconquête’s Sarah Knafo (10.4%).
Matters-o-Meter: Merging successful lists is possible, and Bournazel merged into Dati’s for a united centre-right. Knafo also wanted to do this, but was refused; however, she withdrew to try and block the left. Grégoire refused a merger with Chikirou, proof of where the NPF alliance is at the moment. This split in the left will probably hand Bournazel victory, but it will be a tight race. 4/10
Also on that date, Toulouse will hold the second round of its election. In the first round, Republican Jean-Luc Moudenc (37.2%), also backed by Renaissance, François Piquemal of LFI (27.6%), and the Socialist François Briançon (24.5%), also backed by the Ecologists and Communists reached the runoff. The RN’s Julien Leonardelli missed out by a distance on 5.4%.
Matters-o-Meter: Of course, a three-way run-off is favourable to Moudenc, and it is beneficial to him that Leonardelli also missed the second round. 4/10
On the same date, Rhineland-Palatinate in Germany holds its state election. This was another state to end up in West Germany during the Cold War. It is the case that early elections were somewhat similar to the federal ones in that the CDU and SPD were the main parties, although like Baden-Württemberg, the state leaned towards the CDU, who governed from the state’s inception until 1991. In every election from 1947 (held under the French occupation) until 1979 the CDU would come first, the SPD second, and the FDP third, with only two cases (communists in 1947 and neo-Nazis in 1967) seeing a fourth party. There was variation as to whether the CDU would win a majority or not. Peter Altmeier, Minister-President from 1947 to 1969 was the longest-serving in any one German state, and was second only in total to Bernhard Vogel, also from the CDU, who was in from 1976 to 1988 and would also lead the state of Thuringia from 1992 to 2003. In between these two as Minister-President was Helmut Kohl, who resigned in 1976 to become leader of the national CDU and fight to lead his country, which he did from 1982 to 1998, overseeing German unification. Those from this state, especially in the CDU, could have a very glittering career!
Helmut Kohl led his state from 1969 to 1976, stepped down to become Leader of the Opposition, and then was Chancellor from 1982 to 1998 In 1983, the FDP lost their seats and finished behind the Greens, and in 1987 both parties entered the state. The CDU lost their majority because of this, and in 1988, Vogel was replaced as leader by Carl-Ludwig Wagner. In 1991, the SPD finished ahead of the CDU for the first time, and formed a coalition. They have governed the state ever since. Rudolf Scharping, the new Minister-President, resigned in 1994 to challenge Kohl in the federal election (he lost). He was replaced by Kurt Beck, under whom the SPD had lasting success, even winning a majority in 2006 as the Greens lost all seats. The Greens returned in 2011, and as the FDP were gone an SPD-Green coalition was formed. However, in 2013, Beck resigned over the bankruptcy of the Nürburgring motorsports track. Social Affairs, Labour, Health and Demography minister Malu Dreyer replaced him. In 2016, the AfD entered parliament as the third party, and the FDP re-entered in fourth. This led to the coalition changing to include the FDP. The last election was in 2021. Out of 101 seats, the SPD won 39, and the CDU won 31. The Greens won ten, the AfD nine, and the FDP six. The remaining six went to the moderate conservative and localist Free Voters (FW). The SPD-Green-FDP coalition continued, but Dreyer retired in 2024. Her replacement was Labour Minister Alexander Schweitzer.
Alexander Schweitzer heads an SPD-Green-FDP coalition in Rhineland-Palatinate Time might be running out for the SPD’s 35-year-long chokehold on the state. The CDU does lead, but it is quite tight between them. Gordon Schneider, a two-term deputy who was also a Mayor of Birresborn, is their candidate to replace Schweitzer, who is running for a first full term. Schenider is not the most well-known figure, although is the brother of federal Transport Minister Patrick Schneider. The Greens are expected to stay way behind the main parties, and are led by Climate Protection, Environment, Energy and Mobility Minister Katrin Eder. However, the AfD are expected to get more than double the total they did in 2021, with Jan Bollinger the party leader. However, they’re still expected to come third behind the CDU and SPD. The FDP are in big trouble everywhere and are not even being mentioned on polls. They are blamed for the failures of the federal traffic light coalition (SPD-Green-FDP) and their bizarre role in breaking it apart. The Free Voters are also not guaranteed 5%. There could be a new face as Die Linke could win seats for the first time, but this is not guaranteed.
Matters-o-Meter: The current coalition will not continue as the FDP are heading out (perhaps for good) and the SPD and Greens together are nowhere near a majority. There are three scenarios that could happen. At an absolute push, if Die Linke get in, a left-wing coalition of SPD-Green-Linke could theoretically be possible. However, looking at the numbers, I doubt it. With the AfD under ‘firewall’ from all other parties that refuse to do business with it, there is no right-wing coalition either (CDU-FW will not have anything close). Therefore, our last two scenarios are an SPD-CDU grand coalition, and a CDU-SPD grand coalition. I think the most likely is that the CDU come first, which will mean that they hold the office of Minister-President (and the SPD don’t) for the first time since 1991. 6/10
On 22 and 23 March, Italy is holding a constitutional referendum. Italy’s political system has been volatile, especially since the end of the Cold War. To stop the main opposition Italian Communist Party (PCI) getting power, the Christian Democracy party was completely dominant. Despite its name, the “White Whale” basically contained everyone in the entire centre. When the Cold War ended, there was no longer any need for an anti-communist vanguard, and in fact communism itself was not in vogue either, with the PCI renaming itself the “Democratic Party of the Left” (PDS). Christian Democracy also disbanded under the weight of many scandals and its own obsoletion. Instead, the main force on the right became Forza Italia (Forward Italy), a new party of the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. Basically, after that, elections would be a battle between Berlusconi and whatever person the left (led by the PDS) would put up for the vote.
Silvio Berlusconi capitalised on the fall of Christian Democracy to become the leader of Italy’s right, and had three terms as PM (1994-5, 2001-6, 2008-11) Parties and coalitions would change names. The PDS eventually settled on the name Democratic Party (PD), a name which completely breaks from even the palest tint of Marxism. New forces would pop up in the 2000s and 2010s. The Northern League (Lega Nord) a radical right-wing party looking for independence or autonomy for Italy’s more prosperous north. However, under Matteo Salvini, it began focusing more on the right-wing populist element, growing in Europe through the 2010s due to the migration crisis; and de-emphasising (and then dropping all together) the “Northern independence” part. The Five Star Movement (M5S) would be a somewhat syncretic populist party, in some ways quite left-wing, but in others to the right, and crucially, Eurosceptic. In 2018, following uneasy governments led by the PD, there was a shock, as what was now just Lega (League) overtook Forza Italia to be the main part of the “centre-right coalition (CDX)”. The M5S took massive gains, being the largest individual party, as the PD (and its “centre-left coalition (CSX)” of much smaller allies) took a hit. Lega then left Forza Italia, instead going with the M5S for a coalition of populists under the lawyer Giuseppe Conte, a member of neither party. Conte was considered a figure close to the M5S. With Lega and the M5S not always seeing eye-to-eye, and Lega improving in the polls, Salvini pulled the plug on the coalition, but the PD swooped in to save Conte and stop an early election with Lega ahead. However, former PD Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, considered a centrist, broke from the PD and took enough MPs with him to a new Italia Viva (Italy Alive) party to foil the coalition. With one year to go until the election and the country recovering from COVID, a national unity government involving nearly all parties, including the PD, Italia Viva, M5S, Lega, and Forza Italia was formed under former President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi.
Matteo Salvini tasted power after the 2018 election but could not quite align a general election with his party’s peak Now, the CDX was a coalition of four main parties, although one, the centrist Us Moderates (NM) was quite small. As well as Lega and Forza Italia, there was also Brothers of Italy (FdI), which was a clear third party in the coalition, but grew after refusing to join the Draghi government. Unlike Lega, which had its ideological basis in modern right-wing populism, FdI had its basis in the neo-fascist movements formed after World War II. It is not quite accurate to call FdI of 2022 “fascist”, more post-fascist, sympathetic to Mussolini but in the modern, democratic era. Notably, she was more pro-Western and pro-EU than Salvini. One may compare it to the fact the PCI dropped communism and changed its ideology for the post-Cold-War world. Thus, in 2022, the CDX won a majority with FdI as the main party, and Meloni became PM. The coalition has held. The PD and M5S, which due to the experience of life in the Conte government dropped populism and became basically another centre-left party, are the main opposition. There has been a polarisation with FdI becoming the main, dominant force on the CDX, squeezing out Lega and Forza Italia, while the PD and M5S remain allies, for the most part.
Giorgia Meloni won power in the 2022 election The government doesn’t have a two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution, so this bill on judicial reform is put to the people instead. The question is “Do you approve the text of the law revising Articles 87, paragraph 10, 102, paragraph 1, 104, 105, 106, paragraph 3, 107, paragraph 1, and 110 of the Constitution, approved by Parliament and published in the Official Gazette no. 253 of 30 October 2025 under the title ‘Provisions Governing the Judicial System and the Establishment of the Disciplinary Court’?” It seems the main thing it will do is separate the careers of prosecutors and judges.
Matters-o-Meter: Both the ‘Yes’ (All four CDX parties and some smaller ones) and ‘No’ (PD, M5S, and others) campaigns have made sensational claims about its importance in saving democracy/destroying it and so on. I do wonder if this is just a referendum on Meloni, because how many people actually care strongly about the granular details of the judiciary? Polls have the referendum very close, but Meloni is in a strong-enough personal position that she could survive a defeat here. 5/10
On 24 March, Denmark holds its general election. Denmark’s political system gradually developed since the first election in 1849 (and before that) with minimal revolutions (even continuing, bizarrely, during German occupation), which is great for Denmark but makes it harder to give a brief overview. It was progressive as it began to be dominated by the predecessors of today’s Venstre (Left), the main liberal party which brought in reforms to allow modern parliamentarianism and democratisation. The Social Democrats first entered parliament back in 1884. The forces of conservatism were represented by Højre (Right). Venstre was dominant enough that it had various splinters, such as the Danish Social Liberal Party (RV) which split in 1905 after being expelled for its pacifism. After several defeats, Højre became the Conservative People’s Party (DKF). With the liberalisation and more people being enfranchised, Venstre’s dominance would fade, and in 1924 the Social Democrats became the largest party. The Communist Party of Denmark (DKP) won seats for the first time in 1932. At the time of the 1945 election, the first after German occupation ended, the main parties were Social Democrats, Venstre, DKF, DKP, and Social Liberals. However, that was the DKP’s peak, in after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was put down, many communists left the DKP to form the Socialist People’s Party (SF), known today in English as the ‘Green Left’, in between the Social Democrats and DKP. They replaced the DKP in Parliament.
Aksel Larsen split the DKP after the events of 1956, forming the Green Left The Social Democrats were dominant (but not a complete hegemon), but their leaders swapped quite often. In the three decades after 1945, only two men, H. C. Hansen (1955-60) and Jens Otto Krag (1962-8, 1971-2) governed for over five years, and even then, only narrowly. Members of the SF who were annoyed with their coalition with the Social Democrats formed the Left Socialists (VS) in 1968 to become the sixth party. However, the system was really shaken up in 1973, which is called the “landslide election” but in fact was anything but, in fact notable for the emergence of several new parties. The right-wing populist Progress Party (FrP) came second, starting as a party of “taxpayers” that basically wanted to get rid of income tax, and most of the government in general. Other parties got seats that hadn’t before, including the returning DKP. However, in 1979, the DKP fell out again, and the VS did as well in 1987, so they merged with other smaller parties into the Red-Green Alliance in 1989, first getting seats in 1994. Although the Social Democrats always remained the largest party, from 1982 to 1993 Denmark was governed by a coalition led by the DKF’s Poul Schlüter. After that, the Social Democrats were back in through Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. During this time, the FrP was falling apart due to the eccentricity of its leader, and was replaced in the 1998 and 2001 elections by the Danish People’s Party (DF). The FrP had already become a far-right party, and the DF, which was no doubt right-wing populist, spent much of its time trying to remove that baggage (compare the switch to the French National Front becoming today’s National Rally). Also in 2001, there was an earthquake as for the first time in three quarters of a century, the Social Democrats came second (to Venstre), and a Venstre-DKF coalition was formed under Anders Fogh Rasmussen which would govern from 2001 to 2011 (most of it under Ramussen). They won three elections in 2001, 2005, and 2007: while the latter saw a New Alliance form, splitting from the centre of the Social Liberals and DKF; it later rebranded as the Liberal Alliance (LA).
Anders Fogh Rasmussen led Venstre to a first place finish for the first time since the interwar period in 2001 In 2011, the Social Democrats won power back. A new party emerged in 2015, The Alternative, which split from the Social Liberals to become Denmark’s green party. There, Venstre won power back. However, there was an earthquake. Venstre declined to third, behind not just the Social Democrats but the DF. They had to rely on the DF’s support for power. In 2019, the Social Democrats won power, and there was a triumph for the two-party system with the DF declining to joint third with the Social Liberals. Another new party showed up in the New Right, to the right of the DF. A Social Democratic minority government led by Mette Frederiksen was formed, but supported by other red bloc parties (the Social Liberals, SF, and Red-Green Alliance, plus like-minded parties in the Faroe Islands and Greenland).
Mette Frederiksen has led Denmark since 2019 The last election was held in 2022. Frederiksen’s Social Democrats won again. They were canny in adopting populism, being more left-wing than many such parties on the continent, but also showing scepticism to immigration. They won fifty of 179 seats. Venstre, at one stage in its history considered radically left-wing for allowing poor people to vote, but now the voice of the centre-right (although, ultimately from the conservative tradition, took a hit and won 23. This was because of the foundation of the new Moderates party, formed by Venstre PM from 2009 to 2011 and 2015 to 2019 Lars Løkke Rasmussen, wanting it to be to the centre of Venstre. The SF won fifteen, but the new main force on the radical right was the Denmark Democrats (DD), formed by former Venstre immigration minister Inger Støjberg and thus more moderate than the DF. They won fourteen seats, as did the Liberal Alliance, who have moved to the right since forming. The DKF won ten after initially having high hopes, and the Red-Green Alliance (the most left-wing party as a communist front) won nine. The Social Liberals, who brought about the election by a vote of no confidence, were punished and went down to seven, while the New Right went up to six, as did The Alternative. The DF, now outflanked by both the DD and New Right, went down to five. The remaining four seats went to the Faroe Islands and Greenland which have their own party system. In the Faroes, both the Union Party (close to Venstre) and the Social Democratic Party (JF, close to the Social Democrats) won a seat each, with the Union Party pro-union and the JF more neutral but leaning somewhat towards the union side as well. However, in Greenland, the seats were won by Siumut (Forward, close to the Social Democrats), and the radically left Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA, Community of the People), both of whom support independence (which is backed by nearly the whole population, but is stopped by practicality).
The very crowded parliament of 2022. L-R: Red-Green Alliance (nine seats), Inuit Ataqatigiit (one), The Alternative (six), Green Left (fifteen), Social Democratic Party (one), Siumit (one), Social Democrats (fifty), Social Liberals (seven), Moderates (sixteen), Venstre (23), Union Party (one), Conservative People’s Party (ten), Liberal Alliance (fourteen), Danish People’s Party (five), Denmark Democrats (fourteen), New Right (six) This result was a win for Frederiksen, who decided a centrist grand coalition instead of a left-wing one. The three-party government was between the Social Democrats, Venstre, and the Moderates. The picture for her is unclear going into this election. On the one hand, the Social Democrats will lose perhaps a fifth of their seats, but still be the largest party. Venstre, led by Deputy PM Troels Lund Poulsen, are expected to drop back further by a few seats. The Moderates, led by Rasmussen (who is Foreign Minister), have had a big drop in support. The Socialist People’s Party has shot up, perhaps to second place, as a result of Frederiksen abandoning the left, and came first in the 2024 European Parliament election here under longtime leader Pia Olsen Dyhr (a minister in the 2011-15 red government). Both Støjberg’s Denmark Democrats and the Liberal Alliance, led by the young libertarian Alex Vanosplagh, will make more progress (particularly the latter). The DKF of Mona Juul will make a small recovery, while like the SF the Red-Green Alliance will also make gains. The Social Liberals could get a couple of seats back, while the New Right has fallen apart, and split, with the largest faction, the Citizen’s Party hovering around the 2% threshold. The Alternative are also at risk, but the DF should also make gains thanks to the death of the New Right.
Matters-o-Meter: Due to the decline of all three governing parties, the coalition will lose its majority. Anyway, the conservative “blue bloc” has been revived with the DKF and DF endorsing Poulsen for PM. Really, there will probably be a very small left-wing majority, and no centrist option for Frederiksen (the left have made it clear they will not mix and match). With support from the Faroes and Greenland, a Social Democratic-SF-Social Liberal-Red/Green coalition is possible, but could severely restrict Frederiksen who has been a model for many social democrats around Europe wishing to dip their toes into anti-immigration rhetoric. 7/10
On the same date, Florida’s 14th Senate district will have a special election. Florida was a Confederate state in the Civil War, which went from blue to purple, and then finally a red state which voted for Donald Trump three times in a row. The district is based in the city of Tampa, and Republican Jay Collins won with 60.3% of the vote in 2024, and resigned after being appointed lieutenant-governor in 2025.
Matters-o-Meter: Josie Tomkow, a former member of the lower house, will win for the Republicans against Democratic union man Brian Nathan. 2/10
On the same date, Florida’s 51st House district will have a special election. Tomkow, who is running for State Senate resigned in 2025. She won 56.9% of the vote in 2024.
Matters-o-Meter: This seat in the north of Polk County is a bit tighter than the Senate seat, but the Republican non-profit leader Hillary Holley is expected to beat retiree Edwin Pérez (D). 2/10
On the same date, Florida’s 87th House district has a special election. Incumbent Mike Caruso resigned to become Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller of Palm Bech County. He won 59.5% of the vote in 2024.
Matters-o-Meter: The Palm Beach County district has been closer in the past, but former council member Jon Maples should hold the seat for the Republicans against Democratic fitness centre owner Emily Gregory. The district has gotten some attention because it is the home of Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort. 2/10
On 26 March, the Faroe Islands will hold a general election. Part of the Danish realm and electing two seats in the Danish parliament (that takes place two days prior), it has significant autonomy. In 1906, the party-list system was introduced, with the elections fought between the Union Party, which wanted to keep close links with Denmark (such as preferring the Danish language to Faroese), and Sjálvstýri (Self-Government), which wanted more autonomy. In 1925, the trade-union-based Social Democratic Party (JF) was founded and won seats at the next election in 1928. In 1935, a conservative Business Party emerged, and it merged with conservative defectors from Sjálvstýri to form the People’s Party in 1939, taking the number of parties up to four. Despite having elections, there wasn’t self-government. However, the UK occupied the islands in World War II, and allowed more autonomy than the Danish did. A very tight majority supported independence in 1946 after the war, but as the invalid votes would have swung it, the Danes considered the vote inconclusive. Instead, they dissolved parliament and called for an election, which didn’t show a clear pro-independence majority either. Instead, the compromise of Home Rule began in 1948.
Andrass Samuelsen (Union Party) became the first Prime Minister of the Faroe Islands in 1948 The left-wing, pro-independence Republic emerged in 1950 as a reaction to the Danes cancelling independence. In 1994, the right-wing Centre Party also won seats for the first time. For a time, there were these six parties (Union, Social Democratic, People’s, Sjálvstýri, Republic, and Centre), until Progress split from the People’s Party as a liberal, pro-independence party in 2011, winning seats that year. In 2015, the Social Democrats became the top party, and leader Aksel V. Johannesen became PM in a coalition with Republic and Progress. They were defeated in the 2019 election, and Union Party leader Bárður á Steig Nielsen became PM in coalition with the People’s and Centre parties. In 2022, there was a return to six-party politics as Sjálvstýri fell below the threshold of 1/33 votes, missing out on seats for the first time since 1945. The election was held because the Centre Party leader Jenis av Rana stated he would not back a (Danish) Conservative People’s Party government in the national election because the leader of that party was gay. After he was sacked by Nielsen for this, the Centre Party pulled out, costing the coalition its majority. The Social Democrats won nine seats of 33, the Union Party seven, the People’s Party and Republic six each, Progress three, and the Centre Party two. A Social Democratic, Republic and Progress coalition was formed, returning Johanssen to power.
Aksel V. Johannesen was Prime Minister in the 2015 to 2019 term, and again since 2022 Polling suggests a defeat for the government, with the Social Democratic Party expected to lose about half of its representation, perhaps ending Johannesen’s fifteen-year stewardship of it. Nielsen’s Union Party has not really made waves either, probably staying at about seven seats. It is the People’s Party of Beinir Johannesen, Aksel V. Johannesen’s own nephew, who is expected to score a big win, perhaps double the seats of 2022. Republic, led by Deputy PM Høgni Hoydal, will probably stay about the same, perhaps losing one seat. Progress will lose at least one of their three seats under Ruth Vang, while the Centre Party, still led by av Rana (as it has been since 2001) will probably stay on two seats. Sjálvstýri are probably going to finish just short again.
Matters-o-Meter: The results, on a good day, would allow the younger Johannesen tochoose whether he wants to lead a pro-independence coalition with the left-wing Republic, or a right-wing coalition with the anti-independence Union Party. Of course, there is more focus on independence in the other autonomous part of Denmark, which is Greenland where the US have been making demands for the territory (the population wants to leave Denmark at some point, but as an independent country rather than a part of the US). However, a pro-independence government may be able to win significant autonomies, as Copenhagen is weakened by the Greenland situation and in the tight Danish election may be reliant on Faroese votes. 5/10
On 31 March, Massachussets’ Essex 5 House District holds a special election. In 2024, Democrat Ann-Margaret Ferrante won with 66.5% of the vote against an independent, but this was similar to her share against a Republican in 2022. She died in 2025.
Matters-o-Meter: In this seat, with the small city of Gloucester as its biggest locale, and Ferrante staffer Andrew Tarr (D) will defeat Christina Delisio (R), a former planning board member. 2/10
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Texas: Democrat Menefee wins safe blue seat in friendly fight
On January 31, the second round of the Texas 18th congressional district special election in the United States was held, following a first round on 4 November 2025.
Texas’s 18th congressional district factfile:
- Population: 825,192
- Religions: No precise data, but majority are Christian, with unaffiliated the largest majority
- Ethnicity: 43.4% Hispanic, 32.2% Black, 16.7% White, 4.9% Asian, 2.2% Mixed, 0.7% Other
- Type of government: Constituency in a federal presidential republic
- Freedom in the World 2025 score: N/A, United States score: 84/100 (Free)
The election was caused by the death of incumbent Sylvester Turner, from the liberal Democratic Party. Turner was elected to the Texas House of Representatives in 1988, taking office in 1989. In 2015, he was elected Mayor of Houston, and took that office in 2016 (serving in the state house until then). He served until 2024. Later that year, he was elected to the US House for Texas’s 18th, taking office in 2025. He died later that year.
Special elections work differently in Texas compared to regular elections. In regular elections, each party has a primary to nominate a candidate, and then there is a general election featuring each of these. However, in special elections, all candidates, including multiple from the same party, face a so-called “jungle primary” before a general election if no candidate gets a majority of the vote. This is just another name for the basic two-round system with the difference (compared to most countries) that candidates from the same party can face each other.
There were a total of seven Democratic candidates on the ballot, representing a party which got 69.4% through Turner in 2024. In alphabetical order, the first was Feldon Bonner II, a Christian minister.
Amanda Edwards was elected to Houston City Council for the at-large district’s Position 4 in 2015, taking office in 2016 and serving until 2020.
Stephen Huey is a consultant.
Jolanda Jones is an incumbent member of Texas’s state House, being elected to represent the 147th district in 2022.
Isaiah Martin is an activist.
Christian Menefee was elected Harris County Attorney in 2020, taking office in 2021. He resigned in 2025 (taking effect in 2026) to fight the election.
Valencia Williams has worked as a precinct chair.
Again by alphabetical order, Theodis Daniel is the first of five candidates representing the right-wing Republican Party, which got 30.6% of the vote in 2024. Daniel is a military veteran.
Retiree Ollie Knox is another candidate from the party.
Carmen María Montiel is a journalist and author.
Carter Page is a consultant.
The final Republican candidate is Ronald Whitfield, a contractor.
In 2024, Vince Duncan ran as a write-in candidate, getting 0.0% of the vote. This time, he is an independent on the ballot. He owns a furniture company.
There are three more candidates running as independents or representing parties that did not run in 2024. Reyna Anderson is an independent. She has worked as an advisor to NGOs.
George Foreman IV works as an educator.
Finally, Tammie Rochester is running for the left-wing Green Party of the United States. She is a social worker.
Several other candidates withdrew from the race or were speculated about but declined. This is considered a safe ‘blue’ (Democratic) seat, and after Turner died in March 2025 the Republican Governor of the state set the date of the election as November 4, leading to criticism from Democrats that he deliberately delayed the election to leave the seat vacant for as long as possible to help a Republican Party with a small majority.
In the primary, three Democrats got notable endorsements. Edwards was endorsed by three Representatives from other states: Lois Frankel (Florida), Jennifer McClellan (Virginia) and Lateefah Simon (Washington). She also got support from various PACs.
Jones also got three endorsements from Representatives from outside Texas: Bonnie Watson Coleman (New Jersey), Mark Takano (California), and Richie Torres (New York). Also, the former member for this seat from 1989 to 1995 Craig Washington endorsed her. She was also supported by PACs.
Menefee was endorsed by three current Texas Representatives: Greg Casar, Jasmine Crockett, and Lizzie Fletcher. Maxwell Frost (Florida) and Pramila Jaypal (Washington) also endorsed him. Erica Lee Carter, the former member of this district endorsed him, as did other former Texas Representatives Colin Allred and Beto O’Rourke. Five state representatives and one state senator also endorsed him, as did other local and party officials, as well as PACs, unions, and the city newspaper the Houston Chronicle.
Menefee, Edwards and Martin earned the most money (between $1.6m and $1.0m), with Jones on just under $350,000 and no other candidate in six figures.
The largest poll suggested Menefee and Edwards would advance, with Jones the only other viable candidate.
Menefee (D) won 22,022 votes (28.9%), and Edwards (D) won 19,467 (25.6%), so both advanced to the runoff. Jones (D) won 14,549 (19.1%), while Montiel (R) won 5,110 (6.7%). Martin (D) won 4,337 (5.7%), with Knox winning 3,131 (4.1%). Huey (D) won 1,415 (1.9%), and Whitfield (R) won 1,175 (1.5%). Page (R) won 943 (1.2%), with Daniel (R) winning 937 (1.2%) and Williams (D) winning 915 (1.2%). Foreman (I) won 828 (1.1%), Bonner (D) won 555 (0.7%), Duncan (I) won 407 (0.5%), Anderson (I) won 263 (0.4%), and finally Rochester (G) won 135 (0.2%).
After this, Jones endorsed Edwards, while the state chapter of the largest union, the AFL-CIO, endorsed Menefee, as did the environmentalist Sierra Club. Menefee raised over $2.2m, with Edwards on over $1.7m. Polls had Menefee in front.
Indeed, Menefee won with 18,646 votes (68.9%) compared to 8,434 for Edwards (31.1%). Texas is changing its districts for the regular election this year, and so Menefee could face another incumbent Representative for the seat in the Democratic primary.
Analysis
This was one of two elections held in Texas on January 31. The other one (for a State Senate seat) is more interesting, and that article’s “Analysis” section will be something of a part two for this. This is a safe Democratic seat in downtown Houston and it is no surprise the Democrats held onto it easily. I’ll focus on the history of Texan politics, the city of Houston, and then this race and the particularities of the candidates. This is mostly just because it is more interesting to talk about historical elections and the development than a safe Democratic seat. Texan history is often described by the ‘Six Flags Over Texas’. The state was first colonised by France, but this did not last and Spain then colonised the region. It was part of Mexico when that country declared independence from Spain, then Texas itself declared independence from Mexico, before joining the US in 1845. The sixth flag was the Confederacy during the Civil War.
The coat of arms of each of the six countries to rule Texas at the State Capitol building Texas was a slave state, and the pro-slavery Democratic Party dominated elections as Texas joined the US. In 1845, the Whig Party was the opposition to the Democrats. But in the South, most members joined the Democrats as the country became defined by and polarised over slavery, and in the North many joined the anti-slavery Republican Party. In the South, the main opposition to the Democrats became the American Party (the so-called “Know Nothings”) who were defined by anti-Catholicism and would soon be split over slavery. Trying to keep a neutral stance over this topic was impossible. They endorsed former Whig President Millard Fillmore (who wanted to keep quiet about any association with them) in the 1956 election. It was notable that the Republican candidate John C. Frémont would not even bother run in Texas and many southern states, making it a straight battle between the victorious Democrat James Buchanan and Fillmore in Texas. Even with a former President, the Know Nothing/Whigs finished third, and it was impossible to be “neutral”. The US was now defined by its deep split on slavery.
Know Nothing flag (the ‘foreign influence’ is the Vatican) So much so that in 1860, when the Democrats nominated the northern “moderate” (on the slavery issue) Stephen A. Douglas, southern delegates walked out and nominated Buchanan’s VP John C. Breckinridge. Meanwhile, the Republicans had their man: Abraham Lincoln. The dead Know Nothing/Whigs formed their own party, the “Constitutional Union”. They were worried that the southern states would make good on their promise to secede, and thus wanted to have no change on the slavery issue. Their candidate was John Bell. Even though he didn’t run in Texas or indeed the South in general, Lincoln won the election, sweeping the North. Brecknridge swept the South with Bell and Douglas winning a few bordering states. Only Breckinridge and Bell ran in Texas, with Breckinridge winning 3:1. This election was the direct cause of the secession and Civil War.
I have spoken about Georgia’s history after this, and Texas, as a Southern state, is similar.
Even though it was controlled by the Democrats, which now favoured segregation instead of slavery, it was somewhere where farming-based populists did well. Texas’s history of voting for third-party candidates is just interesting in itself. In 1880, it was the best state for an early candidate of the farmer-labour movement, James B. Weaver of the Greenback Party, and in 1888 it was the second best state for that party’s successor, the Union Labor Party, and its candidate Alson Streeter. This party became the Populists and Weaver even carried five states under its banner in 1892, and came second in Texas. However, the party died after that. This represented the ‘progressive’ thought in Texas (indeed, even the Know Nothings were quite populist regarding issues like the emancipation of women and labour rights). In the 1912 election where the Republicans were split, the Socialist candidate Eugene V. Debs got nearly as many votes as both William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt. In 1920, a Democrat former Governor James E. Ferguson founded an American Party opposed to joining the League of Nations and won 9.9% of the vote in Texas despite not being on the ballot anywhere else. The Republican Party was also split in the South. Those who were tired of losing every election to the Democrats and being harassed by the Ku Klux Klan formed their own faction called the “lily-whites”, who were more focused on business expansion and accepted Jim Crow, while the multiracial faction which wanted to continue focusing on the rights of black Americans were called the “black-and-tans”. Indeed, in 1920, a black-and-tan list got 5.6% of the vote in Texas without a candidate.
An image showing the factionalised GOP in the South The Democrats were starting to re-establish themselves in the North as a party which targeted the urban workforce, many of whom were “white ethnics”, often Catholics, of the sort whom the Know Nothings would campaign against. The Catholic Governor of New York Al Smith was nominated for the presidency in 1928, and Protestant Southerners were shocked. There weren’t many Catholics there at all, and even worse, Smith opposed Prohibition of alcohol. The conservative reaction against Smith was so large that remarkably, in 1928 Republican Herbert Hoover managed to carry the state. As well as Prohibition, may thought that a Catholic would basically take orders from the Vatican. However, with the Great Depression Franklin D. Roosevelt won the state back with 88.1% of the vote in 1932 (the biggest win there). Roosevelt was a liberal, and his New Deal worried the tycoons who had a big say in the state party machine. Also, in the 1944 election he replace pro-segregationist John Nance Garner as his running mate with the progressive Henry A. Wallace. Even worse, the “white primary” system which contributed to the disenfranchisement of black and Mexican-American voters was ruled unconstitutional. When Roosevelt loyalists took over the state Democrats, a group called the Texas Regulars ran a slate of unpledged electors which won 11.8% of the vote, continuing Texas’ story of well-placed third parties in elections. However, the segregationist States’ Rights Democratic Party which ran Strom Thurmond in 1948 did not do well here, winning just 9.1% of the vote as the local party stayed loyal to Harry S. Truman in the election (Thurmond won four southern states).
Texas Regulars poster (“Old Glory” is the American flag) In 1952, general Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Republican candidate, but was considered a hero by both sides (indeed, the Democrats wanted him too) and the Texas Democrats endorsed him, leading to him winning the state in 1952 and 1956. In fact, Texas became something of a bellwether state, voting for Eisenhower in his two landslides but returning to the Democrats for their wins in 1960 and 1964. Of course, this was the era of the Civil Rights Movement, which led to the reversal in fortunes in the South for both major parties. Indeed, the enfranchisement of Mexican-Americans is the only thing that saved the Democrats in 1968 in this state as Hubert Humphrey beat the nationally victorious Richard Nixon very narrowly. Another segregationist, George Wallace of the American Independent Party carried five states but won 19% of the vote in Texas. After this, the Democrats won for the last time in Texas in 1976. The history of voting for third-party candidates ends too with one major exception. In 1992, Ross Perot, a businessman from the state ran as an independent nationally, and won 22.0% of the vote here. This was actually only slightly better than his national performance, but he somehow managed to not win a single electoral vote despite taking 18.9% of the national popular vote. Perot ran again in 1996 for the Reform Party (albeit still as an independent in Texas) but this was far weaker in general, and indeed in Texas he did worse than he did nationally. Anyway, although the vote varies somewhat, Texas votes for Republicans reliably and has done so in every election since 1980. It is the second-most valuable state and has often been a dream for Democrats that one day they will be competitive again: perhaps due to demographic change with decreasing white populations, but the Republicans have managed to improve their standing enough with minority voters (albeit still being behind with this demographic) to stay above water. Here’s a table with all the non-Democratic, Republican or Whig candidates to get at least 5%:
Year Party Candidate % Position 1856 Know Nothing Millard Fillmore 33.4 2 1860 Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge 75.5 1 1860 Const. Union John Bell 24.5 2 1872 Liberal Repub. Horace Greeley (endorsed by Dems) 57.1 1 1880 Greenback James B. Weaver 11.3 3 1888 Union Labor Alson Streeter 8.2 3 1892 Populist James B. Weaver 23.6 2 1912 Progressive Theodore Roosevelt 8.9 3 1912 Socialist Eugene V. Debs 8.3 4 1916 Socialist Allan L. Benson 5.1 3 1920 American James E. Ferguson 9.9 3 1920 Black-and-Tan None 5.6 4 1924 Progressive Robert M. La Follette 6.5 3 1944 Texas Regulars None 11.8 3 1948 States’ Rights Democratic Strom Thurmond 9.1 3 1968 American Ind. George Wallace 19.0 3 1992 None Ross Perot 22.0 3 1996 None Ross Perot 6.8 3 Since the three-man elections in the 1990s, Donald Trump was the worst-performing Republican in Texas with 52% of the vote, but recovered in 2024. Thus, the state is probably currently in territory where Democrats can only win in the case of a total landslide: if Texas flips, the election was already beyond doubt by the time it was decided. Still, because it’s such a big prize any hint Texas might be moving is enough to excite Democrats. Like most Southern states, Texas was one where the state offices fell to the Republicans after the electoral ones did. The last Democratic Governor, Ann Richards, lost her re-election bid in 1994 to future President George W. Bush, and the last Democratic Senator lost in 1993. The high point for Democrats in Texas in the 21st century was 2018, where Senator Ted Cruz had a surprisingly narrow race against Beto O’Rourke, who remains a major figure because of this run but bit off more than he could chew by running for President in 2020 (indeed, Cruz’s own failed presidential run in 2016 probably hurt him).
Beto O’Rourke has the most total votes cast for any Democrat for Texas, but the 2018 optimism that it could flip proved a flash in the pan Houston, meanwhile, is quite the opposite. Though the boundaries have changed slightly over time, the 18th District has represented the downtown part of the city since 1973, and has always been represented by a Democrat. If there is any doubt as to which type of Southern Democrat, Barbara Jordan who took office that year was the first black woman from the South in Congress. Every member since has also been black. She retired at the 1978 election, and Mickey Leland replaced her, winning six elections before dying in 1989. His replacement was Craig Washington. Leland and Washington were among the first black members of the state lower house since Reconstruction, and Jordan the first black state senator as well. Washington opposed some projects even though they would have financially helped the city and this led to him losing the primary to Sheila Lee Jackson in 1994. In total, Jackson was elected fifteen times, dying in 2024 (after winning the Democratic primary for a sixteenth time). Her daughter Erica Lee Carter was chosen by the state Democrats to finish the last couple of months of her term, while a more competitive race in the regular election was held. After Jackson Lee died, the executive committee of the county party got to choose the candidate, and it was a tight race between Sylvester Turner and Amanda Edwards, with Turner winning 41-37. Turner was a former Mayor of Houston after a long time in the state House. Houston mayoral elections are held without party labels. Turner lost to the white Democrat Bob Lanier with the vote strongly correlating with racial lines in a tight runoff. He tried again in 2003 but came third. In 2015, he won a tight runoff with Bill King, mayor of the suburb of Kemah. He was probably what you can described as a generic mayor of a progressive-leaning city, and was re-elected without too much fuss in 2019, being term-limited in 2023. Jackson Lee ran for that office, and Edwards, a former Houston City Councillor who had enough support to get 10% in the statewide Democratic primary for the Senate seat in 2020, said she would campaign for Jackson Lee’s seat. Jackson Lee was trounced in the mayoral runoff though, and thus Edwards was faced with a popular incumbent and lost the primary.
Sheila Jackson Lee was elected fifteen times for this seat Turner won the general by 39 points, and then died after two months, bringing us to this special election. The Republican performance here was so paltry it barely warrants mentioning; instead, there were three relevant Democrats. Christian Menefee was the favoured choice of the establishment: Lee Carter endorsed him, as did O’Rourke and even more left-wing Democrats like Pramila Jayapal. It’s not so surprising that he won. There doesn’t seem to be a clear ideological difference between the three. Edwards, in particular, seems ambitious, and will appear on the ballot for 2026 even though she pulled out of the race. Because of redistricting, Menefee will have to take on Al Green from the 9th district, who is being moved in here. Green was first elected in 2004 and is known for his stunts against Donald Trump, being kicked out of last year’s State of the Union for shouting at him. Basically, someone who knows what Democrats want. It will be a tough fight for Menefee’s congressional career to continue rather than end before it started.
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Minnesota: Two easy DFL wins show unpopularity of ICE
Two special elections were held in the American state of Minnesota on 27 January, for House Districts 47A and 64A. Though these are separate elections, this article will cover both.
Minnesota House District 47A factfile:
- Population: 42,456
- Religion: No precise data, but most common in the state are Christianity and unaffiliated, with Islam the largest minority religion
- Ethnicities: Non-Hispanic White 70%, Non-Hispanic Asian 10%, Non-Hispanic Black 8%, Hispanic 8%, Non-Hispanic Mixed 4%, Non-Hispanic Other 0%.
- Type of government: State constituency in a federal presidential republic
- Freedom in the World 2025 score: N/A, United States score: 84/100 (Free)
These elections used the first-past-the-post system. In District 47A, the incumbent was Amanda Hemmingsen-Jaeger, from the liberal Minnesota Democratic–Farmer–Labor Party (DFL). She was first elected in 2022, taking office in 2023. She resigned in 2025, after being elected to the Minnesota Senate in a special election (taking office instantly).
Shelley Buck, the leader of the tribal council of a local Indian reservation easily won the DFL primary against two other candidates with 87.5% of the vote. The others were David Azcona (8.1%) and Juli Servatius (4.4%) The DFL won 60.6% of the vote last time, but this time Buck was the only candidate in the general.
Minnesota House District 64A factfile:
- Population: 41,548
- Religion: No precise data, but most common in the state are Christianity and unaffiliated, with Islam the largest minority religion
- Ethnicities: Non-Hispanic White 80%, Non-Hispanic Black 6%, Hispanic 5%, Non-Hispanic Mixed 5%, Non-Hispanic Asian 3%, Non-Hispanic Other 0%
- Type of government: State constituency in a federal presidential republic
- Freedom in the World 2025 score: N/A, United States score: 84/100 (Free)
The incumbent in this seat was the DFL’s Kaohly Her. She was first elected in 2018, taking office in 2019. In 2025, she was elected Mayor of St. Paul, stepping down as lawmaker, and then taking office as Mayor in 2026.
Six candidates entered the DFL primary. The winner was labour lawyer Meg Luger-Nikolai who won 29.9% of the vote, narrowly beating the next candidate, Dan McGrath (26.5%). The other candidates were Lois Quam (21.6%), Beth Fraser (15.0%), Matt Hill (5.6%), and John Zwier (1.3%). Her won 83.2% last time.
Unlike 47A, in 64A there was an opposing candidate, that being small business owner Dan Walsh from the right-wing Republican Party. Walsh was the only Republican to enter the primary, and also ran in 2024, winning 16.6% of the vote.
It was also permitted, in both races, to vote for write-in candidates.
This election took place within the 2024-2026 Minnesota House term. In 2024, the DFL and Republicans both won 67 of the 134 seats each, and thus made a power-sharing agreement. Temporary vacancies (like these two) would give a party a majority for a small period of time. Most dramatically, a gunman killed the DFL leader Melissa Hortman and her husband. District 47A is located in Woodbury and Maplewood, suburbs of Saint Paul, while 64A is in Saint Paul “proper”.
In the District 47A election, Buck won 1,913 votes (97.6%), while write-in candidates won 48 (2.5%). In District 64A, Luger-Nikolai won 5,557 votes (95.3%, up 12.1%), while Walsh won 254 (4.4%, down 12.2%) and write-in candidates won 21 (0.4%, up 0.1%). Thus, Buck and Luger-Nikolai were elected.
Analysis
Sometimes, an overwhelming election victory is described humorously as “Assad margins”, but both DFL candidates managed more than Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad did in his last two presidential elections. Before I get to the current context, let’s go through the political history of Minnesota briefly, partially for context, but mainly because its interesting. At the very least, you’ll understand why the Democrats have the name “DFL” in Minnesota. The national American picture has been a two-party one with Democrats and Republicans since the American Civil War (1861-1865). Minnesota became a state in 1858, having been part of various territories before then and was mostly focused on the ethnic cleansing of the state’s sizeable Native American population. At the same time, most of the population had settled from New England, and therefore during the Civil War sided with the Union. The state became a very safe Republican area. Its first presidential election was the famous one in 1860 which brought Abraham Lincoln to power and caused the civil war, and it was Lincoln’s second best state (behind only Vermont). It was a place that did have truck for alternative candidates: in 1892, the Populist candidate got over 10% of the vote, and also the Prohibition Party candidate also got 5%. The Populists were based on farmers and would today be seen as left-wing populists, while the Prohibition Party were seen as progressive at the time. In 1901, Republican Vice President Theodore Roosevelt became President on the death of the incumbent Willian McKinley. In 1904, he was elected in his own right, but in 1908 convinced his Secretary of War William Howard Taft to run. Taft was easily elected, but the progressive Roosevelt turned against the conservative Taft. Thus, in 1912, Roosevelt formed his own Progressive Party to run against Taft, splitting the Republican vote down the middle (Roosevelt won slightly more of the popular vote than Taft, but did carry six states to Taft’s two) and allowing the Democrat Woodrow Wilson to win easily. Roosevelt did manage to carry Minnesota, beating Wilson in a relatively close race, with Taft in third. This was the first non-Republican to take the state, although even in this case it was a third-party dissident Republican instead of a Democrat.
Roosevelt broke a streak of thirteen straight Republican victories in Minnesota presidential elections However, the Progressives reunited back into the Republicans for the 1916 election when the candidate Charles Evans Hughes was a moderate, in between the progressive and conservative camps (he lost to Wilson anyway). In 1916, Minnesota was incredibly close, with 392 votes in it, but Hughes won. However, the period 1916-1920 saw the Midwest turn against Democrats for several reasons: preferential treatment to their “Solid South” in farming communities, a postwar economic downturn that saw agricultural prices collapse, and discrimination against German Americans during World War I and punitive measures towards Germany and Austria after it. Because of this, the Republican Warren Harding won a landslide in 1920 and in Minnesota which was decided by under 400 votes in 1916, he now won with 70.6% of the vote. The Democrats would be massively divided throughout the 1920s, with Northern Democrats often being urban “white ethnics”: Italians, Irish and the like, and the Southern Democrats being rural conservatives. In 1924, the convention went on for 103 ballots, before they picked John W. Davis of West Virginia: a Union state in the Civil War, but a deeply conservative one. Republican Calvin Coolidge was conservative (although, not in the same way Davis was), but also quite popular at the time. This did see a new Progressive Party being formed under Robert M. La Folette of neighbouring Wisconsin, which was popular amongst German and Scandinavian farming communities in Minnesota too, being more like the late Victorian Populists than Roosevelt’s “Bull Moose Party”. La Folette only took his home state, but was close behind Coolidge in Minnesota. There was hardly any appetite for Davis’ southern conservatism here and indeed anywhere outside the broad south, and Coolidge won easily. Herbert Hoover won the state in 1928 for the Republicans too.
Franklin D. Roosevelt would be the first Democrat to carry the state after 74 years of statehood The Democratic Party had the odd win in state elections, such as winning the governor’s mansion in 1914. However, by 1918, a left-wing “State Labor” convention was held and they nominated David H. Evans. Evans formed the Farmer–Labor Party (FLP), and finished in second place, ahead of the Democrat. Gubernatorial elections came to generally be between the Republican and FLP candidate, and in 1930, the Great Depression hit the Republicans hard and led to large growth of the FLP, leading to Floyd B. Olson being elected governor. In the presidential election, Franklin D. Roosevelt adopted much of the FLP platform, appealing to the Midwestern farmers in Minnesota, as well as the urban, working-class “white ethnic” and black voters in other states, while also keeping the Solid South. There were very few states where the Republicans hadn’t alienated everyone due to the Great Depression. Because of this, throughout the 1930s, Roosevelt would easily win presidential elections, while the FLP would dominate state politics. The two would be allies: Roosevelt promised to use the federal government’s resources to back FLP projects as long as they endorsed him in presidential elections and blocked any populist third party. This occurred, and in 1944 the weak state Democrats merged to form the Democratic–Farmer–Labor Party, thus restoring two-party politics in the state.
Populist FLP badge. “Of, by, and for the people” Anyway, Roosevelt won four landslides and Minnesota selected him every time, although it was close in 1940, perhaps due to the strong German-American presence in the state. In Harry Truman’s surprise win for the Democrats in 1948, the state stuck with the party, although in the Republican landslides of 1952 and 1956 under Dwight D. Eisenhower, Minnesota was a state to fall. After that, it became a safe Democratic state and has voted for the Democrat in every election since except for 1972, a Republican landslide under Richard Nixon. Voting Democrat in every election since 1976 is the longest streak for any state. Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal, and the local Republican party changed its name to the Independent-Republican Party to try and lessen the damage to the Republican brand. However, under Ronald Reagan the Republicans won two landslides, with Minnesota the only Democratic state in 1984 (because the candidate Walter Mondale was from that state), and the Republican grassroots became more conservative and proud to be Republicans, reverting to the old name in 1995. Still, the state has always been a sort of “old-school” left-wing, with workers and farmers, the old bedrock of the left, being the namesake of the local Democratic party. It has an engaged voter base, with consistent high turnouts, and a maverick streak. In 1992, the businessman Ross Perot ran for president, coming a strong third but not winning any states as an independent. He then formed the Reform Party for a less successful bid in 1996. However, in 1998, Minnesota elected the Reform candidate, the former WWE star Jesse Ventura, as governor! It split from the national Reform Party when it moved to the right and became the Independence Party, but did not manage to survive as a major party and in statewide elections the DFL have had the upper hand over the Republicans.
Jesse Ventura was elected as a third-party governor in 1998 (Reform) and 2002 (Independence) Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996 can be considered a peak of Democratic support in Minnesota, as he won comfortably even with two national candidates against him. Under Clinton, the Democrats cemented their position as the party of the urban and the aspirational. In 2000, when the Republicans won under George W. Bush, there was a big swing in rural areas towards the Republicans, but the Democrats kept the state due to their urban support, especially in the Twin Cities, Minneapolis and Saint Paul. In 2016, many states that were loyally Democrat, but had seen their industries suffer, known as the ‘blue wall’ switched to the Republicans due to Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again agenda, and much of Minnesota did including the Iron Range, but again urban areas kept the DFL candidate Hillary Clinton in front. In 2020, the blue wall was flipped back by Joe Biden before Trump won again in 2024. However, 2024 was an easier DFL win in Minnesota than 2016, perhaps due to the fact that Governor Tim Walz was the vice-presidential candidate.
Gov. Tim Walz was the Democratic candidate for VP in 2024 Therefore, the Minneapolis-St. Paul area is the key to Democratic support in Minnesota. In presidential and gubernatorial elections, the DFL will normally get about 50-55% support, and the Republicans about 45-50%. Because of this, the DFL will get the governor’s mansion, all of the presidential electoral votes, and both Senators, but state bodies like the legislature are much more strongly contested. Such states aren’t particularly rare, but they don’t normally get too much attention nationally. It’s all about the true “swing states”: Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada, and North Carolina. However, in the 2020s, several events have focused national, and sometimes international media attention on the state. Firstly, in 2020, a police officer killed a black American named George Floyd while arresting him on suspicion of using counterfeit money at a shop. The officer, Derek Chauvin, was later convicted of murder. This led to anti-racist protests, often known as the Black Lives Matter movement or George Floyd protests, which were far greater in scope than just Minnesota or the US. Politically, it was a polarising event: with the left focusing on the injustice towards black Americans, often at the hands of the police, while the right focused on some protests which descended into rioting or other violence. Another incident mostly gained traction in right-wing circles, when a YouTuber went about investigating daycares ran by Somali-Americans in the state, accusing them of not really existing (or at least operating at the capacity they’re supposed to) and being a front to fraudulently claim government funding. Many have doubted the fairness of the allegations, however, fraud cases have existed in Minnesota, and certainly, it has led to more right-wing attacks on the Somali-American community. Minnesota has the largest one, and the only Somali-American member of Congress, Ilhan Omar, is from the state. As she is also one of the most left-wing, it is clear that “Somalis in Minnesota” have been an issue for some Republican supporters.
Ilhan Omar, the only Somali-American Congresswoman It is certainly the case that there was fraud in Minnesota, and some real cases did involve the Somali community. In fact, with the cases building pressure on Walz, he announced he would not run for re-election. But if this revelation was a scalp for the right, another event would turn opinion against them: Operation Metro Surge. Trump’s successful campaigns often focused on dealing with immigration, and he frequently made use of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Operation Metro Surge was focused in the Twin Cities and the state of Minnesota more broadly, and the large-scale presence of ICE agents in the area was seen as an escalation and intimidation tactic by liberals. In particular, a woman called Renée Good was killed by an ICE agent, Jonathan Ross in her car: it is generally understood that Good was in some way trying to protest or be obstructive, and right-wingers believe Ross was acting in self-defence. However, it was viewed by many as a huge overreach and led to even more protests. Then, weeks later, a man named Alex Pretti, who was also confronting ICE agents, was shot and killed in the state. This killing could not be justified or explained, even by Republicans, because their excuse (Pretti was carrying a gun) offended his own supporters who back the Second Amendment, the right to bear arms. Trump struck a more conciliatory tone, a rare event when dealing with domestic opposition. Certainly, the Overton window is still large enough for anti-immigration sentiment in the US, but the fact is Operation Metro Surge just led to resentment from too many people for its gung-ho tactics. It is true that the US is a polarised society, with many voters stuck in stone as conservatives or liberals. But affecting their material wellbeing is one thing that can turn people around, and the presence of ICE agents killing fellow citizens in their own city has probably made up a lot of people’s minds for them. Even if a lot of people supported some action on immigration, they also agreed that the administration had gone “too far”.
American singer Bruce Springsteen made a song called “Streets of Minneapolis” featuring an anti-ICE protest on the cover The killing of Pretti was three days before the election, and this perhaps explains the shocking results. In American political culture, the phrase “tantamount to election” is used, where one party is guaranteed to win a seat, so winning the primary is the same as being elected. In 47A, this was literally the case, with local Indian chief Shelley Buck winning the primary easily and being elected unopposed. Lawyer Meg Luker-Nikolai had a competitive primary, but turned an already remarkable 83% into a 95% vote share even with a Republican candidate in the race. Part of that can be explained by the fact voter turnout will have been higher in a regular election held concurrently with a presidential election (among others), but it is definitely the case that local DFLers are furious with what is happening in their state. It will galvanise their voters, and it will surely be remembered when this state, which currently despite everything has a tied 67-67 House, has its general election in November.
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Myanmar: USDP election win changes nothing in civil war
Myanmar held its election over three geographic phases on 28 December 2025, 11 January 2026, and 25 January 2026. Myanmar factfile:
- Population: 55.8 million
- Religions: Buddhism 88%, Christianity 6%, Islam 4%, etc.
- Ethnicities: Bamar 68%, Shan 10%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 3.5%, Han 3%, etc.
- Type of government: Unitary assembly-independent republic (suspended under military junta rule)
- Freedom in the World 2025 score: 7/100 (Not Free)
The election was for both houses of Myanmar’s parliament, with the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Assembly) being the lower house and the Amyotha Hluttaw (National Assembly) being the upper house. The electoral system has changed. In the last election in 2020, first-past-the-post was used. For the Pyithu Hluttaw, there were 440 members, with 330 being elected from the various townships, which acted as constituencies, and 110 appointed by the military. For the Amyotha Hluttaw, there are 224 members, 168 elected in constituencies (twelve for each state or region), and 56 appointed by the military. There would then be three committees of an electoral college: elected members of the Pyithu Hluttaw, elected members of the Amyotha Hluttaw, and appointed members; each would nominate a candidate, and in order of votes received, they would become President, First Vice President, and Second Vice President. People who had dual citizenship are blocked from this, as are those with parents, spouses, or children who do so (or are foreign). However, in 2021, the electoral commission switched to closed-list PR for half of the seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw. Also, new registration laws were introduced in 2023, mandating all parties to re-register within sixty days, to possess at least $35,000 in funds, to have at least 100,000 members (up from 1,000), and contest at least half of all constituencies and have party offices in half of all townships.
In 2020, the lead party was the liberal National League for Democracy (NLD). It won 68.0% of the vote and 258 seats for the Pyithu Hluttaw, and 68.3% of the vote and 138 seats for the Amyotha Hluttaw. Its leader is Aung San Suu Kyi. The child of two prominent political figures in Burmese history, she was a founding member of the NLD in 1988 during protests against the dictatorship, being the party’s General Secretary. In 2011, the NLD formally registered as a political party, with her as the Chairperson. In 2012, she was elected in a by-election as a member of the Pyithu Hluttaw for Kawhmu, and also became Leader of the Opposition. After they won the 2015 election, she ceased to be Leader of the Opposition in 2016. She ceased to become an MP to take a role in the government (being blocked from the presidency due to her marriage to a foreign national), with this announced as State Counsellor, in effect the Prime Minister. She was arrested and removed as State Counsellor in the 2021 coup, and the NLD was deregistered under the 2023 laws, meaning she ceased to be registered Chairperson of the party. This also means the NLD cannot run in this election.
Second in 2020 was the right-wing Buddhist nationalist and pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which won 21.9% of the vote and 26 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw, and 22.2% of the vote and seven seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw. Its leader is Khin Yi, who served as Chief of the Myanmar Police Force from 2002 to 2011. In 2011, he was appointed Minister of Immigration and Population, until the USDP’s defeat in 2015. In 2019, he became the USDP Vice Chairman, and after the coup, he was appointed to the same ministerial role in 2021, until 2022. He became Acting Chairman of the USDP in 2022, and then Chairman (ceasing to be Vice Chairman).
The majority of other parties represent an ethnic minority, but let’s go through the major ones. Third in 2020 was the ethnic Shan and centre-left Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). Its leader, Khun Htun Oo, died in 2022, and the party was deregistered under the 2023 laws.
The right-wing, ethnic Rakhine, and Buddhist nationalist Arakan National Party (ANP) won 0.4% of the vote and four seats in the lower house, and 0.4% of the vote and four seats in the upper house. It is lead by Thar Tun Hla, and is banned from running for the junta.
The right-wing, ethnic Pa-O, and pro-military Pa-O National Organisation (PNO) won 0.9% and three seats in the lower house, and 0.6% and one seat in the upper house. It has been led since 1976 by Aung Kham Hti, and since around 2008 has been leader of its armed wing (an ally of the junta).
Winning 0.3% of the vote and three seats for the lower house, and 0.4% and two seats for the upper house was the Ta’ang National Party (TNP), an ethnic Ta’ang party. It is led by Aik Mone, and was among the parties dissolved by the junta in 2023.
The Mon Unity Party (MUP), an ethnic Mon party won 1.0% of the vote and two lower-house seats, and 1.1% of the vote and three seats in the upper house.
The Kayah State Democratic Party (KySDP), an ethnic Karenni party, won 0.1% of the vote and two lower-house seats, plus 0.1% of the upper-house vote with three seats. The party was deregistered for this election.
The Kachin State People’s Party won 0.3% and one seat, and 0.4% of the vote in the upper house but no seats.
The right-wing, ethnic Arakanese Arakan Front Party (AFP) won 0.2% and one seat in the lower house, with 0.1% and no seats in the upper house. It is led by Aye Maung, who formed the similar Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) to run in the 2010 election. He was elected to the upper house, taking office in 2011 for Rakhine State No. 1 constituency. The RNDP was one of the parties that merged into the ANP in 2014, with Aye Maung joining. He attempted to switch to state politics for the 2015 election, but lost to the NLD candidate, and his term as a lawmaker ended in 2016. He did get a seat in the lower house for Ann in 2017, but after disputes left the ANP later that year, founding the AFP in 2018.
The Zomi Congress for Democracy (ZCD), an ethnic Zomi party, won 0.1% of the vote and one seat in the lower house, and 0.1% of the vote but no seats in the upper house. Its president, Chin Sian Thang, joined the lower house in 2016 until the 2021 coup, and then died later that year.
The final party to win lower-house seats in 2020 was the Wa National Party, which won 0.0% of the vote and one seat, while it did not run in the upper house.
The New Democracy Party (Kachin) (NDP (Kachin)) won 0.0% of the vote and no seats, but did win 0.0% of the vote and one seat in the upper house.
There were some parties which didn’t win seats, but still warrant mentioning. The National Unity Party (NUP), which promotes a social market economy, won 0.5% of the upper house vote, and 0.2% of the lower house vote.
The Karen National Democratic Party (KNDP) won 0.4% of the vote for both houses.
The Shan and Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), a conservative and ethnic Shan party, won 0.4% of the vote for both houses.
The right-wing and Buddhist nationalist People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) won 0.3% of the lower house vote, and 0.2% of the upper house one.
The ethnic Red Shan Tai-Leng Nationalities Development Party (TNDP) won 0.2% of the vote for both houses.
Shah-Ni Solidarity Party won 0.1% of the vote for both houses, as did the centrist People’s Party.
The Naga National Party (NNP) won 0.1% of the vote for both houses. The Danu National Democracy Party did the same.
The Inn National League Party (INLP) won 0.0% for the lower house, and did not run for the upper house. The same is true of the Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party (PSDP), an ethnic Karen party.
110 lower-house seats and 56 upper-house seats were duly appointed by the military, while fifteen lower-house and seven upper-house seats were cancelled due to insurgencies. New parties include the Rakhine Nationalities Party (RNP), the Zomi National Party (ZNP), the National Interest and Development Party (NIDP), the Pa-O National Unity Party, and the Kayin State People’s Party.
The Presidency has been vacant since the death of Myint Swe, a member of the USDP. A lieutenant general in the military, after the 2010 election he was nominated as Chief Minister of Yangon Region in 2011. After the next election, he stopped being Chief Minister in 2016, instead becoming First Vice President. He became Acting President in 2018 after the incumbent resigned until a replacement was found. After the 2021 coup, the incumbent President was removed, and Myint Swe became Acting President until his death in 2025.
The role of president is, in practice, carried out by Min Aung Hlaing. He rose through the ranks to be Joint Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in 2010, and then in 2011 was promoted further to Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services. He led the coup in 2021, and became Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), the military junta. He took the role of Prime Minister later that year. After Myint Swe went on medical leave in 2024, he appointed Min Aung Hlaing Pro Tem President (On Duty), under which office Min Aung Hlaing exercises presidential power. In 2025, the state of emergency ended, and Min Aung Hlaing ceased being the Chair of the SAC and Prime Minister. The SAC was replaced by the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC, nominally subject to the security council which he also leads), which he became Chairman of. Either way, it is clear he rules the country in practice.
Initially, the junta promised elections by 2023, but continued to extend the one-year state of emergency by intervals of six months until 2025. Constitutionally, an election was required six months after the state of emergency ended. In general, military rule is common in Myanmar, with a democratic transition in the 2010s leading to the NLD taking power in 2015. In 2020, the NLD won in a landslide against the USDP, leading to the military claiming it was fraudulent (which is generally not been considered true by observers). This was dismissed by the electoral commission, but in a coup, Aung San Suu Kyi and the President Win Myint were arrested in 2021.
Min Aung Hlaing promised a one-year state of emergency and “a free and fair multiparty election”. Aung San Suu Kyi received criminal charges including breaching COVID-19 violations, illegal use of walkie-talkies, and inciting public unrest. She was sentenced to four years in prison (commuted to two by Min Aung Hlaing). The NLD was raided in 2021, but in 2022 the military said it could run if it wanted, before this was reversed and the party was dissolved (among many others) in 2023. Many think that the law on foreign spouses was specifically designed to block Aung San Suu Kyi, while the law changes making it harder to run limits political participation (in particular, ethnic parties).
Most expected the elections to be a sham, with the UN and US. The chair of the electoral commission was arrested and convicted after the coup and replaced by a junta appointee. Even in free elections, the military appointee members and guaranteed Vice President have been controversial, as has the amount of fake news. Some MPs of the NLD and allies formed a government-in-exile called the National Unity Government (NUG), and the junta and NUG consider each other terrorists. This has turned into a civil war with the government, NUG, and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) all fighting each other, causing casualties and displacement. Also, it will mean that the election may not be able to be held in all constituencies. It is thought the change to PR and increase in constituency size may be to limit the effect of this. The opposition has attacked and even killed people for cooperating with the election, and the NUG says that doing so is making yourself an “accomplice to high treason”. Before the election, the SSPC pardoned or reduced the sentence of over eight thousand people. The election was split into three phases: 102 seats in Phase 1, 100 in Phase 2, and 63 in Phase 3.
In the lower house, the USDP won 44.2% of the vote and 233 seats. The SNDP won 6.2% of the vote and six seats, while the PNO won 2.6% and five seats. The MUP won 1.1% and five seats, while the NUP won 13.4% and four seats, and the Naga National Party won 0.3% and four seats. The Danu National Democracy Party (0.6%), the Karen National Democratic Party (0.4%), the Inn National League Party (0.3%), the Kachin State People’s Party (0.2%), the Shah-Ni Solidarity Party (0.2%) and the Rakhine Nationalities Party (0.2%) all won one seat. Independent candidates received 2.3% of the vote, and one was elected. No other parties won seats, while the election was cancelled due to insurgency in 66 seats and 110 members were appointed.
In the upper house, the USDP won 45.1% of the PR vote and 45 seats, as well as 44.3% of the constituency vote and 63 seats, for a total of 108. The NUP won 16.4% of the PR vote and sixteen seats, as well as 16.1% of the constituency vote and no seats, for a total of sixteen. The People’s Party (which won 8.8% of the lower house vote) won 8.7% of the PR vote and five seats, and 8.4% of the constituency vote and no seats, for a total of five. The MUP won 1.2% of the PR vote and two seats, and 1.2% of the constituency vote for three seats, for a total of five. The KNDP won 0.4% of both votes, for one PR seat and two constituency ones, a total of three. The AFP won 0.2% of both votes for the same seat pattern, with the ZNP (0.0% in the lower house) doing the same on 0.0%. The PNO won 1.5% of the PR vote and one seat, and 2.8% of the constituency vote for one more, a total of two. The PPP (7.7% in the lower house) won 8.3% of the PR vote for one, and 8.0% of the constituency vote for none, a total of one. The SNDP won 6.9% and one PR seat, plus 6.6% and no constituency seats for a total of one. The Danu National Democracy Party won 0.5% and no PR seats, plus 1.0% and one seat for a total of one. The NIDP (0.4% lower house vote) won 0.3% of the vote in both votes, winning a PR seat. The same happened with the PSDP (0.3% lower house). The TNDP (0.2% lower house). The Kachin State People’s Party won 0.2% of both votes and one PR seat, while the RNDP won 0.1% in both with one PR seat. The Pa-O National Unity Party (0.1% lower house) and Kayin State People’s Party (0.1% lower house) did the same. The NNP didn’t run for PR, but won 0.2% of the constituency vote and one seat. The Wa National Party did not face any election but did win a constituency seat unopposed. The Shah-Ni Solidarity Party won 0.2% in both votes and no seats, while independents won 0.3% of the constituency vote and no seats. 56 seats were duly appointed, and eleven constituency seats were cancelled due to insurgency.
The coup (2021), dissolution of major parties (2023), and election were all condemned by a number of countries, including the US, Japan, UK, France, Germany, and Australia, as well as the EU and ASEAN.
Analysis
There are several interesting parts of this election. Firstly, the main point is that the USDP is considered not just pro-military but basically a proxy of the military, although there is still a small amount of information up in the air. As Myanmar formally transitions from military to civilian rule, it is assumed Min Aung Hlaing will stay in charge, but whether he becomes President himself, or someone else does (such as USDP leader Khin Yi) is still unclear. Two things have been true in Myanmar. For most of its independent history, its rulers have come from the Tatmadaw: the Royal Armed Forces (even though the country is not a monarchy). For all of its independent history, there has been some sort of armed civil conflict. Normally, the thorn in the government’s side has been ethnic armed organisations, or EAOs, who normally stand for one of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, of which there are dozens (indeed, when going through the parties, most had an ethnic or geographic name, this is not a coincidence). Some non-ethnic groups are put under the EAO umbrella as well. However, since the junta takeover and civil war, EAOs have normally picked a side: Tatmadaw or NUG.
This map of Myanmar, grouped by control in the civil war, is enough to tell you that it has become hell on earth for so many of its people In my 2026 election preview, I gave a brief history of Myanmar, but I want to expand on it, because this is one country where history is the most important factor. Burma, as it was called, was some sort of monarchy for a thousand years, but with different dynasties changing as well. The last of these were the Konbaung Dynasty (1752-1885). The Burmese Empire, were worried about British expansion in India, and the tension between the two powers lead to the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826) between the British Empire and East India Company on one side, and the Burmese Empire on the other. The British won, taking swathes of Burmese territory in the Treaty of Yandabo. During Company rule, British India was split into ‘presidencies’, and Burma was part of the Bengal Presidency. In 1852, the British manufactured another conflict (the Second Anglo-Burmese War) with Burma and won again, this time annexing more territory without a treaty in 1853. A few years after that, India transferred from Company rule to direct rule as the British Raj, and Burma became one of its chief commissioner’s provinces. However, most of the territory taken at Yandabo was not included in this province, and indeed, after independence, became part of the Republic of India.
The Konbaung Dynasty was the final dynasty of the Burmese Empire The much smaller Burmese Empire became desperate, and contacted France for help. This made the British threaten them into becoming a protectorate. The Burmese refused, and British India invaded, annexing the rest of the territory, and ending the Burmese monarchy. The Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885) lasted just three weeks. Burma became a major province in British India. The Burmese monarchy relied heavily on religious endorsement: the monarchy would sponsor the monks, and the monks, who needed the money, would give legitimacy to the crown. The British had no need for this and stopped it, instead introducing separation of church and state, Queen Victoria as the only monarch, and promoting secular and even Christian education. The British were known for “divide-and-rule” tactics, and they applied them in Burma, where resistance to their rule continued for about a decade after 1885. They stripped apart the centralised government and monarchy and crushed opposition from the Bamar people. However, they allowed people in tribal areas, designated as Frontier Areas, to continue using their traditional governance as long as they did not cause problems, formally being governed separately from Burma proper. Christian missionaries brought with them schools, hospitals, and religious conversion. Some languages that had never been written down before now had their own alphabet and literature. Thus, they were not inclined to resist, and some even gained a sense of loyalty to the British. This obviously drew a wedge between the Bamar and the minorities, and this may explain why Myanmar is such an ethnically fragmented society.
Flag of British Burma Though the Burmese were never in a position to mount a serious military challenge to British rule, they had another weapon: embourgeoisement. Some educated men were allowed to travel to London to become lawyers, and believed that gradual liberal reforms would help raise the standard of rights for Burmese. Not only were they are colonised nation, but they were a colony of a colony, because Indian migrants would also have a higher status than them (as would Chinese). In the 1920s, progressive reform indeed brought some changes, including Rangoon College being separated from the University of Calcutta to become Rangoon University. This would be a hotbed of middle-class Burmese, who would grow to become more nationalist. Various rebellions would pop up, with the ‘thakin’ (master) movement, so-called because Burmese leaders would call themselves the real masters of the country and even put ‘thakin’ in front of their name, escaped the confines of student politics and began to spread nationally. The British responded, in 1937, by removing Burma from India and making it a separate Crown Colony. Burma would have its own government, even though it remained part of the British Empire. Its legislature would be empowered as well. Though most parties wanted independence in some way, they were factional and had large bouts of infighting. Still, an election was held in 1936, and Ba Maw became Burma’s first Premier.
Ba Maw The government was somewhat unstable, and forms of resistance grew in Burma. As the population became more aware and conscious, more would join strikes and protests, and this became a cycle. At the same time, Japan was engaging a campaign of territorial expansion, which threatened British Burma. As World War II broke out between the UK and Germany, Ba Maw announced he would refuse to participate in the war, for which he was jailed. The new Premier, U Saw, travelled to the UK to try and convince the British leader Winston Churchill to give Burma Dominion status (that held by Canada and Australia, where the country was basically fully independent but still part of the British Empire), but Churchill refused. Worried about his own future if Japan invaded, he also made contact with Japan. However, the British intercepted this and exiled him in Uganda. It was not particularly unwise, as after Pearl Harbor and the European and Pacific wars being intertwined, Japan indeed invaded and occupied Burma, making it the State of Burma, a nominally independent country, but a puppet state led by Ba Maw. The leaders of the Thakin movement, known as the Thirty Comrades, supported Japan, forming the Burma Independence Army (BIA) under Aung San, a former student leader. This became the Burma National Army (BNA) after ‘independence’. Many BIA soldiers took revenge on minority groups and Indians, who they viewed as suck-ups to the British. However, the Thirty Comrades viewed the Japanese as just as oppressive as the British, and independence as a sham.
Aung San quickly realised that the Japanese were even worse than the British. A follower of his was quoted by a British general as saying “if the British sucked our blood, then the Japanese ground our bones!” Thus, in 1944, the BNA changed sides, allying with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and their rival People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) to form the Anti-Fascist Organisation (AFO). Of course, the Japanese were defeated, and the AFO became a multi-party political alliance, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). The British wanted to try Aung San for his wartime collaboration, but his popularity made that impossible. In the end, the Labour government in London was happy to be rid of Burma, and independence agreements were signed in 1947. In general, the communists and conservatives in the AFPFL were dissatisfied, while the non-communist left was happiest. The communists accused them of selling out and were expelled from the AFPFL, but the AFPFL won a landslide in the 1947 pre-independence election. Premier Aung San would not quite make it to independence, as he was assassinated by gunmen, probably led by U Saw who was hanged for it. His replacement, U Nu, was the leader of the PRP, renamed the People’s Freedom (Socialist) Party or PF(S)P, and then in 1948 simply the Burma Socialist Party (BSP). Independence would indeed come in 1948 as the Union of Burma, with U Nu as Prime Minister.
Flag of the Union of Burma In fact, the Communists decided to form a parallel state, and an insurgency. There were two communist groups: the Communist Party (Burma) split from the CPB and AFPFL in 1946, and were known as the Red Flag Communists. The CPB which stayed were the White Flag Communists, but they too began an insurgency. Ethnic groups which were pro-British and thus feared retribution from the new independent government also armed. The Karen group formed the Karen National Union (KNU) with two military branches: the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). There existed groups of mujahideen (jihadists), Muslims who wanted their region’s annexation into Pakistan. The Pa-O National Organisation (PNO) had its Pa-O National Army (PNA). As well as the communists and EAOs, another problem was the existence of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT), who had lost the Chinese Civil War, and some of which had ended up trying to set up a base in Burma. Despite all of the instability, it should be said that U Nu’s government had some success in developing the young nation economically, for which they were rewarded with big wins in the 1951-2 election and the 1956 one. However, 1956 did give rise to a serious opposition, the National United Front (NUF). The NUF was syncretic with both left-wing opposition to the AFPFL and conservatives. In 1958, the BSP took themselves out of the AFPFL, and this caused a split. U Nu formed the “Clean AFPFL”, while the BSP faction was called the “Stable AFPFL”. U Nu stayed in power in a coalition with the NUF. However, this was shaky, and thus he called on military leader Ne Win to form an interim government pending elections.
Interim Prime Minister Ne Win will surely not cause any problems in the future Ne Win duly held these elections in 1960 and the Clean AFPFL won a landslide, putting U Nu back in power. However, in 1962, Ne Win performed a coup, taking power in a junta called the Revolutionary Council. He also formed his own party, the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), and made the ideology the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’, ruling for a quarter of a century. In 1974, he disbaned the junta and became a civilian leader of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, but little changed in practice. The BSPP declared themselves different from both the “bourgeois” social democracy, abolishing parliament, but also communists. In 1964 a one-party state was formally declared. Ne Win did provide a stable government, and its bizarre ideology meant it was neither pro-American nor pro-Soviet, thus dodging being a proxy battleground in the Cold War the same way much of the rest of South-East Asia was. However, it was economically struggling and he did not get rid of the EAOs. In 1987, he withdrew notes, making peoples’ savings worthless, and replaced them with Ks. 45/- and Ks. 90/- notes because an astrologer said that their factor nine was “auspicious”. This was somewhat suboptimal as everyone became penniless overnight, and this led to riots known as the 8888 Uprising (8 August 1988) which got rid of Ne Win. However, it did not bring democracy, as soon after this there was another military coup and junta called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) led by Gen. Saw Maung. This brutally cracked down on remaining protestors, but promised 1990 elections, which were duly granted. Also, they renamed the country to the Union of Myanmar in 1989. Aung San’s daughter Aung San Suu Kyi was a key leader of 8888 and helped form the National League for Democracy, while the BSPP had changed its name to the National Unity Party, still a proxy of the military. The NLD won a landslide, but the junta did not hand power over, instead just ignoring the results. Saw Maung was quickly replaced by Than Shwe in 1992, reportedly due to going mad (which has hardly stopped Myanma leaders before). In 1997, the SLORC was replaced by another junta called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). There was intermittent criticism and sanctions against Myanmar from the international community, and in a country with chronic poverty and civil war, when Than Shwe’s daughter had a wedding where she was ‘dripped out’ in multi-million-dollar jewellery, people were not thrilled. This led to the 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’ where Buddhist monks were a key part. Though the non-violent protest movement was suppressed, the SPDC did allow reforms and a dodgy 2008 referendum restored elections. However, these would be on the military’s terms: a quarter of the seats reserved for them, as well as the Home Affairs ministry, while Aung San Suu Kyi would be banned from the presidency. A 2010 election was held with the military party now being Thein Sein’s Union Solidarity and Development Party. The USDP won a landslide and Thein Sein indeed became President.
Thein Sein, a man lost to the sands of time Under Thein Sein, there were some reforms, most notably the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the registration of the NLD as a party, as well as an amnesty on political prisoners, and less repressive rules on speech and media. Because of double-jobbing rules, there were large-scale by-elections in 2012, which allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to become an MP and the party to take power in Parliament in 2015. Htin Kyaw became President, but the office of State Counsellor was made to give Aung San Suu Kyi power. However, the international community was somewhat bemused by her rule, as she also appealed to the Bamar majority, especially against the Rohingya minority. Rohingyas are Muslims, a group that began to be targeted after the 1962 coup. Many Muslims were seen as ‘Indians’ and thus British lackeys during the colonial period, where sectarianism was rife, and was also used by the Japanese. This was restored by Ne Win, forcing some Muslims into EAOs or mujahideen and continuing the cycle. Their home, Rakhine State has remained dreadfully poor, with tension between the Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims causing sectarian violence, and the Rohingya hugely discriminated against. A guerrilla force, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was formed, leading to a brutal crackdown in 2016 by the Myanma government and military, led, ultimately, by Aung San Suu Kyi. This is perhaps why that her second fight for freedom does not get the same attention that her first one did. Anyway, after winning another landslide in 2020, the military were sick of her, and for her troubles in helping them kill thousands of people, she was jailed again.
A Rohingya village turned to nothingness As it is known, the NLD did not go down without a fight. In fact, they set up their own National Unity Government and People’s Defence Forces (PDF). Myanmar is now a quagmire with the government on one side, and the NUG on the other, with various EAOs picking a side. Not every anti-government EAO is pro-NUG, but they are at least co-belligerents. One example is the four-member Northern Alliance, consisting of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which is ethnic Kachin; the CPB splinter Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which is fiercely pro-China, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which is ethnic Ta’ang, and the Arakan Army (AA), which is ethnic Rakhine and anti-Rohingya. A different ethnic alliance called the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) also exists, with its Federal Union Army of various ethnicities, plus other EAOs and non-ethnic groups like the CPB, still standing. Some EAOs have worked with the government, including even ARSA, which has fought against the AA. We’re still not done, because there are also EAOs which are explicitly neutral and non-combatants. For instance, in Wa State, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) managed to take control of the state. They don’t want independence, they don’t want war, they simply want to be left alone. The government allows this because the UWSA is not a threat and bats off EAOs that try encroaching on it. In case that wasn’t enough, the insurgency in north-east India has also spilled over into Myanmar, with the junta allowing them safe haven in exchange for attacking the NUG or enemy EAOs.
What power is worth to Min Aung Hlaing The international community has been split, and even ASEAN has. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore hate the junta, while Cambodia and Thailand have been more favourable towards them. East Timor also opposes the junta, while China is in a strange position, being naturally favourable to the junta (a clear enemy of the West). However, Min Aung Hlaing built a power base on border areas based on four crime families, who ran online scams. They lured Chinese workers over the border and then enslaved them, and the Communist Party of China did not take kindly to this (“nobody enslaves Chinese people but us!”). Thus, China has also been funding the MNDAA. However, it is no fan of the NUG either. India naturally is opposed to the junta but is worried that making an enemy of it too much will place Myanmar strictly in China’s sphere of influence. Russia is the main ally and funder of the junta. Min Aung Hlaing once implied Vladimir Putin was a reincarnation of the rat king Thawma:
“During the time of our Lord Buddha, when a rat king named Thawma dug up tubers and offered them to the Buddha, the Buddha smiled. When asked why he smiled, the Lord Buddha replied that the rat king Thawma would be reborn as the emperor of the Russian people, one of the 12 Western peoples, during the reign of King Pāpa after the year 2000 of the Buddhist era. He would be unrivalled in the art of weaponry, a unique weapons master emperor, and would become a close and friendly ally of the Burmese kings.”
The West’s influence here is somewhat limited, but it continues to support the NUG and place sanctions on the junta. Now, Myanmar is in something of a transition as the military junta has ended and there is officially a civilian government (!). There will be a presidential election. Probably, it will be won by Min Aung Hlaing, and ran in exactly the same way as before. Seeing as the government runs about 40% of the country it doesn’t matter too much. Still, some national-level (non-ethnic) parties ate into the USDP’s support a bit. Like the 2010 election when the NLD were banned, the NUP were the main opposition, getting 13.4% of the vote. The thing is, this doesn’t matter in practice because it is clear that having small parties to which the junta-turned-definitely-legitimate-government can tolerate will not threaten them. There is probably something to be analysed in the fact that the USDP allows itself to win 44% of the vote instead of 95% like most dictatorships. Perhaps they wanted to show that this was a truly democratic election, mostly for a domestic audience of some people who may be wavering. But the chart that matters is the one showing the war situation, not the electoral one.
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February: What’s going on with the elections?
Hello again readers,
2026’s shortest month is not short on elections. Quite the opposite, in fact. Nine national votes, several other votes, let’s just start.
Remember: I made a 2026 preview election, but several elections either were not confirmed then or did not meet the requirements.
For those that already have a score on the Matters-o-Meter, I instead will give a prediction.
On 1 February, Costa Rica holds its general election. I already described Costa Rica and indeed this election in the above article, so here’s the abridged version. At the last election, six parties won seats. The National Liberal Party (PLN) won the most with nineteen. This party was neoliberal in nature, being one of Costa Rica’s “grand old parties” during the 20th century, when it had a two-party system. Despite winning the most seats, presidential candidate José María Figueres (a former President) lost in a runoff to Rodrigo Chaves Robles. Chaves Robles belongs to the Social Democratic Progress Party (PPSD), being a finance minister in the old left-wing administration but reinvented himself as a populist. As time went on in his presidency, he became more conservative. His party won ten seats. The Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), which was the other side of the neoliberal two-party system, won nine seats, while the right-wing New Republic Party (PNR) won seven. The liberal Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) and the left-wing Broad Front (FA) won six.
President Rodrigo Chaves Robles (PPSD) Prediction: The result had already happens, so I’m just going to explain it. This time, the PPSD was an irrelevance (its candidate came tenth). Instead, the continuity candidate was Laura Fernández Delgado of the Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), which was a splinter from the official PPSD. She said she would appoint Chaves to her cabinet and build El Salvador-style “mega prisons” to deal with crime. Chaves is still popular with the public. The PLN candidate was the economist Álvaro Ramos Chaves. He was the only person who was even competitive. However, opinion polls suggested Fernández would win, and indeed she did, in the first round, getting over 40% of the vote which is necessary to avoid a runoff. It seems Central America is turning to right-wing governance to deal with the organised crime which has plagued it for so long.
On the same date, Haute-Savoie’s 3rd constituency in France held the second round of a National Assembly by-election. As France is a semi-presidential country, the president gets the most attention from foreigners, but the legislature is important for the day-to-day running of the country. France’s political system has evolved over time, with this constituency appearing at the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958. France had experienced unstable and divided government during the Fourth Republic period between 1946 and 1958, under the parliamentary Fourth Republic, and this led to the end of parliamentarianism, with wartime resistance leader Charles de Gaulle being rallied around as a president instead. The problem was that unlike in the UK and West Germany, there were too many different parties for an effective parliamentary system. The initial coalition was made up of the French Communist Party (PCF), the social-democratic French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO), and the Christian-democratic Popular Republican Movement (MRP). However, the departure of the communists from government, and the rise of the Gaullist party (which went through various guises) made even this unstable structure mathematically unfeasible.
Wartime leader Charles de Gaulle led the transition from a parliamentary to presidential system Haute-Savoie’s third constituency is in some ways, a place where time stands still. This is a rural and mountainous area in the Alps, close to the Swiss and Italian border in France’s east. De Gaulle was someone for whom time would stand still as well. To him, a sort of conservative, France was still a major power, even during the Cold War. It wasn’t simply one of the countries in the Western Bloc. In the 1958 election, his “Union for the New Republic” (UNR) was victorious, defeating the old parties and the conservative National Centre for Independents and Peasants (CNIP). This parliament and local authorities would make de Gaulle President by electoral college. However, Haute-Savoie’s 3rd constituency would stick to the old ways. The UNR didn’t even run here, and an MRP candidate, Joseph Philippe, won with 68.9% of the vote against an SFIO candidate in a runoff. De Gaulle used his majority to call for a referendum on direct suffrage for the president. Apart from the UNR, the other parties supported a ‘no’ vote. The CNIP split over the issue. However, de Gaulle got his way with 62.3% support, and called new parliamentary elections to boot. The UNR won a huge landslide. Even though the MRP slid down further (to fifth), they still won here, with Philippe winning 54.4% in a runoff with the UNR.
This constituency’s first MP, Joseph Philippe De Gaulle was re-elected in 1965, but with the left resurgent enough to find a challenger, François Mitterand, who managed to win 44.8% of the vote in the runoff. De Gaulle was wounded, and the UNR was renamed the Union of Democrats for the Fifth Republic (UD-Ve). This party did win, but what was clear was that the opposition was more strongly-defined, with the SFIO-led Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS) and PCF showing big gains, and the centrist and conservative parties weakening. In Haute-Savoie’s 3rd constituency, Philippe had died in 1966, with his ‘alternate’ Roch Meynier replacing him. The MRP and CNIP merged into the Democratic Centre, but this would not save Meynier. UD-Ve candidate Maurice Herzog, a famous mountaineer who had served as de Gaulle’s Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports, topped the poll, and in the second round, Herzog was elected with 46.2%, beating the SFIO on 41.6% and Meynier on 12.2%. It took a decade for the Gaullist wave which swept France to finally reach this part of the country; just as the rest of it was going to come to blows about the conservative system he set up.
‘May 68’ is just a month in the calendar, but any Frenchman will know exactly what it means In May 1968, the counterculture of the 1960s hit France, with protests in universities. The police suppression made them grow and grow, and suddenly they turned into general strikes. De Gaulle managed to restore order and called new elections, which his renamed Union for the Defence of the Republic (UDR) won in a huge landslide. Herzog was re-elected easily. Despite this, de Gaulle’s attempted administrative reform with another referendum. He tried to use his popularity to blackmail the electorate, threatening to resign if they voted ‘No’. The problem was that Prime Minister Georges Pompidou was popular enough amongst the Gaullists anyway, and so there was an obvious successor. Only the Union of Democrats for the Republic (still UDR, but another name change) supported a ‘yes’, and with 52.4% of the vote the ‘No’ side won leading to presidential elections. This election saw a revival of the Democratic Centre, with Alain Poher being seen as the leader of the ‘no’ campaign. The SFIO performed very badly, with most votes going to the PCF or Democratic Centre. The PCF just missed the second round, with Poher sneaking in front, but still convincingly losing to Pompidou in the runoff.
In Georges Pompidou, the Gaullists had a clear successor to their namesake The first elections under Pompidou were in 1973. By then, responding to their disaster, the SFIO reorganised itself into the Socialist Party (PS). Also, the Democratic Centre and centre-right Radical Party combined into the Reformist Movement (MR). However, left-leaning members of this party split into the Movement of Radicals of the Left (MRG) and allied with the PS. The UDR won a clear majority, but not quite the huge landslide of 1968. In the Haute-Savoie constituency, Herzog beat PCF and MR candidates in a runoff. Pompidou would die in 1974. The PCF and MRG backed Mitterand as the main left-wing candidate, while the Gaullists did not have a clear successor. The official UDR candidate was in fact in third on 15.1%. Valery Giscard d’Estaing was leader of the National Federation of Independent Republicans (FNRI). This party split from the CNIP to back Yes in the 1962 referendum, and had been a steadfast ally of the Gaullists ever since. However, it was not itself a Gaullist party, declaring its attitude to Gaullism as a “yes, but”. British readers may compare them to the Liberal Democrats under Nick Clegg: close to the main right-wing party, but trying to influence them in a liberal (and crucially, pro-European direction). Giscard won with 50.8% of the vote in the election. Mitterand was getting closer and closer. This was the first non-Gaullist President in the sixteen-year history of the French Republic. “Giscardism” would need its own party. The FNRI became the Republican Party (PR), while the Democratic Centre, what was left of CNIP, and others, became the Centre of Social Democrats (CDS). PS members opposed to the alliance with the PCF formed the Social Democratic Party (PDS… why does this all sound familiar?). These three parties, plus the Radicals, became the Union for French Democracy (UDF).
It is no coincidence that the UDF logo is a map of Europe Giscard governed in a genuinely liberal and even progressive manner, leading to concern from the Gaullists, who re-organised as the Rally for the Republic (RPR) in 1976 under Jacques Chirac. Though the left were expected to win, the PS and PCF grew apart and they ended up losing. The RPR won with the UDF in second, leading to more strength for the Gaullists within a more difficult alliance. The RPR would lose their majority, and this constituency was one of those to go. Engineer Claude Birraux ran as the UDF (and specifically CDS) candidate, and beat Herzog in the first round. With the PCF withdrawing to support the Socialist, Herzog had no choice to do the same to avoid non-socialist vote-splitting, and so Birraux was elected. The presidential election had both two socialist, and two right-wing candidates in 1981. Giscard won 28.3%, Mitterand 25.9%, Chirac 18%, and the PCF candidate 15.4%. Despite this, Mitterand won the runoff with 51.8% of the vote, and dissolved the National Assembly. This was the first time in the 23-year history of the Fifth Republic that it had a left-wing President. His first act was to dissolve the National Assembly, and the PS won a big majority, dealing a blow not just to the RPR and UDF, but the PCF too.
In Mitterand, France’s left finally had a leader to topple the Gaullists and their liberal allies Still, like it would to Gaullism, Haute-Savoie 3 would resist the Socialist wave. Birraux won his runoff with the PS easily. In 1986, the election would have a twist: PR. The RPR and UDF would ally as the Union of the Opposition for Renewal (UOR), and defeat the PS. This made the Gaullist Chirac Prime Minister under the Socialist Mitterand. In Haute-Savoie, the UDF won two seats, the PS won two (under two different lists due to a local dispute) and the RPR one. The UOR hated PR because it helped the far-right extremist National Front (FN) get seats at their expense, and abolished it. The 1988 election was tense between Mitterand and Chirac. Mitterand won the first round easily, while Chirac narrowly beat the UDF candidate. The National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen came a strong fourth, while the PCF declined hugely. Mitterand won the second round with 54%, and called new elections, which the PS won easily, while both the PCF and especially the FN declined. The UDF vote held up better than the RPR one. In Haute-Savoie 3, back with new boundaries, the RPR decided to back the UDF candidate in the Union of the Rally and the Centre (URC), with that being Michel Meylan from the Republican Party, who won easily. In France, the left were in the ascendency, but this constituency would be a little house of liberal conservatism nonetheless.
Jacques Chirac would revive the Gaullists after they lost their momentum on the right to the liberals In 1993, the Socialists were battered in the election, losing a huge landslide to the RPR and UDF. Meylan won easily against an FN candidate in the runoff. In 1995, there were two RPR candidates for president with Chirac and Prime Minister Éduoard Balladur both running. The PS topped the poll then, with Chirac edging ahead of Balladur and Le Pen, with the PCF in fifth. However, Chirac beat Jospin with 52.6% of the vote. Despite this, the PS genuinely did experience revival, winning the 1997 election at the expense of the RPR and UDF. But in Haute-Savoie 3, Meylan again easily beat the FN candidate. In 2002, Chirac topped the poll for re-election, but Le Pen surprisingly beat the PS candidate to second. The UDF declined, but the fact that several other left-wing candidates took a share of the vote led to the PS coming third. This helped Chirac as all the parties endorsed him against the extremist Le Pen, and he won 82.2% of the vote. Chirac had also scored a big win in terms of party politics. After the more centrist parts of the UDF, the CDS and PSD, merged into the Democratic Force (FD), the Republican Party had renamed itself Liberal Democracy (DL), and emphasised its more right-wing liberal elements. They then split from the party. However, in Haute-Savoie 3, Meylan refused and became a ‘direct member’ of the UDF, whose collective parts merged into an actual party later on. The RPR merged with DL to form the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), and thus the UDF was hugely weakened and became a minor party. The UMP won a landslide in the 2002 election, and the PS was the main opposition. With Meylan retiring, his deputy Martial Saddier, who stayed with DL into the UMP, topped the poll and easily beat the FN in a runoff.
Martial Saddier served the constituency for two decades as a UMP member One of Chirac’s achievements was limiting the presidency to five years by referendum in 2000. As a result, the next election was in 2007. Nicolas Sarkozy from the UMP won the first round ahead of the Socialist candidate, with the UDF and Le Pen third and fourth respectively. Sarkozy won 53.1% of the vote to be elected. In the parliamentary vote, the UMP won again. In Haute-Savoie 3, Saddier even won in the first round. In the 2012 presidential race, François Hollande of the PS won in the first round ahead of Sarkozy, with Le Pen in third and left-winger Jean-Luc Mélénchon beating the UDF, which rebranded into the Democratic Movement (MoDem) to show its ‘autonomy’ from the Gaullist camp (as the UDF brand had been associated with propping up the Gaullists). Hollande won with 51.6% of the vote. The PS also defeated the UMP in the 2012 parliamentary elections. In Haute-Savoie 3, Saddier did win but with a runoff, with his rival being from Europe Ecology The Greens (EELV). The Greens, who many natural Socialists voted for in 1993 as a protest, had become the EELV and were backed by the PS in this constituency.
Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 election ended the two-party system which dominated the Fifth Republic In the whole of the Fifth Republic, certainly from the 1965 election and rise of Mitterand onwards, France had been dominated by a two-party system: the Gaullists on the right, and the Socialists on the left. Yes, there were others: the liberals, communists, greens, and far-right, but all four forces ultimately were too small to go alone, and the first three were ultimately perceived to be members of a bigger bloc. Emmanuel Macron was part of the Hollande government, but formed his own party, En Marche ! (On the Move!, EM), which was liberal in orientation rather than socialist or even social-democratic. This, and the good performance of Melenchon, running under the banner of La France Insoumise (LFI, France in Revolt) led the official Socialist candidate to come fifth with just 6.4% of the vote. Macron won 24%, while Le Pen’s daughter Marine Le Pen won 21.3%. Her task was to reform the FN from a far-right party to a populist one, like those rising in Europe: radical, but not quite ‘extremist’. Sarkozy renamed the UMP to The Republicans (LR) in a restructure, but their candidate François Fillon had a nepotism scandal and fell to third with 20%, ahead of Melenchon on 19.6%. Macron then won 66.1% of the runoff vote. The two-party system died immediately, and has not come back. The near-decade of Macronism has completely changed France for good. Macron made Édouard Philippe his first Prime Minister. Philippe was a member of LR but switched to EM after Fillon’s scandal. He led a coalition with the MoDem to a ‘presidential majority’ in the election, for which EM was renamed La République En Marche ! (LREM, The Republic on the Move). The LR came second in a big alliance called the Union of the Right and Centre (UDR). Their main ally was the Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI), which was led by dissident UDF members who opposed their change to MoDem and the end of the alliance with the UMP. The PS and MRG (now the Party of the Radical Left or PRG) plus others took a huge whacking, while LFI and the FN rallied. Saddier was in big trouble as the LREM candidate was eight points ahead in the first round, but managed to survive with 51.5% in the runoff. In 2020, Philippe stepped down and was replaced by Jean Castex, another former LR member. Notably, neither men actually joined LREM.
Marine Le Pen has transformed the radical right from a noisy protest to a party that could win power Le Pen expelled her own father from the FN in 2015, and wanted to further separate the party from him, so renamed it the National Rally (RN) in 2018. Again, she came second to Macron in the 2022 election, but it was narrow between the top three: Macron, Le Pen, and Mélénchon. The Republicans came a distant fifth, and there was no revival for the Socialists in tenth. Macron won with 58.6% of the vote, and named Labour Minister Élisabeth Borne as his PM. Borne led the LREM-MoDem coalition, now called Ensemble (Together), and also included Philippe’s new party Horizons and the Radical Party. This won the election, but lost its majority. Blaming the split in the left for Mélénchon narrowly missing the runoff (with EELV, PCF, and PS candidates getting about 8.5% together), the New Ecological and Social People’s Union (NUPES) was formed. It would be made of four planks: LFI and its allies, the “Ecologist Pole” led by the EELV but with other green parties, the PS, and the PCF. Thus, the radical left had wrested control of the left for the first time in decades. They came second, with the RN third and UDC fourth. Even in this circumstance, Haute-Savoie 3 stayed loyal to LR. Saddier resigned in 2021 to take a different office, but his successor Christelle Petex-Levet easily beat an LFI/NUPES candidate in a runoff. Still, the Gaullist heartland was getting smaller and smaller, and smaller than all of the new ‘big three’: the Macronists, the left, and the nationalist right. The lack of majority did mean that the Gaullists would at least have a lot of influence in parliament, and this hamstrung Macron in the turn of the year 2023 to 2024. An immigration bill didn’t get the LR nod and was therefore voted down with a Green ‘motion to dismiss’ (the first successful one in fifteen years), and referred to a committee. The right-wing committee made several amendments, so much so that it even got Le Pen’s endorsement, leading to shock from many members of Renaissance (which LREM became in 2022). Though Macron is now considered a figure of the centre-right, in 2017 his win was seen as a triumph for liberalism after the election of Donald Trump and the UK’s vote to leave the EU in 2016, and now he was voting with Le Pen for immigration restrictions. Therefore it led to the biggest rebellion from the government party in fifty years from left-leaning Ensemble MPs. It snuck through, but Borne was removed as Prime Minister as Macron looked to revitalise his government after the crisis. National Education Minister Gabriel Attal, a popular young figure, was named the new PM.
Gabriel Attal is considered a potential heir to Macron In the European Parliament elections in 2024, the National Rally-led alliance scored a huge win, earning thirty of 81 seats. The Renaissance bloc technically came second with thirteen, but only because the different parts of NUPES ran separately: the PS-led bloc won thirteen as well, while the LFI-led list won nine, and the EELV-led list (with that party now renamed The Ecologists) won five; a combined 27 seats. Therefore, it was a clear third place in reality for the Macron bloc. He responded by dissolving Parliament for new elections. By 2024, the new three-party system had strengthened. NUPES expanded by allowing some additional left-leaning parties to join, renaming itself the New Popular Front (NFP). Meanwhile, the “fourth party”, The Republicans, were in crisis. Éric Ciotti, who lost the primary for the 2022 presidential election, then won the party leadership election, and announced an alliance with the RN for the 2024 race. However, the LR executive committee was massively against this, and it led to a leadership dispute, sometimes with two LR candidates in a constituency, one backed by the Ciotti wing (the joint RN-LR candidates are known as Union of the Far-Right or UXD candidates, while Ciotti had his own internal group, called the Union of the Right for the Republic or UDR, which became an independent party for the election). Ciotti was restored as party leader and member by a court despite attempts to remove him, but left LR after the party, fully committing to the UDR. In the end, the NFP won the most seats with 180, followed by Ensemble on 159, with 125 for the RN and a further seventeen for UXD candidates for a total of 142, the LR executive committee-backed candidates won 39. However, the RN/UXD won the most seats. In Haute-Savoie 3, Petex-Levet was beaten in the first round by Antoine Valentin, the UDR candidate. Valentin won 39.7%, Petex-Levet won 32.4%, and the LFI/NFP candidate won 24.0%. The latter withdrew from the second round, keeping Petex in a job with 56.2%. Overall, the 2024 election was a defeat for Ensemble, so Attal resigned. Michel Barnier was named the new PM. Barnier, an LR grandee, had served in several high French and EU domestic offices, being in charge of EU negotiations with the UK over Brexit, plus organising the 1992 Winter Olympics in Albertville. This further showed Macron was moving closer to the right, with Marine Le Pen giving a lukewarm endorsement and the NFP being furious, as they won the most seats. Nonetheless, this type of thing just made LR more irrelevant. Macron edged closer to the right, while Le Pen moved closer to the centre, meaning there was little space left in the centre-right. In fact, the RN abstained on a vote of confidence to allow Barnier in. However, months later they changed their mind after the government tried to put through a budget without a parliamentary vote. This made Barnier’s government the shortest in the Fifth Republic. The replacement was François Bayrou. Bayrou was a MoDem grandee who was their candidate for President three times, performing strongest in 2007 when he came third. In September, he revealed an austerity budget, for which he was removed by the NFP and RN/UDR.
Current PM Sébastien Lecornu Sébastien Lecornu, who left LR to become a member of EM in 2017, was the new PM, but resigned a day later because LR threatened to leave the governing coalition. However, he managed to get agreements with LR and the Socialists over pension reform to stay in office. This has caused tension in the PS. Thus, we have the party system: on the left, the NFP, made up of LFI, the PCF, Ecologists, and PS. LFI and the PS are the strongest forces, but do not trust each other, with LFI being more populist left, and the PS being more centre-left. Renaissance is Macron’s force, with allied parties forming Ensemble, and LR and the UDC is an ally because of its own fading relevance. Finally, RN is the radical right, with the UDR on its side. In 2025, Petex-Levet resigned, citing the toxicity of politics. It was in this context that the by-election was held, with a total of eleven candidates. Antoine Valentin ran again for the UDR, with the Republican candidate being Christophe Fournier. Notably, there was not one unified NFP candidate. Anthony Penhouët ran for Place Publique (Public Square, PP), which was founded in 2018 as a centre-left party. PP is not part of the NFP, but won the PS endorsement. PP was founded by the MEP Raphaël Gucksmann, who is considered an important presidential candidate that may battle with Mélénchon for left-leaning votes. Valentin won a storming first round with 45.1%. Fournier won 15.2%, with Penhouët on 13.5%. A localist candidate won 7.8%, with the LFI candidate on just 6.5%. Notably, there was no Ensemble candidate to avoid vote-splitting on the centre-right. After this, the other candidates dropped out, with the left-wingers calling on voters to block Valentin (in effect, endorsing Fournier).
Matters-o-Meter: Macron’s second term is becoming incredibly messy and everything in France is geared towards the 2027 election. But this is a big win for the radical right in a conservative stronghold. Since 1958, it has never had a left-wing representative, nor a far-right one, always having either a liberal or a Gaullist (and the two were traditional allies anyway). Thus, a change here is rare. In 1967, the liberal incumbent Roch Meynier lost to the Gaullist Maurice Herzog, but Herzog lost to the liberal Claude Birreaux in 1978. The liberal Michel Meylan retired and at the 2002 election, there was no UDF candidate, with the party damaged at the time. A Gaullist won in their place, and since then the Gaullist party (UMP and then LR) have always held the seat, surviving even the high point of Macronism in 2017. However, this time Valentin won with 59.1%, while Fournier got just 40.9%. This was a big win for the far-right (although it should be noted that the UDR is technically itself a Gaullist party, being a splinter of the LR, just not the ‘official’ one and in alliance with the RN), and just as big a defeat for the government. With Macron term-limited, can Macronism survive, or will French politics end up split simply between right and left? The RN seems the most credible force at the moment, because the NFP is beset by fighting mostly between LFI and the PS. Will Glucksmann and Mélénchon both run, perhaps allowing a Macronist candidate like Attal or Édouard Philippe to make the second round? RN leader Marine Le Pen is currently banned, with party President Jordan Bardella expected to be the candidate. This by-election answers none of these questions, but shows just how small the LR heartland is becoming, as they become basically a satellite force of the liberals, reversing the trend of the latter 20th century. It’s a defeat for Macron too, while the left’s split is also significant here. 5/10
Let’s head to 3 February, for the special election in Alabama House District 38 (in the US). American politics was explained in the above article, just scroll down to November where it talks about the midterms. Basically, the country has one of the strongest two-party systems in the world, with very few areas of success for minor parties. The government is the right-wing Republican Party, with the liberal Democratic Party in opposition, and the party colours of red (R) and blue (D) are often used to describe areas. As it happens, Alabama is a deep red state, and this rural area is no different.
Matters-o-Meter: Debbie Wood (R) was first elected in 2018, and then re-elected in 2022 without a Democratic opponent. However, she resigned because her husband accepted a new job in Florida, taking the family with him. Chambers County Republican Party chair Kristin Nelson and farmer Garrett Dixon advanced to a primary runoff ahead of police officer Micah Messner, with Nelson winning that runoff. On the Democratic side, the candidate is called Hazel Floyd. Though full results aren’t in at the time of writing, Nelson has about 85% of the current vote, and Democrats don’t have a chance here. 2/10
There was an election on the same date in New York’s 36th State Assembly District. New York is the opposite of Alabama, being a blue state. Unlike the other local elections, you may well have heard of the incumbent: Zohran Mamdani (D) was elected Mayor of New York City, the country’s largest, last year. The area is located in Queens, both a county and a borough of NYC. In many parts of New York, especially NYC, the battle is not between Democrats and Republicans, but ‘moderate’ (centrist) and ‘progressive’ (left-wing) Democrats.
Matters-o-Meter: The Republicans have not bothered with a candidate here since 2012! Incumbent Aravella Simotas won that race with 84% of the vote anyway, but lost her primary in a very tight race to Mamdani in 2020. Mamdani ran unopposed in the general, and his next two races. This time Diana Moreno won the local Democratic Party, Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), and Mamdani’s endorsement, with two other candidates, both Democrats who failed to get the nomination, running with the lines ‘Queens for All’ and ‘People First’. Moreno won with 73.9% of the vote anyway. 2/10
On the same day, there was an election in New York’s 74th State Assembly District. Once again the incumbent may be known to some people: Harvey Epstein (D) was made famous by a very funny Saturday Night Live sketch poking fun at his unfortunate name. He decided to move to NYC’s City Council. This is an uber-safe seat in Manhattan, which includes the UN Headquarters. The last time a Republican ran here was 2022, where Epstein won 82.9% of the vote; in 2024 they didn’t bother.
Matters-o-Meter: Democrat Keith Powers is well-known in New York City, being the Majority Leader on NYC Council. Unlike in Mamadani’s old seat, there is a Republican candidate called Joseph Foley, but unsurprisingly, Powers thrashed him with 82.3% of the vote. 2/10
We aren’t going to have to go very far, because on the same date New York’s 47th Senate District held a special election. Incumbent Brad Hoylman-Sigal (D) became Borough President of Manhattan, with the district in the west of the borough. Hoylman-Sigal has been elected seven times, and faced opposition in the general election from a Republican only twice, in 2014 and 2024. In 2024, he won 83.8% of the vote.
Matters-o-Meter: NYC Councilman Erik Bottcher is the Democrat, and faces a Republican called Charlotte Friedman. Preliminary results show Bottcher winning over 90% of the vote. 2/10
On the same date, there was also a special election in New York’s 61st Senate District. Incumbent Sean Ryan (D) stepped down to become Mayor of Buffalo. This district has been more competitive, with Ryan winning it in 2022 following a redistricting (the district was previously the 60th, which he flipped in 2020). In 2024, he won 61.7% of the vote. Chair of the Erie County Democratic Party Jeremy Zellner ran against the Republican candidate Dan Gagliardo.
Matters-o-Meter: Though at least this race was somewhat competitive, it was still for a seat in one state’s Senate, which is 41-22 Democratic-controlled anyway. And it wasn’t that competitive anyway. Zellner won with 59.5% support.
8 February is a mega day of elections, starting with a general election in Japan. I spoke at length about the Japanese political system in my review of the Fukui gubernatorial election held last month.
Basically, Japan’s governing party is the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). After being founded in 1955, its main rival was the left-wing Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Because of the Cold War dynamics between them, these were quite big parties with big factions, with the LDP, who always won the elections, in particular being split with liberals and right-wing nationalists, and everything in between being in the same party. The 1993 election, the first after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, saw the LDP finally lose their majority, but the JSP also take a big hit. Many of the new parties that randomly sprung up seemed to simply be LDP splinters that wanted that party out of power over various corruption scandals, but themselves be rather syncretic without a strong ideological basis. Chief among them was the New Frontier Party (NFP). This coalition, with every party except the LDP and the communists quickly collapsed and the JSP got in power, but in alliance with the LDP. The JSP would, over time, quickly lose its major-party status and many of their members formed the Democratic Party (the rump became the Social Democratic Party, SDP, which is a lot smaller). When the NFP itself collapsed, many members joined this party, which renamed itself the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), leading to a new two-party system.
The LDP’s own English section on their website uses this logo with ‘Lib Dems’ as the abbreviation. Calling them this should come with a jail sentence The DPJ’s origin meant that it didn’t really have a clear ideology, and instead elections were simply fought on good governance rather than “left vs right”. This made the DPJ a more feasible vote, and they took power in 2009, but this government was a failure for various reasons including economic challenges and the Fukushima nuclear disaster, so the LDP won a big majority in 2012 under right-winger Shinzo Abe. His coalition partner was Komeito (Justice Party), which was founded by the leader of a Buddhist sect, and was generally more centrist and therefore was a moderating influence. Abe wanted to increase the size and role of Japan’s military, something strictly limited by Japan’s constitution. Komeito supported this to some extent, but not fully, and even then, it would need two-thirds of the House in favour. At the same time, the DPJ was falling apart after losing the 2012 and 2014 election, and rebranding as simply the Democratic Party (DP) in 2016. This party got thumped in Tokyo elections, for the governorship in 2016 by the independent Yuriko Koike, and then her party Tomin First no Kai (Tokyoites First) in the 2017 house election. With the DP in disarray, Abe called an election, and Koike formed her own party, Kibō no Tō to try and capitalise. She only let in the more conservative members of the DP, with those having heritage from the JSP days not allowed in, and they formed their own Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). In an upset, the CDP beat Kibō no Tō to become the official opposition.
Yuriko Koike’s unwillingness to let left-leaning figures into her Kibō no Tō backfired, leading to her retreat from national politics The CDP’s name was deliberately chosen to mark its opposition to changing the constitution’s military provision. Koike retreated from national politics, and Kibō no Tō became the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), which in 2020 suffered as a large part of it merged into the CDP. Abe resigned on health grounds in that year, and new PM Yoshihide Suga did not last long due to his handling of COVID-19. His replacement Fumio Kishida faced a 2021 election, where the LDP won handily, and the CDP lost some ground in the opposition stakes to the more right-wing Japan Innovation Party (Ishin or ‘Restoration’ for short) which had a huge base in the city of Osaka but attempted to become more relevant nationally. Notably, Abe’s 2022 assassination by a youngster whose mother had given her life savings to a Christian sect close to the LDP and a slush fund scandal scandalised the right-wing factions in the LDP. The LDP’s polling was hit and Kishida went, replaced by Shigeru Ishiba who beat right-leaning candidate Sanae Takaichi in the leadership election. He held an election almost immediately in 2024, which was the last to be held and thus quite useful for the sake of comparison.
Fumio Kishida tried to take on the LDP’s right-wing factions The 2024 election saw ten parties win seats. The LDP lost its majority, winning 191. The CDP won 148, decent gains. Ishin won 38, with the DPFP winning 28 and Komeito on 24. The left-wing progressive Reiwa Shinsengumi (Reiwa is the current ‘era’ name in Japan, while Shinsengumi were an elite group of commoner swordsmen during the 19th century) went up to nine, with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), always a minor force, on eight. Two radical right-wing parties won seats: Sanseitō (Political Participation Party) and the Conservative Party of Japan (CPJ) on three each, while the SDP won one, a far cry from its halcyon days as the JSP. Twelve independents won seats. Not only did the LDP lose their majority, but they were short even when adding Komeito’s seats. After negotiations, Ishin and the DPFP decided to abstain to allow Ishiba to carry on. However, in the upper house, Sanseitō made big gains and the coalition lost its majority there, too. Ishiba resigned, and this time Takaichi came in.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. You may realise the blue ribbon on both her and Kishida’s suit: it is in tribute to Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea The difference between the LDP and Sanseitō is quite stark. The LDP faction of Abe represented an old-style nationalism, one where Japan’s military had to be revived because of honour and glory and the Emperor and so on. However, this new type was quite different, worried that Japan would be ruined by immigration, similar to right-wing populism in Europe. Takaichi quickly latched on and started denouncing multiculturalism, and Komeito weren’t happy, especially as the right-wing figures she appointed to Cabinet were implicated in the slush fund scandal. They broke a coalition that had lasted since 1999, and instead, the LDP aligned with Ishin, and called a new election to get her own mandate. Komeito acted quickly and formed an alliance with the CDP called the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), merging the parties in the lower house. At first, it seemed like an election between the LDP and CRA. Takaichi had huge personal popularity, especially amongst young people, and used it by threatening to resign if the LDP-Ishin coalition did not win a majority. This cut into the support of Sanseitō. And as time has gone on, polls have looked better and better for Takaichi. Youngsters have engaged in ‘Sana-katsu’: stanning Sanae (for older readers, a ‘stan’ is an obsessive fan, but usually of a celebrity rather than a politician).
Matters-o-Meter: This is a funny one to rate, because Japan is a G7 country and obviously very important. But Japanese elections are often very predictable. Because the momentum is with the government so much, it is obvious they are going to win and give Takaichi a free hand. I think her popularity is hugely significant for a few reasons. Firstly, it revitalises the LDP which took a whacking under Ishiba. Secondly, it puts the right-wing faction back in the ascendency for the first time since the fallout over the scandal and death of Abe. Ishin may well have a pretty long period as being what Komeito were, a steadfast ally of the LDP. Also, it’s going to look pretty ugly for the main opposition. Since the 2009-12 government, voters have not trusted them, and it seems they are willing to put up with the LDP mostly because of this. The CRA has not captured imaginations at all. At the start, there was a talk of them winning the election. Now, it’s pretty clear they will lose seats; some projections have them losing as much as two-thirds. It is clear that senior party leaders will be hurt. Another impact is that it will forestall the gains of the real far-right, with Sanseitō making only modest gains. With Ishin, the LDP will probably have a ‘supermajority’ and Takaichi will be the most powerful PM since Abe. The other opposition will suffer, although the DPFP will remain somewhat significant. Anyway, this election is important. But the results feel like a foregone conclusion. 7/10
On the same date, Portugal will have the second round of its presidential election. I already wrote an article about the first round:
Portugal has traditionally had a two-party system, but with some minor parties due to PR. The big two are the centre-right (sic) Social Democratic Party (PDS), and the centre-left Socialist Party (PS). They would alternate power, sometimes in majority, and sometimes backed up by one of the smaller parties. The Socialists scored a big win in 2022, leading to the Christian democratic CDS-People’s Party (CDS-PP, the CDS stands for Social and Democratic Centre) winning no seats. However, the PDS added the CDS-PP to a Democratic Alliance (AD) in 2024 which won the election, with a minority. In 2025, the two-party system was broken, as while the AD came first, the PS came third, narrowly behind Chega, the right-wing populist party led by André Ventura. Prime Minister Luís Montenegro now rules, relying on support of either the PS or Chega on an issue-by-issue basis. The presidency has some level of relevance because he leads the negotiations when a coalition has to be built, which due to there now being a three-party system is always.
Prime Minister Luís Montenegro The current President, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (PSD) was term-limited. In a surprise, the Socialist candidate António José Seguro won the first round easily with 31.1%, a boost for the PS. André Ventura came second with 23.5%. It was expected that Ventura would win the first round, and Seguro would get through in second but it would be more competitive. An eight-point win for Seguro was not anticipated. João Cotrim de Figueiredo, the former leader of the right-liberal Liberal Initiative (IL) won 16%. Former Admiral Henrique Gouveia e Melo won 12.3% as an independent, while PSD candidate Luís Marques Mendes won just 11.3%. It was a bad election for the alternative left-wing parties too, with the best among them narrowly cracking 2%.
Seguro has made use of his own name, promising a ‘Safe Future’ (Futuro Seguro) if elected. Great bantz! Matters-o-Meter: Obviously the growth of right-wing populism in Europe is interesting. Let’s look at the general trend: first they are seen as reprehensible by all parties, and then over time they are more accepted (see Le Pen in the French section above as an example). I think Chega are going through that now. Notably, though many PSD, CDS-PP, and IL members endorsed Seguro, including Marques Mendes, the parties themselves refused to endorse any candidate. Luís Montenegro won power in the first place after moving the PSD to the right, and now his position leads to him having to work with Chega. The thing is, that once populist parties actually taste power, their support plateaus. Ventura also has no chance here. Seguro will win with about two-thirds of the vote, according to polls, and surely there is not enough time for a 15% swing. Ventura actually winning would be seismic, but it’s so unlikely that this election for what is after all a mostly ceremonial office gets a low score. 3/10
On the same date, Thailand has a general election. In the annual preview post, I gave the brief history. Thailand has had a huge number of coups from its military, and we’ll start the abridged version in 2001, when the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT, Thais Love Thais Party), the creation of the businessman Thaksin Shinawatra, won power. Thaksin was popular, and won the 2005 election with a majority, something that hadn’t happened before in a traditionally fragmented party system. Many believed Thaksin had too much power, and after changing foreign ownership laws so his family could sell holdings, this led to protests. Thaksin held new elections in 2006, but these were boycotted by the opposition. After criticism, a pretext was found to annul them and hold new ones, but before these could take place another coup occurred. Thaksin and the TRT were banned, but most of their members just formed a new People’s Power Party (PPP) and won the election in 2007. Despite massive protests from royalists, and the dissolution of the PPP, they won again in 2011 under the new name Pheu Thai Party (For Thais Party, PTP). In 2014, the Thaksinite government was removed by another coup, with Prayut Chan-o-cha leading a junta called the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).
Prayut Chan-o-cha wears a tie to prove he is definitely not a military strongman There was a transition from the junta to democracy, with a referendum stating that the junta could appoint a Senate, which would be involved in selecting the PM. Therefore, there was little doubt Prayut would be able to carry on. There were five major parties in the 2019 election: the PTP, Prayut’s Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP, People’s State Power Party), the progressive anti-junta Future Forward Party (FFP), and the royalist, conservative Democrat Party and Bhumjaithai Party (Thai Pride Party, BJT). By 2023, the FFP had been banned on a donation laws charge, and replaced by the Move Forward Party (MFP), which won the election that year ahead of the PTP. The ex-junta split: Deputy PM Prawit Wongsuwong wanted co-operation with opposition forces, leading to Prayut leaving and forming his own United Thai Nation Party.
Party Seats Move Forward 151 Pheu Thai 141 Bhumjaithai 71 Palang Pracharath 40 United Thai Nation 36 Democrat 25 Others 30 The above was the results of that election. The MFP’s big policy is removal of the incredibly strict lèse-majesté law, which bans any criticism of the Royal Family. The conservative parties see any modification as beyond the pale. Because of the Senate, the MFP and PTP could not get a government together, so instead the PTP, removed by two coups themselves, went into coalition with the junta’s forces, with Srettha Thavisin becoming PM. He was removed soon after for appointing one of Thaksin’s lawyers, who had been indicted in a bribery scandal, as a minister. Instead, Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra became PM, but a border crisis broke out with Cambodia in her term. A phone call with that country’s dictator Hun Sen was leaked, with Paetongtarn sounding deferential, leading to uproar and the end of the coalition. With the MFP banned because of lèse-majesté, it has been replaced by the People’s Party (PPLE), which formed a temporary agreement with the BJT for new elections and a constitutional referendum.
Prediction: Boy, this is tough. It is clear there are three forces in Thailand that matter: progressives (PPLE), Thaksinites (PTP), and conservatives. Of the conservatives, it is clear that the junta parties (UTN and PPRP) are cooked and junta figures will retreat from political life. Therefore, the two more established conservative parties, being the BJT and Democrat Party, will instead be the important ones, with the BJT ahead of the Democrat Party. The success of the MFP made Thai right-wingers sign a ‘pact with the devil’ in doing business with the Thaksinites, but the phone call leak made this impossible. Does this mean the PPLE is finally ready to be accepted by the Thai deep state? I think that might be the case. Certainly, PPLE will win the most votes, but not a majority. It may be the case that leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut may not be allowed to become PM, but he will probably have an important position either way. Despite various forms of suppression, the youth have not abandoned the orange party. Now, they will have to be co-opted, and probably some reforms allowed.
On the same date, Thailand also has a constitutional referendum. The 2017 constitution was passed during junta rule in a dodgy referendum in 2016 with 61.4% support, where campaigning against it was banned. As part of the PPLE’s price for the coalition government with the BJT, there had to be an election and referendum. The court said that for the constitution to be changed, there needed to be three votes: firstly, on changing the constitution, secondly, on the methods of the rewrite, and thirdly, on the new constitution itself. This, it is hoped by PPLE, would lead to some leeway with the lèse-majesté laws.
Prediction: I am pretty sure that the Yes side will win, because most people support some change. The People’s Party and Pheu Thai Party support it of course, but even the BJT and Democrat Party are comfortable with it. Only the junta parties oppose it. The juicy part will come later down the line at some point, when the first two articles, on the state and monarchy, are debated. Remember, all this vote is about whether the constitution should be changed. What the new constitution will look like is far more interesting.
We’re not done yet, because on the same date Aragon in Spain will have its regional election. Spain, of course, had its transition to democracy immediately after the death of fascist dictator Francisco Franco in 1975. Spain’s system of regional autonomy is sometimes overlooked by foreign observers, but particularly important in a country known for regional movements, most notably those in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Elections were held for the first time in 1977, won by the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), who was appointed by King Juan Carlos I. Juan Carlos was designated as Franco’s successor, but instead of following the fascist model shifted Spain into a constitutional monarchy. He appointed Adolfo Suárez, a rather obscure figure, as Prime Minister in 1976, and Suárez then founded this UCD. The UCD was a centre-right party, but in some ways comparable to the LDP in Japan, because it was the ‘institutional party’ of managing Spain’s democratic transition. The new constitution divided Spain into ‘autonomous communities’, a remarkable change from the Franco era where even speaking the Catalan or Basque language in public was risky. However, Suárez struggled to keep up with day-to-day governance and resigned in 1981. The UCD was battered, getting thumped in the 1982 election and falling apart soon after. The 1982 election, when the social democratic Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) won power, is considered the end point of Spain’s democratic transition, as power was peacefully handed over from the UCD to the PSOE.
Madrid’s main airport is named after Adolfo Suárez who led Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy The conservative opposition to the PSOE was a coalition of the People’s Alliance (AP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The AP was a “post-Francoist” party, which, while accepting that Francoism was over, attempted to resist the changes as much as possible. The PDP was a smaller Christian democratic party. In 1983, this alliance, which also included the small Liberal Union (later, Liberal Party) was christened the People’s Alliance. The PSOE accelerated devolution, and in 1983 Aragon held its first election, won by the PSOE, with the People’s Alliance coming second. Third place went to the Regionalist Aragonese Party (PAR), a centre-right party that, as its name suggests, believes in Aragonese regionalism. It was actually part of the AP-PDP coalition for the national election, but went it alone. However, in 1987, even though the PSOE won the most seats, the People’s Alliance propped up a PAR government to take power. In 1989, the People’s Alliance parties merged into a new People’s Party (PP). Though the AP was quite radically right-wing, the PP positioned itself as a mainstream conservative party. Spain now had the two-party system it has today, although the PSOE would hold on to the national government until 1996. In 1995, the PP won power in Aragon (for the first time as the senior party), and in 1996 they did so nationally. The PAR, which changed its name into the Aragonese Party in 1990, declined in relevance over time, as Aragon resembled the national system, with power changing between the PSOE and PP. Nationally, the PSOE would rule from 1982 to 1996, with the PP in charge from 1996 to 2004, and the PSOE from 2004 to 2011. In Aragon, the PP would serve one term from 1995 to 1999, with the PSOE in power from 1999 to 2011 under Marcelino Iglesias. Both parties would be backed up by the PAR.
Marcelino Iglesias led the Aragonese government from 1999 to 2011 2011 was a good year for the PP, as in Aragon, they defeated the PSOE for the first time in twelve years, with Luisa Fernanda Rudi taking power. Nationally, they also defeated the PSOE, taking power under Mariano Rajoy. But 2015 would be a somewhat crazy year. In Aragon, Podemos (We Can) rose to third at the expense of both the PP and PSOE. A left-wing anti-austerity party, it was only founded the previous year as a response to a financial crisis. Podemos propped up a PSOE government in Aragon, with Javier Lambán as the new President. Podemos came third in the national election too, with the Citizens (Cs) in fourth. The Cs won some seats in Aragon, but came out of Catalonia and presented a liberal case against independence. They were seen as an alternative party to the PP. Rajoy lost his majority, and no government could be formed. New elections were necessary in 2016, but little change. After a protracted saga, the PSOE abstained so Rajoy could remain as PM. In 2018, a kickbacks-for-contracts scandal saw the PSOE, Podemos, and regionalist parties swing against Rajoy and install the PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez as Prime Minister.
Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) became Prime Minister of Spain in 2018 The national election in April 2019 was a win for Sánchez as the PSOE made gains, as did the Cs, while the PP and Podemos’ alliance Unidas Podemos (Together We Can) made losses. Also, the right-wing populist Vox (Voice), a PP splinter from the right, became a fifth national force. Still, the PSOE had no majority. The next month, the Aragonese elections mirrored the national ones: the PSOE and Cs made gains, while the PP and Podemos lost seats, while Vox entered for the first time. Lambán stayed in power, but Sánchez had to call new elections in November. The PP and Vox were the main beneficiaries as the Cs fell apart. They had slowly edged to the right in their four years of national relevance, and would over the next few years disappear as a genuine electoral force. Despite the gains for the right, Sánchez snuck over the line with votes from Unidos Podemos and regionalists, forming a coalition government with the former.
Albert Rivera’s Citizens party went from a national force to the dustbin of history relatively quickly The last Aragonese election was in 2023. The PP made big gains, winning 28 of 67 seats, while the PSOE was overtaken, now on 23. Vox increased modestly to seven, with the Chunta Aragonesista (CHA, Aragonese Union) on three. This party is a left-wing Aragonese nationalist party that first won seats in 1995, reaching its high point in 2003. Also on three seats was the ‘Empty Spain’ movement, which originated in Aragon as Teruel Existe (Teruel Exists) that seeks to represent ‘forgotten’ rural provinces. Podemos’ alliance went down to one seat, while the United Left (IU) of Aragon, which is an alliance led by the Communist Party, also won one, as did the PAR. The PP formed a government backed by Vox and the PAR, under Jorge Azcón. The most recent Spanish election was two months later. The People’s Party won 137 seats compared to 121 for the PSOE. Vox won 33, while Sumar (Unite) won 31. Sumar was a coalition formed by the IU (led by the Communist Party of Spain or PCE) and also included Podemos as well as other national and regional parties, including the CHA. However, it successfully marginalised Podemos, who took just five of 31 seats and left soon after. These were the four ‘national’ parties. The rest of the seats went to regional parties. Seven each went to the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and Together for Catalonia (Junts). Both are Catalan nationalist, but the ERC is left wing and Junts is centre-right. EH Bildu (Basque Country Gather) won six seats, while the Basque National Party (EAJ) won five. Similarly, both are Basque nationalist but EH Bildu is left-wing and the EAJ is centrist. The left-wing Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), the centrist Canarian Coalition (CC) and the conservative Navarrese People’s Union (UPN) all won one seat. Notably, all these parties are regional, although their attitudes vary. Sánchez needed the votes of every party except from the PP, Vox, and UPN to be in power. Compared to many social democrats, who present themselves as moderates detached from the left, because Sánchez is in a coalition with the Communist Party, he has led an unashamedly, and sometimes even chauvinistically left-wing government, one that is not afraid to show how progressive it is. Of Aragon’s thirteen seats, seven went to the PP, four to the PSOE, and one each to Vox and Sumar.
President of the Aragonse Government Jorge Azcón In 2024, Vox pulled support from all regional governments with the PP because the latter agreed to a distribution of unaccompanied migrant children, including in PP-controlled regions. Lambán died in 2025, hurting the PSOE, and with the political situation difficult (as Azcón had to negotiate with Vox for a budget) he decided to try his luck with a snap election. The PSOE leader is Pilar Alegría, who was the Education Minister in the national government until Azcón called the election.
Matters-o-Meter: The PP is likely to win again, with a very small uptick in seats predicted, while the PSOE is likely to lose a couple. Vox are expected to make gains and perhaps get as much as double as they did last time. An eight-party parliament will likely decrease to six as Podemos and the PAR are likely to lose their sole seats (historic in the latter case as the PAR have won seats in every Aragonese election to date). The CHA will maybe have a very small increase, with Aragón Existe staying on three or falling to two, and the IU/Sumar staying on one. Spain is starting to resemble a three-party system because the radical left is losing ground. The PSOE and Vox are obviously incompatible, but Vox’s alliance with the PP doesn’t seem too stable either. And so, the story will be, how does Azcón take power? A projection has them on 29, the PSOE on seventeen, Vox on fourteen, the CHA on four, Aragón Existe on two, and the IU/Sumar on one. The PP is five short, and without Vox, they don’t have the numbers, with Aragón Existe being the only party that would potentially give them support. CHA and the IU are too left-wing. Does the PSOE abstain to stop Vox having too much influence? The results will be interesting, but because only one person has a chance of winning, it can’t be overrated. 4/10
On 10 February, Oklahoma’s 35th House district will have a special election. Oklahoma is one of the newest states in the US, becoming the country’s 46th state in 1907. Despite this, its political inclinations are similar to that of an ex-Confederate state, moving from Democratic to Republican over time. This rural district is safe Republican territory. The incumbent, Ty Burns (R) was first elected in 2018 with 71.9% support. That was the last time a Democrat bothered to run here, but Burns resigned due to a domestic violence conviction.
Matters-o-Meter: Rancher Dillon Travis won the Republican primary in a runoff, while a former sheriff Mike Waters was the only Democratic candidate. Travis should win easily. 2/10
On 10 February, Virginia’s 39th Senate District holds a special election. It’s a safe blue district in the city of Alexandria, which is ultimately considered part of the wider Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. The incumbent, Adam Ebbin (D), was first elected in 2011 but resigned to take a post as Senior Adviser of the state’s Cannabis Control Authority.
Matters-o-Meter: Elizabeth Bennet-Parker, a member of the lower house, won the Democratic primary, while the Republican candidate is called Julie Robben Lineberry. The former will win without issues. 2/10
On the same date, Virginia’s 5th House District holds a special election. Bennett-Parker is the incumbent, and she resigned to campaign for the Senate seat. This district is also in Alexandria, and Bennett-Parker was elected unopposed the last time round.
Matters-o-Meter: Councilman Kirk McPike won the Democratic primary easily, and should beat IT consultant Mason Butler (R) without any problems. 2/10
On 11 February, Barbados will hold a general election. Barbados declared independence in 1966, but democratic elections were first held in 1951 and semi-democratic ones before that. The party that led Barbados during self-government was the Barbados Labour Party (BLP). Despite the party’s name, it was more of a liberal party than a socialist one. In 1961, the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), a BLP splinter group, won power, and Barbados has remained a two-party system. Every election since independence has returned no MPs from any party except the BLP and DLP, bar one in 1994. The DLP won the 1961, 1966 and 1971 election under Errol Barrow, the father of independence. After the BLP took power in 1976, they ruled for ten years before Barrow won the 1986 election and then died in 1987. His successor Lloyd Erskine Sandiford won in 1991, but the BLP won back power in 1994 and ruled under Owen Arthur until 2008.
Errol Barrow founded the DLP and led Barbados to independence In 2008, David Thompson led the DLP to victory, but died in 2010. His successor Freundel Stuart won the very narrow 2013 election, sixteen seats to fourteen. However, Barbados was struggling economically, and in 2018 voters reacted with a historic wipeout: the BLP won all thirty seats. The same result happened at the 2022 election. BLP leader Mia Mottley completed Barbados’ transition from a Commonwealth realm to a republic in 2021, and is seen by the world media as a leading black female voice in world affairs. Certainly, she hasn’t seemed to lose much domestic popularity. The DLP leader is Ralph Thorne, who was elected a BLP MP but decided to cross the floor to become Leader of the Opposition.
Matters-o-Meter: The parties are ideologically similar, being centre-left and basically having the outlook of progressing what is still a relatively young nation. One thing the British bequeathed its former colony was the first-past-the-post voting system, which isn’t ideal in the English Carribbean in my view. It worked in the 19th and 20th century UK because there were Liberal and Tory (and later Labour and Conservative) heartlands, but in Barbados, this effect does exist but is less strong. Thus, a third consecutive BLP sweep is possible, remarkable in a full democracy. That does mean the election, in what ultimately is not a strong and powerful country, is quite uninteresting though as it is unlikely Thorne will become PM. 4/10
On 12 February, Bangladesh holds its general election, another one described in the yearly preview article. The abridged version: the Awami League (People’s League, AL) was formed during Bangladesh’s struggle for rights, and ultimately independence from Pakistan, achieved in 1971. Leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman then was untouchable, and formally declared himself President for Life in 1975. Soon after, most of his family was killed in a military coup, including Mujib himself. Major General Ziaur Rahman, who took power in a subsequent coup, formed his own Bangladesh National Party (BNP) to run when civilian power returned. The BNP was removed as well in 1982 by Hussein Muhammad Ershad, who formed his own Jatiya Party (Ershad) (National Party (Ershad), JP(E)). However, a revolution in 1990 led by both the Awami League and BNP led to the downfall of Ershad’s dicatorship. The BNP won the resulting election, in alliance with the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (Bangladesh Islamic Congress, or Jamaat for short). This is an Islamist party, which is disliked by the secular Awami League. After the opposition boycotted the 1996 election, citing unfairness, a system of ‘caretaker governments’ before elections was held. There was a heated rivalry between the Awami League and BNP. Both were led by women close to maytyred leaders: Sheikh Hasina was Mujib’s daughter who survived the massacre of her family because she was studying in West Germany. Meanwhile, Khaleda Zia was the wife of Ziaur. After a military intervention in 2006, the Awami League won the 2008 election in a landslide.
Sheikh Hasina was Prime Minister from 1996 to 2001 and again from 2009 to 2024 as leader of the Awami League, founded by her father Hasina’s family was killed by Zia’s husband, and she had no intention of letting the BNP anywhere near power again. She consolidated power, abolished the caretaker system, and won non-competitive elections in 2013, 2018, and 2024. The thing that did for her was her establishment of a quota system, reserving a proportion of government job for descendants of ‘freedom fighters’ (i.e. Awami League supporters). Student pressure led to the quotas going in 2018, but in 2024 the Supreme Court ruled this invalid. Students Against Discrimination turned into a general strike, and it was a successful revolution. Hasina was gone, having quickly fled to India, and Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus became interim “Chief Adviser”. The AL was banned and Hasina sentenced to death in absentia, although Hasina is an ally of India and they will not give her up (indeed tension between the countries has massively spiked since the revolution). Khaleda Zia died in 2025, so Tarique Rahman (her and Ziaur’s son) is the new BNP leader. It seems that, though they were allies in the fight against Hasina’s dictatorship (and that is what it became), they will now be political rivals (and hopefully for the sake of peace no more than just rivals). This would mean Bangladesh would move in a more conservative and religious direction.
Prediction: The BNP will win the election. The stakes and ramifications are quite high. The Awami League was loyally supported by minorities, including Hindus, and that is why she was liked by India. Since then, spates of religious violence has occurred, with India’s Hindu nationalist government raising the alarm on the attacks on Hindus. It will be interesting to see if India and Bangladesh’s relationship can heal; both the BNP and Jamaat are trying to show some overtures to minorities.
On the same date, Bangladesh will hold a constitutional referendum. There were round-table talks on various things, with agreements like term limits for the Prime Minister, a bicameral Parliament, the opposition getting some roles (like a Deputy Speaker) and an increased role for the President known as the July Charter. This will be voted on here.
Prediction: ‘Yes’ will win. I mean, after a revolution it would be pretty funny if they all decided actually the old way was sound. The fact that each party has been involved means that local politicians will be able to convince voters to pick ‘yes’.
On 17th February, Georgia’s 18th Senate District will hold its election. Georgia is a ‘swing state’, but, as previously noted, one where there are red and blue areas, this one being the former. Incumbent John F. Kennedy (the F. stands for Flanders in this case, R), who had served since 2015 and was president pro tempore of the body, resigned to run for lieutenant-governor. It is a rural district in Middle Georgia, and safely Republican.
Matters-o-Meter: Here, the Republican candidate is the attorney Steven McNeel, while the Democrat is “small business owner” LeMario Brown. In the ‘jungle primary’, five Republicans ran alongside Brown. Brown got a decent haul of 36.1% and Democrats will monitor their share in a red part of a key swing state. Even senator Mark Kelly (from Arizona) came to campaign with Brown. But, even if Brown somehow wins, the stir will be forgotten about in a couple of weeks. 2/10
On 22 February, Laos has its parliamentary election. Laos is a Marxist-Leninist country, and has been since 1975. The most important thing about that system, at least when it comes to this blog about elections, is that the state is constitutionally subordinate to the party. Thus, the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) decides candidates and leaders at internal events like the Party Congress last month, which renewed the leadership of President Thongloun Sisoulith. Because of this, it doesn’t really matter, even though there is some competition, because all candidates need approval.
Prediction: I think the LPRP will win a majority. Unfortunately, no bookies were willing to give me odds on this one.
On 23 February, there will be a by-election in Chicoutimi. Chicoutimi is a constituency in the provincial legislature of Quebec, in Canada. Firstly, I will explain Canada’s political system. Canada was formed as a federation of various provinces, including Quebec, but as a former British colony, inherited a parliamentary system (which all of its provinces use). Thus, provincial by-elections are a somewhat bigger deal than state special elections in the US. Canada also inherited the parties from the old country: the Liberal and Conservative parties dominated Canada. Quebec was and is unique as the only French-majority province in Canada. Persecution by the British had led to them strongly guarding autonomy. Still, it also had Liberal and Conservative parties in its provincial elections. Unlike the UK, US, and to a large extent Australia, where local parties are merely branches of the federal ones (such as the Utah Democratic Party, Scottish Liberal Democrats, and so on), Canada’s provincial parties gained serious autonomy over time. Both in Canada’s national government and Quebec, the first half of the twentieth century was a period of Liberal domination. One example of Quebec’s attitude would come during World War I, when Canada conscripted people to go to war for King, Country, and Empire. The Quebeckers did not see the point. Being in Canada before the British settlers, they didn’t even have any loyalty to France either. They simply saw themselves as quasi-‘indigenous’ Canadians, with no Old World power to love. Indeed, at the time, the Quebeckers were considered ‘Canadian nationalists’ as they wanted to end the relationship with the Crown! The main point though is that the French Canadians have seen the English Canadians as unable to truly understand them and imposing an “English-centric” view of the country, while the Anglos often see the Quebeckers as seditious, and overly-demanding. This is not so different to relations between many regions with a strong autonomous streak: Scotland (UK) and Catalonia (Spain) are probably two notable examples. Of course, in those places there also exists an alternative mythology where two separate nations came together to create one great country and all the rest and this definitely exists amongst some Canadians, both Anglo and French, as well.
The 1917 election was held in the midst of the ‘Conscription Crisis’, where the Conservatives and Liberal “Unionists” supported conscription and joined a national coalition, but “Laurier Liberals” (named after the party leader Wilfried Laurier) refused and opposed conscription. The Government won just three seats in Quebec, with the opposition taking 62, but just twenty outside Quebec (where the government won 153). Because the Conservatives were in government for the Conscription Crisis, they were in the wilderness in Quebec. Finally, in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, the Liberal government faltered: still having faith in the ‘free market’. Many Liberal MLAs did not like the coddling with big business during the crisis, and formed their own Action libérale nationale (ALN, National Liberal Action). Soon, the Conservative leader Maurice Duplessis, a skilled orator, managed to convince most of them into joining his team, forming the Union Nationale (National Union). Duplessis won the 1936 election with this banner, but lost the 1939 race. After that, he won four in a row. Duplessis was obviously popular to receive this mandate so many times, but despite the origin story of convincing populist Liberal MLAs to join, he was a very staunch conservative, recieving the backing of a powerful Catholic Church. He was a Quebec nationalist, often locking horns with the provincial government. Left-wingers often refer to his time in charge as ‘Le Grande Noirceur’, or the Great Darkness, but it was not them, nor any other party that would stop him: he died in office in 1959. This period was still mostly one of federal Liberal domination. One trick the Tories used to try and win support was to change their name to the Progressive Conservative Party (PC Party), and they finally did win power in 1957. There was also a left-wing presence in parliament which became the New Democratic Party (NDP), Canada’s main third party. However, the Quebec Liberals won power back in 1960 as the Union Nationale had lost its key leader, and after a decade longer as one of the main two parties, would fade into irrelevance after the 1970 election. The Liberal government initiated the ‘Quiet revolution’, where Quebec would adopt many liberal reforms that the rest of the Western world already had, such as secularisation and an expanded state, ending Le Grande Noirceur.
Maurice Duplessis led Quebec through the post-war era until his death in 1959. His conservative regime was quickly undone by the Liberals when they took power in 1960. In 1970, the Union Nationale came second, but lost seats to the Parti Québécois (Qúebécois Party, PQ), which was founded on the explicit principle of “sovereignty-association”, that Quebec and the rest of Canada should become two different states, and they should be ‘associated’ somehow, perhaps like EU countries are today. The PQ would overtake the Union Nationale, and take power themselves in 1976. The PQ government held a referendum on “sovereignty-association” in 1980, but this was thrashed soundly with 59.6% against. Nonetheless, a situation occurred where the PQ and Liberals were the main two parties in Quebec, and thus, the debate shifted to one of “federalism” and “sovereignty” rather than liberalism and conservatism. In this time, various flashpoints between Quebec and the federal government occurred, and also, Quebec tried to assert itself more. Even if it wasn’t an independent country, it could have more autonomy, and impose its unique traditions (and rejection of Anglo-Canadian ones like the monarchy) on Quebec. Serious crises included the October Crisis, where in 1970 a terrorist group calling for independence kidnapped the Liberal Deputy Premier of the province, and the federal government responded with invoking emergency legislation which led to a temporary period of what was basically martial law. A debate on the constitution, which was passed without Quebec’s signature and the failure of the Meech Lake Accord to provide for some decentralisation, led to the creation of the Bloc Québécois (Quebecker Bloc) in 1991, which would run for federal elections in Quebec. The 1990s were a rather crazy time in Canada in general, politically speaking. The PC Party government fell apart, and in 1993 were reduced to just two seats, as right-wing voters switched to the Reform Party, a populist party mostly based in the west of the country (this sounds familiar). In fact, the Bloc were in their first election Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition (!), although of course could never actually lead the government. In 1994, their pals the PQ won power in Quebec. They held a new independence referendum, and this was defeated narrowly with 50.6% against. Weirdly, independence has kind of been put to one side as an issue ever since. Instead, Quebec’s leaders have focused on provincial autonomy. In the federal system, the PC Party remained sidelined by Reform, which, in an attempt to become a national party, renamed itself the Canadian Alliance. Still, the PC Party were not quite dead, and would take about a third of the right-wing vote. Because this vote-splitting ensured perpetual Liberal government, the parties finally merged, regaining the old Conservative name, in 2003, but this did lead to the end of a ‘populist’ appeal for a more orthodox conservative one. Still, they gained power in 2006, winning three elections and ruling until 2015. The 2011 election saw a wipeout of both the Liberals and Bloc, due to the growth of the NDP, including in Quebec, while in 2012, the provincial Liberal government was defeated by the PQ. This government had numerous gaffes, leading to an early election in 2014 where they were defeated by the Liberals. In 2015, the Liberals regained power thanks to the popularity of leader Justin Trudeau, rooting the Conservatives and relegating the NDP back to third (the party is yet to recover).
François Legault is the current Premier of Quebec In 2018, the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ, Coalition for the Future of Quebec) took power under leader François Legault. The third party in the 2000s was called the Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ, Democratic Action of Quebec), a right-wing populist and Quebec nationalist party. The party even beat the PQ to become the opposition in 2007, and indeed may have won if not for the Liberals’ strong support amongst the English minority. Still, there was a hung parliament and in 2008, the ADQ fell apart in the election. What was left of it merged into the CAQ in 2012. The CAQ was formed by Legault, a conservative member of the PQ who felt disillusioned by the fight for sovereignty. The point was that instead of independence, Quebec would fight for its interests within Canada, something that he thought the PQ was overlooking by instead fighting for independence. In 2012 and 2014, the party was a respectable third place, but in 2018 beat both the Liberal government and the PQ opposition to win power. In fact, the PQ had to settle for joint third, the same amount of seats as the radically left-wing Québec solidaire (QS, Quebec Solidarity) party. Legault has sometimes been seen as a chauvinist, or even a racist, by aggressively trying to limit the use of English at all, and his support of France-style secularism laws, banning religious items. While the Liberal government in Canada supported the idea that Canada was a sort of post-national state, where any demographic could ‘become’ Canadian, Legault’s idea was that only a very certain type of person, who spoke French and did not wear religious symbols, was a Quebecker (even though an English Quebecker community had existed for centuries). The federal Liberal government was re-elected in a minority under Trudeau in 2019 and 2021, while Legault won a landslide in 2022. The last Quebec election had the CAQ on 90 seats, the Liberals on 21, QS on eleven, and the PQ on three. The Conservative Party of Quebec was reformed in 2009 but was mostly seen as a band of eccentrics (most federal Conservatives were Quebec Liberals, indeed PC Party leader Jean Charest became a Liberal Premier of Quebec). However, in 2022 it became a serious force despite not winning a seat. Thus, Quebec has a five-party-system. In 2025, Trudeau became massively unpopular and resigned. His replacement, banker Mark Carney, called a new election. Though the Tories were expected to win, tariff threats from the US allowed the Liberals to win. Canadians are mindful of their independence from the US, and the Tories are often seen as more pro-US (the fact the US has a right-wing government also hurt the Conservatives). Carney likes to call his approach “Elbows Up”, and has worked closely with the conservative government of Ontario (Canada’s largest province, with an English-speaking majority), and in fact his relations with provincial governments are of interest and perhaps an example of Quebec’s influence. The idea is he is the leader of a team working to defend Canada above partisan interests in the face of antagonism from big, bad, powerful America. This led to a shock landslide win after the Tories were miles ahead before Carney took over. This message even got through to the Quebeckers, as the Liberals won a majority of seats in Quebec and the Bloc lost a third of its seats. At Montreal ice hockey games, the American anthem played for visiting teams was booed, an example of Quebeckers embracing this concept of Canadian solidarity.
Mark Carney is still pretty popular even in a time when liberal democracy, and incumbents, are suffering Carney seems to like governing through big meetings, chaired by him, with the leaders of Canada’s provinces and territories, where they come to agreements. This is not common in the US, Germany, or Australia, for instance, and had happened before Carney in Canada (the first was held in 1906). I think Quebec is the main reason for this, because the big federal parties rely on votes from the province and can’t declare war on it (there is a reason the most outspoken opposition to Legault is often from the federal NDP, which has been basically moribund in Quebec for several years) and therefore normally have to “go through” Legault. Some of the English provinces, annoyed that Canada has been giving so many concessions to Quebec, have decided that if they pretended they wanted independence too, Canada might be scared of them too (notably, the conservative province of Alberta has tried to do so). With this all in mind, let’s now look at the ‘riding’ of Chicoutimi, which has existed since 1912. It initially had Liberal representation, but in 1935 elected an ALN MLA who then joined the Union nationale. The Union nationale held onto it until 1973! The seat survived the 1960 election where the party was routed from power, and the 1962 election where it lost more seats (by 192 votes). In 1970, all three parties (Union Nationale, Liberal, and PQ) won over 30%, and it finally went PQ in 1973 when the Union Nationale lost all its seats. It voted strongly for independence in 1980 (which was a referendum where ‘No’ won easily), and with a 2/3 margin in 1995. It became loyal PQ territory, voting for the party even in landslide losses of 1985, 1989, and 2007. A lot of MLAs from this constituency had senior roles: Antonio Talbot (MLA from 1938-1965) was interim leader of the Union Nationale and thus LOTO, while the PQ’s Marc-André Bédard was the province’s longest-serving Justice Minister. This place is thus part of the beating hart of Quebec sovereigntism. But in 2018, it went for the CAQ, with André Laforest winning; even the incumbency of Mireille Jean could not save the PQ. Laforest won a thumping victory in 2022 with 62.3% of the vote. The PQ won 14.2%, QS won 12.0%, the Conservatives 8.4%, and the Liberals just 3.0%.
Andrée Laforest Ultimately though, the CAQ’s popularity would not last, after a U-turn on a promised project to build a bridge link between Quebec City and Lévis. This was the flashpoint that turned Legault from Quebec’s champion to ‘just another slimy politician’ to many. The main beneficiary has been the PQ, although the Liberals are gaining as well and the old two-party system may well be back. Polls and by-elections turned against the CAQ, and in January, Legault said he’d resign pending a leadership election. With a general election in a few months, whoever wins has the honour of being a Quebecker Kim Campbell (or for Brits, Rishi Sunak): running the government for a few months with no personal mandate and no chance of winning an election. The leadership election between Environment Minister Bernard Drainville and Economy Minister Christine Fréchette has gotten ugly, and further damaged the CAQ. However, the Liberals are going through their own leadership search. Laforest, perhaps knowing she was gone at the general, resigned to run for Mayor of Saugeney, but lost by under 200 votes.
Matters-o-Meter: Things really can’t get worse for the CAQ, which once mystified English Canada with its two landslides and hold over the federal government. The PQ candidate, Marie-Karlynn Laflamme who works for a university, will surely beat the CAQ nominee Francis Tramblay, who works for a different university. There are also candidates from the Liberals, QS, Tories, and two minor parties. Anyway, really this is just another stop on the rollercoaster of disaster for the CAQ, and the PQ’s reclamation of what it considers to be its natural territory, having held the seat from 1973 until the CAQ’s first landslide in 2018. I find it likely that after being reduced to a small force in the general election, the CAQ ceases to be a functioning or relevant party soon after. Paul St-Pierre Plamondon, the PQ leader, already looks like a Premier-in-waiting. However, the Trump factor has boosted the Liberals as Quebeckers stop viewing Canada as the enemy, and instead rate Carney’s government for standing up to Donald Trump. Despite all this, pure-white and French Saugenay is still a home of nationalism, and unless a massive upset happens it will be another feather in his cap. 5/10
On 24 February, Maine’s 94th House District holds a special election. Maine is another American state, and is a blue one. However, it is tinted with purple, with a Republican Senator and actually one where there is no majority: 74 of 149 occupied seats (two are vacant) are held by the Democrats, 72 by Republicans, and three by independents. There is a decent tradition of independent candidates doing well here (relatively in American terms). Kristen Cloutier (D), previously the Mayor of the state’s second largest city Lewiston, was first elected in 2018 and resigned to become a chief advisor to the President of the State Senate. Cloutier’s election last time was with 59.4% of the vote.
Matters-o-Meter: Even though this is crucial for seeing who holds onto Maine’s house, this is not particularly important to the national conversation like regional by-elections are in some countries. Indeed, the Democrat Scott Harriman, a city councillor should have no problem against school committee member Janet Beaudoin, the Republican. 2/10
On the same date, Pennsylvania’s 22nd House District will hold a special election. Pennsylvania was a staunch Union state in the civil war, and after voting for Abraham Lincoln in 1860 did not vote for a Democrat again until 1936. However, it was not strictly loyal to either party after this, but definitely leaned blue. After 1948, it always was slightly more Democratic than the overall result, so winning Pennsylvania always meant victory for the Republicans. The Democrats won it in every election from 1992 to 2012. However, this pattern was ended in 2016 by Donald Trump narrowly (Trump won the election, but lost the popular vote). In 2020, it went back to the Democrats and Joe Biden, but in 2024, Trump won it, and it is considered one of the most important swing states. As a fan of Philadelphia’s sports teams, and thus privy to the area’s adverts, I know just how much they pay attention to the state during election time!
Hillary Clinton was the first Democrat to lose Pennsylvania since 1988; it was at that point she knew she had lost the general election Anyway, the state positions are also hotly contested, and at the last election the Democrats took the state house with a margin of 102-101! Incumbent Joshua Siegel stepped down to become Executive of Lehigh County. Siegel was elected with 63.8% support in 2022, and re-elected unopposed in 2024. In the blue county seat of Allentown, this place will stay Democratic.
Matters-o-Meter: And because of that, the importance is the same. Democrat Ana Tiburcio, a member of the school board will beat Robert E. Smith, Jr. (R), who was also on the school board. 2/10
On the same date, Pennsylvania’s 42nd House district will hold a special election. This district is in the southwest of the state, in Allegheny County, with Mt. Lebanon as the main township. It’s also pretty blue. Dan Miller (D) resigned after being elected as a judge. He was a former Majority Whip.
Matters-o-Meter: Miller won 66.7% support in 2024, a bad year for Democrats, and so borough councillor Jennifer Mazzococo (D) will also beat Joseph Leckenby (R), who lost to Miller last time. 2/10
On 26 February, Gorton and Denton in the United Kingdom will hold a by-election. This is the first British election of note this year, so a quick primer on the country’s politics. The country’s two party system was initially based on Liberals and Conservatives, like in Canada. However, as voting rights were expanded, with requirements based on money and gender removed, the Labour Party, based on socialist principles, got more votes and during the interwar period usurped the Liberals as the main rival of the Tories. In 1945, during the end of World War II (in between the German and Japanese surrender), Labour won a crushing landslide, and massively strengthened the public sector and welfare state. The Conservatives, knowing that working-class people supported and benefitted from this massively, accepted it in the Industrial Charter. Thus, the first two decades after the war were known as the post-war consensus, where both parties supported a system that had a heavy dose of socialism. That isn’t to say that elections were uncompetitive, but there was a strong two-party system with similar views on economic matters. However, economic crises in the 1970s culminated in the Winter of Discontent of 1978 and 1979, leading to strikes. With this happening under a Labour government, the Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, won the 1979 election.
Margaret Thatcher fundamentally changed British society, and both major parties Thatcher was a neoliberal, who led widescale campaigns of privatisation and limiting trade union power. Labour responded by appointing a left-wing leader in Michael Foot. Centrist Labour MPs then left the party, forming their own Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP decided to go into an Alliance with the Liberals, who had spent much of the post-war period being an irrelevance, in no small part due to the voting system. Thatcher was popular after winning the Falklands War, and the existence of the Alliance hampered any chance for Labour, as the Conservatives won a crushing landslide. Labour elected the more moderate Neil Kinnock as leader, and he sometimes publically tackled the left. Despite this, the SDP would not come back, and they merged with the Liberals to form the Liberal Democrats. They would be a stronger force than the pre-merger Liberals, but ultimately still disadvantaged by the voting system. The reason was that Labour and the Conservatives had more ‘heartlands’, while Lib Dem votes would be more diffused across the country. Thatcher won another landslide in 1987, but it was the issue of Europe that would end her premiership. Since the UK joined the European Economic Communities (EEC), then renamed the European Union (EU), Thatcher was viewed with suspicion by pro-Europeans in her party for often not fully committing to the project. In 1990, she was ousted for the pro-European John Major. Europe had also been a reason why Labour centrists had left to form the SDP, as Foot was in favour of withdrawing. However, Kinnock would accept staying, and soon, the party would become very pro-European (although, the Lib Dems remained the most pro-European party). Major surprisingly beat Kinnock’s Labour in 1992, and Kinnock resigned. The replacement, John Smith, died in 1994, and Tony Blair became leader.
Alongside Thatcher, Blair is the person who casts the longest shadow on modern British politics The 1992-1997 period for Major was disastrous as splits over Europe and general fatigue with Tory government led to many wanting ‘change’. Blair believed Kinnock had not gone far enough, and was a massive pro-European. He believed that he had to give traditional Tory voters ‘permission’ to vote Labour, so he led a branding campaign called “New Labour”. The idea was that, as the Tories accepted Keynesianism after 1945, Blair would accept much of Thatcherism, and ‘triangulate’ old-style socialism with neoliberalism. His progressivism was not based on a strong welfare state or socialist economic policies, but constitutional reform such as devolved regional governments, pro-Europeanism, and an expansion on what might be called ‘civil rights’ for ‘underprivileged groups’. It also came with a flashy ‘modern’ spin campaign, with Labour a 21st century party, and the Tories a 20th century one. Blair won landslide elections in 1997, 2001, and 2005, where the Conservative Party were completely hapless, and seen as stuck in the past. However, Blair’s time was dominated by his rivalry with his Chancellor, Gordon Brown. Brown was still a New Labour figure, but more left-of-centre. It was believed that a gentleman’s agreement meant that, one day, Blair would hand over power to Brown. This happened in 2007, but Brown’s time until the 2010 election was shaky. The Conservatives had elected David Cameron, who promised to be a ‘moderniser’ in the same way Thatcher and Blair had. The Tories would pay attention to the environment, promote gay people, women, and ethnic minorities, support the EU, and just generally not appear as a party of bigoted old men.
David Cameron’s election as Tory leader seemed to mean a new ‘two-party consensus’ of social liberalism, but it would not last long At the same time, the Liberal Democrats were becoming very popular among the young with Nick Clegg, who promised an end to the old two-party system and real change. This led to him getting a good score in the 2010 election, but again they were hampered by the voting system. A hung parliament ensued, leading to a coalition between the Conservatives under Prime Minister Cameron, and Clegg as his deputy. The year 2014 saw two major events occur. Firstly, in elections to the European Parliament, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) were the top party. They had been popular in European elections before, but never fared well in general elections, because like the Lib Dems they were hurt by the voting system. UKIP were to the right of the Conservatives, and were strongly in favour of leaving the EU. Notably, unlike the Tories, whose support was rooted in the middle class (which Blair successfully targeted), UKIP took Labour’s traditional base: the working class. Later that year, a Scottish independence referendum was held because of the success of the Scottish National Party (SNP), who supported it, in regional elections there. The Tories, Lib Dems, and Labour had to team up to defeat the referendum. In 2015, worried about the rise of UKIP, Cameron promised an EU referendum if he won the election. It is possible he was hoping that another coalition would be formed, and the Lib Dems would make it a ‘red line’. However, the Lib Dems were destroyed in the election, and the Tories won a shock majority. The SNP became a major force in the UK Parliament for the first time as pro-independence voters saw Labour’s alliance with the Conservatives for the referendum as a betrayal. Labour leader Ed Miliband, who tried to make a break from New Labour but did not have a clear message in response, resigned. In the Labour leadership election, an obscure left-wing MP called Jeremy Corbyn was elected. Labour always had a small backbench faction of old-school leftists, but these were kept out of sight and out of mind under Blair. Now, they would take centre stage. Cameron had to call a referendum. Two notable Tories, recently departed Mayor of London Boris Johnson and Justice Secretary Michael Gove supported Leave, and, in a shock, Leave was successful at the referendum.
The famous ‘Vote Leave’ bus was a departure from Conservative rhetoric, using Labour red and talking about the country’s National Health Service to appeal to working-class voters Cameron resigned after the referendum, and many expected Johnson to replace him. However, Gove betrayed him by running in the leadership election, and in the end, the remainer Theresa May was elected leader. Meanwhile, New Labour figures were sickened by Corbyn and made no evidence of their hatred towards him. They said he was too lukewarm on the EU referendum and the reason why working-class voters did not back remain. However, a leadership challenge from Owen Smith failed badly and Corbyn was still there. With a very slim majority, May called an election in 2017. Corbyn was unpopular and the Tories were miles ahead in the polls. However, in the campaign, Corbyn took centre stage, focusing less on Brexit and instead trying to hit the Tories as heartless people who would hurt the poorest in society. This struck a chord with the youth, and Labour made gains, in a hung parliament. However, the Tories stuck on. This Parliament would constantly get in the way of Brexit. Every deal would have some faction get in the way, because the Tories had an amount of hardcore Remainers and Leavers who would block any middle ground. Even though UKIP had basically disappeared after the 2016 referendum, leader Nigel Farage returned, now as leader of the Brexit Party, who won the European election in 2019. After this, May went. Finally, Johnson became leader, and called a new election. After the chaos of two years, he would ‘Get Brexit Done’. Corbyn loved talking about socialism, but was stuck between a rock and a hard place on Brexit and was also beset by scandals and voters fatigued by in-fighting. How could he keep the pro-European MPs and urban voters happy while not alienating the pro-Brexit middle class? Indeed, he couldn’t, and Johnson won a landslide, completing Brexit in 2020, winning working-class constituencies known as the ‘Red Wall’. This meant that pro-Europeanism was done in the Conservative Party: pro-EU MPs had formed their own party called Change UK, alongside some anti-Corbyn Labour ones, but it flopped massively, thus locking Europhile Tories out of the party and of Parliament.
The 2019 election was a decisive end to a Parliament completely dominated by Brexit Johnson’s landslide, after Brexit was done of course, would in theory help him go beyond that and remake society in his image as Thatcher and Blair had done. However, things did not go to plan, because of the COVID-19 pandemic which dominated his premiership. In 2022, a few too many personal scandals got him: ministers ignoring restrictions they had put out was a symbol of why people hated the Tories. At the same time, Labour elected Keir Starmer. Though his pitch to the left-wing membership was the same principles that made Corbynism popular in 2017 but with a more professional style, he distance himself from the left and indeed tried to purge them from the party, with Corbyn’s whip suspended not long after. His strategy was to be non-ideological and centrist, instead attacking Johnson based on his personality: Johnson deliberately styled himself in a comedic way like Donald Trump did, but this left him looking non-prime-ministerial compared to the well-spoken lawyer Starmer. After one scandal too many, Johnson resigned in 2022. His replacement, Liz Truss, was known for the shortest premiership in history. A “Growth Plan” of huge tax cuts led to an immediate cost-of-living crisis and inflation, and Truss was gone. Her replacement, Rishi Sunak, accepted the job perhaps knowing he would have the person honour of being Prime Minister for two years, but no chance of keeping it. A notable trend of Sunak’s time was the end of the last bastion of Cameronism. Despite being a Brexiter, Johnson was a social liberal, but Sunak and his party would be much more sceptical of transgender rights, environmentalism, and most of all, immigration.
Stopping illegal immigration became a key task of Rishi Sunak, but most agree he didn’t succeed Still, the 2024 election was a huge landslide for Labour, who won everywhere. They won in the Red Wall, and they won in Scotland too, at the expense of the SNP who were restored to minor status. Where they didn’t win in England, the Lib Dems did well, and the Tories were hugely defeated. Despite this, doomsday predictions of double-digit seat counts (or worse) did not come to fruition, and the Tories remained the main opposition. Still, Starmer had huge power. However, his pitch was that instead of doing popular vote-winning schemes or tricks to win elections, he would do the tough things needed to fix the economy that the Conservatives destroyed. He took power in an environment where social progressivism was scorned. The right-wing media’s new obsession was ‘woke’, which was reflected in Sunak’s move to the right. Indeed, new Tory leader Kemi Badenoch would be unashamedly right-wing. Unfortunately for Starmer, he is not popular at all. People have not necessarily felt like their economic situation is getting better, or if it is, not enough. But Badenoch is struggling too, as Farage rebranded his Brexit Party as Reform UK and was elected an MP for the first time in 2024. Despite having a small group of MPs, it has gained the political momentum since (and a raft of Conservative defections), and is a real force politically.
Nigel Farage had previously been a political success but not an electoral one, but many think he is most likely to be Prime Minister after the next election Another headache for Labour is the popularity of the alternative left. The Green Party, which had always been on the fringe, despite being explicitly to the left of Labour were in some ways more like the Lib Dems because of their focus on the environment and thus their support amongst comfortable, middle-class voters. However, they elected Zack Polanski as their new leader, who is an outspoken socialist. It is clear that the left view Corbyn’s attempts to reconcile with Labour’s centre as a mistake, for which Corbyn was then ruthlessly destroyed. Not chained down by Brexit or his party, Polanski can be as unashamedly left-wing as he likes. Muslim voters have been another problem for him. Corbyn recieved accusations of antisemitism, both personally and of his party, and so Starmer sought to reverse this massively. However, when the Israel-Hamas war of 2023 began, many Muslims (and a significant amount of left-wing non-Muslims) saw Labour as too close to Israel. Thus, this led to the election of a few ‘Gaza Independent MPs’ in highly-Muslim areas, rare places where Labour did badly in 2024. Also, the Workers Party, led by George Galloway, who practiced this sort of politics way back during the Iraq War (being kicked out of Blair’s Labour for it) had been a factor in some by-elections. Though some may assume that it is good news for Starmer that Corbyn’s own attempt to form a party with the Gaza independents called Your Party was a flop due to factionalism, this has given the Greens a free run as the main left-wing party.
Keir Starmer has recieved a battering from left and right Thus, Keir Starmer has to deal with both the left and right hating him. The left-wing version goes like that: Keir Starmer was elected Labour leader on left-wing promises, which were lies he soon broke, and then purged the party of any genuine socialists. His party is now owned by capitalists, just like the Conservatives, and because he is scared of Reform he makes sops to right-wingers, despite the fact that they will never view him as more convincing than Nigel Farage on immigration. He enabled the Gaza genocide, led to the biggest decline in trans rights in a generation, and has not fixed an economy where wages stay stagnant as inflation rises. The right-wing version is more like this: Keir Starmer won’t do what it takes to fix the country which is being destroyed by immigration and wokeness. As a lefty human rights lawyer, he was responsible for defending terrorists and other criminal immigrants, and now cozies up to Palestine to win Muslim votes despite that being miles away from the problems of the British voter, who he prioritises immigrants over. He is responsible for trans and net zero madness, and is too timid to take the drastic measures necessary to fix the country. Whether you agree with either of these views or not, this by-election was the last thing that was needed. Gorton and Denton is in Manchester, where Labour MP Andrew Gwynne had been suspended for offensive messages about colleagues and then resigned. As he was so unpopular, many potential challengers were being talked about for his leadership, including former Deputy PM Angela Rayner, Health Secretary Wes Streeting, and Mayor of Greater Manchester Andy Burnham. As Burnham is not an MP, this was considered a way for him to take the job. He applied, but the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC), which includes Starmer voted him down.
Andy Burnham’s attempt to become an MP again caused a stir Burnham is hugely popular in Greater Manchester, and called the “King of the North” by the media, seen as a rare figure who understands the north and is nearly unique as he is a Labour politician that people actually like. Starmer’s reasoning for not allowing him to run was that Labour could not risk losing the mayoralty, as a by-election would then occur for that, but some saw it as blocking a potential challenger. Many thought Burnham was Labour’s best (or only) hope of keeping the seat. When Gwynne was first elected in 2005, it was known as Denton and Reddish but had changed boundaries and its name. The old seat of Denton and Reddish had been Labour since its creation in 1983, which as you remember was a Conservative landslide. Even then, and with the presence of an SDP candidate, Labour won easily, and in UKIP’s best election in 2015 they still only came third here. The seat is 30% Muslim, and that was reflected in the vote share in 2024. Gwynne won 50.8% of the vote, with Reform UK on 14.1%. The pre-Polanski Greens won 13.2%, but the Workers Party, even without Galloway as a candidate, won 10.3%. The Tories (7.9%) and Lib Dems (3.8%) are no-hopers here. Galloway said he would run if Burnham was the Labour candidate, but after that was blocked, the party dropped out, saying that Labour and Reform must lose. Your Party also didn’t run, and it was said that both parties wanted to avoid splitting the Greens’ vote share. The media reckon it’s a three-way race between Labour, the Greens, and Reform, although both Labour and the Greens of course say they are the only party that can beat Reform and a vote for the other one is a waste that will let Reform win.
Labour claim to be the only party that can stop Reform After Burnham was blocked, Labour’s candidate is called Angeliki Stogia, a councillor in the local area (but not actually in the constituency). She is a rather obscure figure but Labour hope her local credentials will help her. Reform UK have on the other hand gone with Matt Goodwin, a political scientist who is also a presenter on the right-wing TV channel GB News. For the Greens, councillor Hannah Spencer is running. The selection of a plumber was perhaps to dispel the image of the Greens as for middle-class people. The by-election is seen as crucial to Starmer’s leadership, even though Burnham has been blocked. He is already flagging, and, during the campaign, another scandal came out. Peter Mandelson, a key New Labour-era figure was appointed Ambassador to the US on his election. However, Mandelson was named in the Epstein files as someone who maintained contact with Jeffrey Epstein after the latter’s conviction. This led to Mandelson’s resignation, but a second batch transformed Mandelson from embarrassed politician (who had survived scandals like this before) to disgraced persona non grata (and potential criminal suspect). The fall guy was his advisor Morgan McSweeney, who many felt Starmer was basically a project of, and many criticise the latter for being dependant on. However, some thought this was it for Starmer, especially when the leader of the party in Scotland, Anas Sarwar, publicly called for him to go. Cold water was poured over this when the Cabinet, who were previously quite quiet, all at once backed him and indeed there has been some rally-round-the-flag effect for Starmer in response to Sarwar’s insubordination from Labour MPs.
Anas Sarwar calling for Starmer to go seems to have backfired and led to more support for Starmer in the Labour Party Despite this, the by-election is absolutely crucial for Starmer. Winning it may change his fortunes around. It is because of this fact that things have gotten a bit nasty. Parties have been accused of dodgy charts and calling what is clearly a three-party race a two-party one. A leaflet from a “concerned neighbour” failed to note it was paid for and sent out by Reform, which is illegal (but blamed on the printing comapny). In a 2025 by-election for the Welsh regional legislature, in the safe Labour seat of Caerphilly, people abandoned Labour as it was clear they would not win to tactically vote for Plaid Cymru (the Party of Wales), the Welsh version of the SNP, and it became a two-way battle. However, Labour are fighting this one hard, attacking both Reform (and in particular the out-of-towner Goodwin, who does have links to the area but these are spurious) and the Greens. A poll a couple of weeks ago showed Reform at 36%, Labour at 33%, and the Greens at 21%, but Labour going up to 53% (mostly at the expense of the Greens) with Burnham as the candidate. However, in Caerphilly, polls suggested Labour would still have a significant share, only for a large chunk of voters to abandon them when it was clear that it would lead to left-wing vote-splitting against Reform. This is not really Reform territory, but a split left-wing vote can lead to their victory. With the Tories as no-hopers, Reform have a clear path. Far-right activist Tommy Robinson, who has been critical of the party, endorsed them, which Labour pounced on but could rally the right-wing vote. Both Labour and the Greens have said they are the only party which can beat Reform.
Matters-o-Meter: In some ways, Labour may prefer to lose to Reform than the Greens. If Reform becomes the main right-wing party, it may win the 2029 election, but a two-party Labour-Reform system is still one in which they can succeed. But one where the Greens are the main left-wing party means Labour going the same way as the Liberals a century ago. However, it is clear that there no longer exist any safe seats for Labour. The white working class are fond of Farage, while the centrist middle-class, Starmer’s base, is losing faith and has an obvious alternative in the Liberal Democrats. Progressive voters have the Greens, SNP, and Plaid, and Muslim voters have the Greens and Workers Party. A loss crushing enough could be it for Starmer, but if he wins, it might turn some headlines around. 8/10
Well, that’s it. There have probably been some developments in between me writing and publishing, but I hope you enjoyed anyway.
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Fukui: Ishida victorious in shock win for radical right
On 25 January, an election was held for the governorship of Fukui Prefecture in Japan.
Fukui Prefecture factfile:
- Population: 736,855
- Religions: No precise data, but religion is often syncretic in Japan, with Buddhism the most important religion
- Ethnicities: Overwhelmingly Yamato Japanese
- Type of government: Prefecture in a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy
- Freedom in the World 2025 score: N/A, Japan score: 96/100 (Free)
The incumbent, Tatsuji Sugimoto is an independent elected in 2019. However, in 2025 he resigned after being accused of sexual harassment.
In 2023, most parties endorsed Sugimoto. This time, one party ran a candidate. Kanemoto Yukie is a member of the left-wing Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the only party to run against Sugimoto in 2023.
There were also two independent candidates. The first, Takato Ishida, is a former civil servant in the foreign ministry.
Finally, Ken’ichi Yamada ran, being the former Mayor of Echizen in the Prefecture.
This is the first gubernatorial election of the year in Japan, although several mayoral elections had taken place on the same day (but none in Fukui Prefecture).
Ishida won the election with 134,620 votes (48.0%), while Yamada won 130,290 (46.4%). Yukie won 15,735 votes (5.3%), down 5.1% on the JCP’s performance in 2023. Turnout was 46.3%, down 4.8%.
Analysis
A close-run local race has led to a massive shock for the radical right in Japan. Before I bombard you all with acronyms as to who endorsed who, let’s first understand Japan’s party system, and how it came about.
Japan was on the losing side of World War II, and because the US in particular was so instrumental in the battle with Japan, it came under sole US administration. Though the US initially acted to reduce Japanese “militarism”, which was blamed for their far-right government and imperialist adventures, Cold War considerations soon took root, especially after the communist Chinese Civil War. Japan became a very important ally in the Pacific, and now the main threat was not militarism, but communism. In the 1955, the two main left-wing parties were split into the Left Socialist Party of Japan and the Right Socialist Party of Japan. They came third and fourth, behind the conservative Democratic Party and Liberal Party. However, this right-wing government was unpopular, and the socialists decided to merge back into the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Worried, the US helped facilitate the merger of the Democratic Party and Liberal Party to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
The LDP is founded in 1955 Many criticise the fact that the LDP figures were the same pre-war figures who were “fellow travellers” or even active participants in the imperial regime, comparing it to both West and East Germany rehabilitating ex-Nazis, especially scientists. Nobusuke Kishi, Prime Minister from 1957-1960, for instance, was a wartime minister. His grandson Shinzo Abe also became Prime Minister, but more about him later. It is definitely the case that some people in the LDP had dreams of “restoring Japan’s greatness” and so on. However, after passing a military treaty with the US in 1960, there were protests on a cataclysmic scale, and therefore it became clear that re-militarisation was politically risky (it cost Kishi his job). Instead, the LDP led a developmental state which had a strong public sector and gave plenty of people reasons to stay loyal to the LDP. With this in mind, elections became boring affairs, with the LDP winning and the JSP second all the time. Instead, the internal factionalism was the most important thing, often divided between moderate conservatives and more nationalist hardliners. Because there was no point forming your own party as the LDP was so strong and also backed by significant American money, and because any split would help the Socialists, a big tent emerged under the LDP wing. Because of this, Prime Ministers would last less long than competitive party systems like the UK and Canada. During the Cold War, Eisaku Satō lasted the longest, eight years between 1964 to 1972.
Eisaku Satō, the longest serving Japanese PM of the Cold War era The LDP won a majority in every election until 1976, when a corruption scandal beset them. Even then, they won a strong plurality and governed in the same way. They won a majority in 1980, 1986, and 1990. It is no coincidence that the first election without the Soviet Union led to the defeat of the LDP. However, the JSP also lost significant ground. Though it hung on to second, many of the opposition parties were LDP splinter groups, like the Japan Renewal Party and the Japan New Party. There was an eight-party coalition government, with everyone except the LDP and Communists. It is no surprise that this was unstable, with its main achievement being electoral reform. After this, the JSP took power in coalition with the LDP under PM Tomiichi Murayama. The main consequence to the so-called 1955 System, also known as the one-and-a-half-party system, was not the fall of the LDP, but fall of the JSP, the perpetual opposition, punished for being in coalition with the LDP. They renamed themselves the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and are now a minor party. Many ideologically ill-defined parties emerged in the 1990s. Several parties, left and right, merged to form a “New Frontier Party” (NFP) in 1996 which came second, while a lot of JSP MPs left over the alliance to form the Democratic Party. The NFP collapsed and many members joined the Democratic Party, which then became the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). This would be the main opposition in the new 21st century.
The JSP fell apart in the 1990s, with its replacement, the SDP, a shadow of its old self The DPJ was rather syncretic itself. Thus, political scientists note that politics shifted from right vs left (LDP vs JSP) to simply a battle of “who could govern the country better” (LDP vs DPJ). Thus, when the LDP government was having a tough time in 2009 due to factionalism, corruption, and the global financial crash, it became very easy for the electorate to vote in the DPJ in a landslide. Part of the LDP’s governance for so long was because socialism as an ideology never had enough support, and voting against the LDP meant voting for the Socialists. Now, you had two parties that were basically the same. However, this wouldn’t last. The 2009-12 DPJ government would not be a successful one, with them having the same factionalism as the LDP, while also dealing with the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and deciding to introduce a controversial VAT rise. Therefore, the DPJ got pummelled in the 2012 election, and things sort of returned to how they were before the 1990s, with that government putting people off the idea of voting LDP. Under Shinzo Abe, they got a huge landslide majority in 2012, their best result since 1960.
Shinzo Abe returned the LDP to stability after a tough period from the 1990s to early 2010s The 21st century gave Abe the opportunity to restore his grandfather’s vision. Abe was from the right-wing nationalist faction of the LDP, and wanted to restore Japan’s military position. Its postwar constitution put very strong limits on military strength, but he believed that the context of the war on terror gave Japan a responsibility to strengthen its military, and pushed for constitutional revision. Though he won a strong majority, he had a coalition with the New Komeito Party (NKP). The “old” Kōmeitō (Justice Party) was founded in 1962 as the Clean Government League against corruption, but is most notable for its connection to the Soka Gakkai Buddhist sect, and was founded by its leader. It is fair to say there is some separation between church and party, but there is still a strong link. Anyway, the party was considered of the centre, and came a decent third in every election from 1976 to 1990. In 1993, it was part of the coalition against the LDP, and it got absorbed by the NFP, before reviving in 1998 as the NKP, which in 2014 changed its name back to simply Komeito. The new Komeito was a very common ally of the LDP since being formed in 1999, and stayed in coalition even with the landslide win in 2012. Komeito’s support basically helped the LDP reach the two-thirds threshold for constitutional change, but Komeito were mostly a moderating force on the LDP as a centrist party. Therefore, the constitutional changes were not grand. Still, this was the major debate in 2010s Japan.
The LDP thrashed the DPJ again in another huge landslide in 2014. In 2016, the DPJ rebranded to simply the Democratic Party. In 2017 though, this new party got thrashed in Tokyo regional elections, with the new winner being Tomin First no Kai (Tokyoites First Party), founding by Yuriko Koike, who had beaten both the LDP and Democratic Party candidate in the 2016 gubernatorial election. Even though this was a loss for the LDP, it was a more significant one for the Democrats as their leader resigned. Therefore, Abe called a snap election. The Democrats were in disarray and decided not to run. Koike formed her own party, the Kibō no Tō (Party of Hope), and many Democratic Party members ran for that party. However, with Koike a conservative, she did not let those left-wing members from the JSP tradition join, and instead, they formed the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), a centre-left bloc. This election was another landslide win for the LDP, but another shock was that the CDP beat Kibō no Tō to become the main opposition. Kibō no Tō then merged into the Democratic Party organisation to form the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP). This became a significant party, but a smaller one than the CDP. The majority of it merged into the CDP anyway in 2020.
The CDP was formed by Yukio Edano who was blocked from joining Kibō no Tō for being too progressive; they then beat that party to come second Abe continued as PM until 2020 due to health reasons, and his successor Yoshihide Suga lasted one year because of criticism over his handling of COVID-19. New PM Fumio Kishida had an election to deal with nearly straight away. Theoretically, the opposition was in a much stronger position this time (in 2021), because much of it was united in the CDP. However, the LDP won another landslide, and the CDP gained no ground, in fact it lost some to a third force, the right-libertarian Japan Innovation Party which is very strong in the city of Osaka but was starting to assert itself as a nationally relevant party. The 2021-24 period was very significant, despite it being one of LDP rule. Firstly, Abe was assassinated in 2022. The motivation of the attacker was Abe and the LDP’s links with the Unification Church, a South Korean sect based on a modified form of Christianity that is well-known for its links with conservative political figures. Notably, it convinces its members to give it huge financial donations and the attacker’s mother had gone bankrupt as a result. Despite this being a political crime, there was sympathy for the motive and it led to criticism as to the LDP’s link with the “Moonie” church, which Kishida attempted to deal with. Abe was still a big power-player on the right wing of the LDP, and they had lost their leader. Also, the LDP’s right-wing factions had been implicated in a slush fund scandal, leading to Kishida abolishing official factions from the LDP. Even though Kishida was a moderate and this mostly implicated the right of the party, the party as a whole suffered and he decided not to run for re-election as LDP leader in 2024. Instead, Shigeru Ishiba somewhat surprisingly defeated the more right-wing Sanae Takaichi for the leadership of the party.
The assassination of Shinzo Abe was a political success in that it hurt the LDP and their link with the Moonies Ishiba called a snap election, and there were remarkable results, as the LDP lost their majority with just 191 of 465 seats, but were still ahead of the CDP with 148. The Innovation Party won 38, the DPFP won 28, and Komeito fell to 24. The left-wing Reiwa Shinsengumi (Reiwa is Japan’s current “era name”, and the Shinsengumi was an elite organisation of ‘commoners’ during the samurai period) won nine, and the Communists won eight. Three seats each went to parties on the radical right, those being Sanseitō (Political Participation Party) and the Conservative Party of Japan (CPJ), while the SDP won one and twelve independents won seats. Not only did the LDP lose their majority, the LDP-Komeito alliance lost their majority. The Innovation Party and DPP both cast invalid ballots in the confidence vote, allowing the LDP-Komeito coalition to exist in minority. Still, the LDP was wounded. In upper house elections in 2025, the LDP-Komeito coalition lost its majority too, with Sanseitō being a big winner. Suddenly, there was a new “radical right”: not based on restoring the military, but based on keeping out immigrants. Ishiba resigned as a result. This time, Takaichi won the LDP leadership election.
Sanae Takaichi is considered on the right of the LDP Komeito were not happy that Takaichi appointed several of the right-wing figures from the slush fund scandal back to her Cabinet. They also worried that she was borrowing from the Sanseitō playbook, and Komeito (whose Buddhist sect is international) wanted to promote “coexistence with foreign nationals”. Thus, they broke from a coalition which had lasted a quarter of a century. Instead, Takaichi formed a coalition with the Innovation Party. In minority, she called a new election for 2026 to try and get a fresh mandate and capitalise on her own high popularity. Komeito responded by quickly forming an alliance with the CDP, which then became a party merger called the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA). Thus, the election is expected to be between the LDP-Innovation coalition, the CRA and other centre/left parties such as Reiwa Shinsengumi, and even the more conservative DPFP, and the far-right like Sanseitō and the CPJ. This is the current system in Japan as of today.
This is not an article about the general election (8 February), but instead, about the Fukui gubernatorial election, although this election will obviously be viewed as a precursor to the main event and what it means just two weeks before. In 2019, Sugimoto, the LDP-backed candidate beat the CDP-backed incumbent Issei Nishikawa, who had governed since 2003. In 2023, Sugimoto was supported by the LDP and CDP, and only had Communist opposition. Gone because of a personal scandal, this time around the former Mayor Ken’ichi Yamada was supported by the LDP, Innovation Party, CRA, and DPFP. However, he lost to Takato Ishida by just over 4,000 votes (1.6%), while the Communist candidate was a distant third. Ishida was supported by Sanseitō. Ishida said he opposed immigration “because Japan is a mono-ethnic nation”, and that he did not want to Japan to become like Europe. And he won against a candidate endorsed by both the government and main opposition.
This is a major win for Sanseitō, the highest directly-elected office that any candidate they’ve supported has been elected to. The party, which is the most right-wing in the Japanese parliament, is an interesting player in the general election. They had a great result in the upper house election and claimed Ishiba’s job, and is presumably a reason why many LDP insiders supported the right-wing Takaichi for the leadership election despite the fact that her faction is responsible for the LDP’s decline in the first place in large part. Takaichi is very popular with the young, which is Sanseitō’s main base, and has indeed not ruled out working with them post-election (although she hopes she won’t need to if the LDP-Innovation coalition stays afloat). Takaichi’s personal popularity is a threat to Sanseitō, who have warned that the LDP for the most part is not as radical as Takaichi, and neither are as radical as them.
Of course, moving too far to the right to target Sanseitō votes is what cost them the alliance with Komeito, and may well cost them voters to the CRA (while some have also criticised the CDP for moving to the centre and abandoning traditional left-wing positions). This vote shows though that the right-wing wave may or may not be fleeting, for the upcoming election it is going to make a big splash.
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Portugal: Good day for Socialists, Chega in presidential election
On 18 January, Portugal held the first round of its presidential election.
Background
Candidates for the Portuguese presidency need to be 35, and gather 7,500 signatures, submitting them to court. A two-round system is used, with a second round if no candidate gets a majority. Early voting was available for hospitalised, incarcerated, and abroad voters.
Portugal factfile:
- Population: 10.75 million (2024)
- Religion: Catholic 80.2%, None 14.1%, Other 5.7%
- Ethnicity: White 84%, Mixed 3%, Black 2% (inc. some ‘prefer not to say’ etc.)
- Type of government: Formally a unitary semi-presidential republic, although the role of the presidency is limited
- Freedom in the World 2025 score: 96/100 (Free)
The incumbent President is Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, elected as an independent but associated with the Social Democratic Party (PSD). He was a founding member of the party, being elected to Parliament for Lisbon for the 1975 to 1976 term. After the PSD came to power in 1981, he became Secretary of State for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and then in 1982 switched to Minister of Parliamentary Affairs until 1983. He became PSD leader (and thus Leader of the Opposition) in 1996, serving in both roles until 1999. He left the PSD to run for President as an independent, and was elected in 2016.
There are a lot of candidates to get through, so hold tight. The PSD have endorsed Luís Marques Mendes for President this time, and he is also supported by the conservative CDS – People’s Party (CDS-PP, CDS means Democratic and Social Centre). Marques Mendes was also a founding member of the PSD, and in 1976 became Deputy Mayor of Fafe. In 1985 he became Under Secretary of State to the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs in a PSD-led government, and then switched in 1987 to become Secretary of State for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. In 1992, he switched to become Minister in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister until the PSD was defeated in 1995. He was still an MP for Braga, switching constituency to Aveiro in 1999. The PSD returned to power in 2002, and Marques Mendes became Minister of Parliamentary Affairs from 2002 to 2004. After they lost the 2005 election, he became President of the party. However, poor local election results in 2007 led to him being challenged for the leadership and losing it, and he left as an MP too. In 2011 he was appointed a member of the Council of State, serving until 2015, and then again since 2016. In 2025, he suspended his party membership to run for President. His slogan is “O valor da experiência”, which translates into “The value of experience”.
Another candidate is Jorge Pinto, from the green progressive LIVRE (FREE) party. A founder member of the party, he was elected an MP for Porto in 2024. His slogan is “Presidente Presente” or “Present President”.
Another candidate is André Ventura from the right-wing populist Chega (Enough). A PSD member, Ventura was elected to Loures City Council in 2017, but left in 2018, and also left the PSD. In 2019, he founded Chega and became its first President. He was elected an MP for Lisbon that year. In 2021, he also joined Moura’s local assembly, and in 2024 was appointed to the Council of State. After the 2025 election, he became Leader of the Opposition, and later left Moura’s local body. His slogan is “Os Portugueses Primeiro” or “The Portuguese First”.
António Filipe is also running from the radical left-wing Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). He is also endorsed by the left-wing green Ecologist Party “The Greens”. Filipe was first elected to Parliament for Lisbon in 1987, and served as Vice President of the legislature from 2002 to 2009. After 2009, he switched constituency to Santarém, and in 2011 became VP of the Parliament again until 2015, and again from 2019 to 2022. He lost his seat that year, but returned as MP for Lisbon in 2024. His slogan is “Com o Povo, por Abril, por Portugal”, or “For the People, for April, for Portugal” (April being the month of the Carnation Revolution which transitioned the country from dictatorship to democracy).
Catarina Martins is running from the left-wing Left Bloc (BE). She was elected an MP for Porto in 2009, and then became the party’s National Coordinator in 2012. She did not run for re-election as leader in 2023, and also ceased to be an MP that year. In 2024, she was elected an MEP for Portugal. Her slogan is “Contigo” or “With you”.
Also running is André Pestana, a teacher and union leader, who is a founding member of the left-wing Socialist Alternative Movement (MAS). His slogan is “É hora de abrir a pestana” or “Its time to open your eyelashes”.
Another candidate is João Cotrim de Figueiredo from the right-liberal Liberal Initiative (IL). A businessman, he was elected as an IL MP in 2019 for Lisbon, and then became President of the party. He stepped down in 2023 as leader, and as MP in 2024. In 2024, he was elected as an MEP for Portugal. He has two slogans: “Imagina Portugal”, which means “Imagine Portugal”, and “Um Presidente com o perfil certo” which means “A President with the right profile”.
Manuel João Vieira is running a satirical campaign, as an independent. He is an artist and musician. His slogan is “Só desisto se for eleito” or “I’ll only give up if I’m elected”, as he has perennially run losing campaigns.
Humberto Correia is another independent, who is an artist and writer. His slogan is “Agir para construir Portugal” or “Acting to build Portugal”.
António José Seguro is running from the centre-left Socialist Party (PS). He is also endorsed by the liberal and pro-European Volt Portugal. In 1990, he became Secretary-General of the PS youth organisation, and became an MP in 1991 for Porto. He served as PS youth leader until 1994, and MP until 1995, when the PS won, and he became Secretary of State for Youth Affairs. In 1997 he changed to become Secretary of State Assistant to the Prime Minister, until 1999, when he was elected as an MEP for Portugal. He resigned as MEP in 2001 to become Minister in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, until the PS lost in 2002 and he became an MP for Lisbon. In 2004, he became President of the PS Parliamentary Group until 2005, when he switched constituency to Braga. In 2011, the PS lost power and their leader resigned, with Seguro replacing him. However, due to disappointing poll results, Seguro was challenged for the leadership in 2014 and lost, and also resigned as MP. His slogan is “Futuro Seguro” or “Safe Future”.
Finally, Henrique Gouveia e Melo ran as an independent, but with the endorsement of the right-wing and monarchist People’s Monarchist Party (PPM). Gouveia e Melo was an admiral who was named Commander of the European Maritime Force from 2017 to 2019, and in 2021 was Coordinator of the COVID-19 Task Force. After this, he served as Chief of the Naval Staff from 2021 to his retirement in 2024. His slogan is O meu partido é Portugal or “My party is Portugal”.
Those were just the valid candidates, with several more trying to get the signatures and failing, a few withdrawing, and a whole host of others being linked with the job, but in the end deciding against a run.
In Portugal, the president does have some powers, mainly as a coalition-builder in times of hung parliament (which is nearly all of it). Thus, it sits somewhere between a semi-presidential country (such as France, where the president has real powers) and a pure parliamentary country like the constitutional monarchies of Europe, where the King is only considered fit to cut ribbons. Rebelo de Sousa was elected in 2016 and re-elected in 2021, so was term-limited. Thus, speculation about his successor was rife throughout his second term. During his presidency, there was a PS government, until 2024 when a PSD government took power. Gouveia e Melo became a prominent figure during the COVID pandemic, and would often fuel speculation of a run, eventually announcing an independent candidacy. The PSD had a few potential candidates before settling on Marques Mendes. The CDS-PP, their coalition partner, considered running their own candidate before endorsing Marques Mendes as well.
The PS hadn’t bothered with the last two presidential elections, but their leader stated they wanted a candidate this time, and after a fair bit of speculation went with Seguro. Seguro tried to convince the other left-wing parties to back him in a “left unity” ticket, but the PCP, Left Bloc and LIVRE all considered him insufficiently left-wing. Ventura ran in 2021 for Chega, but due to being the current Leader of the Opposition did consider running other candidates, before deciding to go for it. Due to Cotrim de Figueiredo’s popularity, him running made it unrealistic for other IL figures to challenge him.
The perennial issues were gaining popularity in Portugal. A popular topic was how active the president should be, while healthcare, immigration, and foreign policy all came up. Marques Mendes was also questioned about transparency, while Ventura was ordered to remove posters targeting the Romani people. Also, a former IL staff member made sexual assault allegations against Cotrim de Figueiredo, leading to him filing a lawsuit against her.
One-to-one debates were held by each of the eight “main” candidates (excluding Vieira, Correia, and Pestana), before an eight-person debate, then a three-way debate between the other candidates, and finally an eleven-person debate. Opinion polling concertinaed at the end, with Gouveia e Melo losing a significant lead. Most polls had Ventura in the lead but no candidate anywhere near a runoff, with Seguro in second, Cotrim de Figueiredo in third, and Gouveia e Melo and Marques Mendes behind but both getting double-digit scores, with the rest miles off.
In the end though, Seguro won the first round, with 1,755,764 votes (31.1%), and will be joined in the 8 February runoff by Ventura with 1,326,942 (23.5%). Cotrim de Figueiredo came third with 903,201 (16.0%), while Gouveia e Melo finished on 695,244 (12.3%). Marques Mendes won 637,535 (11.3%). Martins was on 116,413 (2.1%), with Filipe on 92,634 (1.6%), Vieira on 60,934 (1.1%), Pinto on 38,586 (0.7%), Pestana on 10,896 (0.2%), and Correia on 4,622 (0.1%). 1.1% of votes were invalid, and 1.1% were blank. Turnout was 52.3%.
Seguro was the winner in every district but three, all won by Ventura: these being Faro, Madeira, and overseas voters. Seguro’s best score was 40.2% in Castelo Branco, while in Madeira he got his worst with 22.8%. Overseas voters were Ventura’s best with 40.9%, while Coimbra was his worst location with 19.5%. In every district, Seguro and Ventura made up the top two. Cotrim de Figueiredo was third in most districts, his best score coming in Lisbon (19.3%). However, he failed to be in the top three in some (even coming fifth in areas), and his worst was Beja (9.6%).
Gouveia e Melo did best in Setúbal (13.7%), and worst amongst the overseas (5.2%). He clinched third in Portalegre, Castelo Branco, and Beja. Marques Mendes’ best score was 16.9% in Vila Real, while his worst was 5.9% in Beja. He clinched third in Vila Real, Bragança, Viana do Castelo, Viseu, Madeira, Azores, and Guarda.
Martins ranged from 3.8% in Madeira to 1.1% in Bragança, Filipe from 6.4% in Beja (beating Marques Mendes) to 0.6% in Madeira, Vieira from 1.6% in Setúbal to 0.7% in Braga, Pinto from 1.3% overseas to 0.4% in Portalegre, Pestana from 0.4% in Madeira to 0.1% in Portalegre, and Correia from 0.2% in Faro to 0.0% overseas.
Seguro won amongst both genders, but his gap amongst women over Ventura was much more significant (38-19 to 28-25 amongst men). Cotrim de Figueiredo did better amongst men than women (20-16), while both Gouveia e Melo and Marques Mendes did slightly better with women (11-10). Others were better with men (7-5).
Cotrim de Figueiredo won amongst those below 35 with 33% compared to 30% for Seguro and 20% for Ventura. Marques Mendes got 6%, Gouveia e Melo 5%, and others 6% with this demographic. For those 35-64, Seguro won 31-27 over Ventura with 18 for Cotrim de Figueiredo, 11% for Gouveia e Melo, and 8% for Marques Mendes, with 5% for others. Among those 65 and older, Seguro won 37-18 over Ventura, with 16% for Marques Mendes, 15% for Gouveia e Melo, and 10% for Cotrim de Figueiredo. 4% went to others.
Ventura won 34-32 amongst those who had no high school education over Seguro, with 13% each for Gouveia e Melo and Marques Mendes, 5% for Cotrim de Figueiredo, and 3% for others. Amongst those with high school, but no college, Ventura won 29-26 over Seguro, with 19% for Cotrim de Figueiredo, 10% for Gouveia e Melo, 9% for Marques Mendes, and 7% for others. Among college graduates, Seguro won 38%, Cotrim de Figueiredo 25%, and Ventura 11%, with Gouveia e Melo and Marques Mendes on 10% each and others on 6%.
Amongst those who made their decision in the last week, Seguro won 38%, Cotrim de Figueiredo 19%, Ventura 14%, Gouveia e Melo 12%, Marques Mendes 11%, and others 6%. Those who did so were split 31-25 in favour of Seguro over Ventura, with Cotrim de Figuereido on 19%, Marques Mendes on 11%, Gouveia e Melo on 10%, and others on 4%.
Interestingly, amongst those who voted for the PSD/CDS-PP coalition in 2025’s parliamentary vote, 31% chose Cotrim de Figueiredo, while 29% picked the official candidate Marques Mendes. 17% supported Seguro, 14% Gouveia e Melo, and 7% Ventura, with 2% for others. Of those who voted for the PS, 71% stuck with Seguro, with 11% for Gouveia e Melo, 7% for Ventura, 5% for Cotrim de Figueiredo, and 3% for Marques Mendes, with 3% also for others. For those who supported Chega, 82% stuck with Ventura, with 8% for Cotrim de Figueiredo, 4% for Gouveia e Melo, 3% for Seguro, 2% for Marques Mendes, and 1% for others.
Seguro celebrated his first-round victory, while Ventura declared himself the leader of the “non-socialist space”, saying that socialism “kills”. Cotrim de Figueiredo blamed the PSD/CDS-PP government for there being a socialist president, as Seguro is hugely expected to win the runoff. Gouveia e Melo expressed disappointment, failing on his mission to “depoliticise” the presidency, while Marques Mendes took responsibility.
Pinto and LIVRE, Martins and the Left Bloc, and Filipe and the PCP and Ecologist Party all endorsed Seguro for the second round. Cotrim de Figueiredo announced that he would not endorse anyone, nor did the IL party. Marques Mendes endorsed Seguro, but the PSD and CDS-PP will not endorse anyone. Despite this, individuals from all three of those centre-right parties have endorsed Seguro. Pestana endorsed Seguro as well, while Correia announced no endorsement.
Analysis
Even though this is a runoff, the election is surely over. António José Seguro losing to André Ventura would be a massive shock. Polling suggests a 2:1 ratio, and if you want to bet, you can get 1/50 for Seguro to win: bet 100 quid, get a profit of two.
In the above article, I already explained Portugal’s political system. Basically, since the Carnation Revolution (1975) restored democracy after a right-wing, but not quite fascist autocratic regime was in for decades, a two-party system emerged, that being the centre-left PS and centre-right PSD. There were various minor parties that propped up both, and the PS relied on the left parties after winning the 2015 and 2019 election, but won a majority in their own right in 2022. After corruption allegations, a new election was held, won by the Democratic Alliance (AD, PSD/CDS-PP coalition), but it was not stable. The new PM Luís Montenegro held another election then, and the AD again came first, with Chega, a right-wing populist force that grew slowly and then rapidly, pipping the PS to second. The AD decided not to form a coalition with any more parties, instead relying on either Chega or PS votes on a case-by-case basis.
Prime Minister Luís Montenegro I will take the results of the seats individually by party, based on how they did at the 2025 election.
Democratic Alliance – 91/230 seats
The AD is made up of two parties, except in the Azores, where it also included the PPM. The PPM is a tiny party which won 0.1% of the vote in the rest of Portugal without the AD, but I will include them here simply because they endorsed Gouveia e Melo, who was a major candidate without a party and it makes it fit neatly here.
Anyway, the main two parties are the PSD and CDS-PP, which endorsed Marques Mendes. The PSD took a win in the 2025 election, but now has to be used to being one of three big parties instead of one of two. This is a big change with them being in majority government from 1987 to 1995. However, after that, from 1995 to 2024 they were only in government from 2002 to 2005 and 2011 to 2015, both times in coalition with the CDS-PP, with the rest being a time of PS dominance. One consequence is that presidential runoffs, previously a rarity, will become a lot more common. This election is a pretty awful result for Montenegro, with Marques Mendes getting the lowest share of the vote for a PSD candidate in a presidential election by far, with the party winning the last four votes on the trot. To be fair, of the five “main” candidates, four were of some flavour of right, with Gouveia e Melo being an obvious splinter despite being formally apolitical, he would have been supported by the traditional PSD voter and indeed exit polls showed he did well amongst the same demographics Marques Mendes did (especially older people). But even if you add up both men’s vote share, it adds up to the same as André Ventura’s.
The CDS-PP is seeming more and more pointless as time goes on. It basically existed to prop up the PSD, until it lost all seats in the PS majority win of 2022. After that, it had to go cap in hand to the PSD and be integrated into its list as the AD in the last two elections, and again have endorsed a PSD candidate, this time a losing one. The party’s autonomy is massively strained as a result, and indeed it took two seats as part of the 2024 and 2025 coalition agreement.
No-one cares about the PPM, but Gouveia e Melo’s failure is quite interesting. He was massively popular as he was wheeled out during COVID, treating fighting the disease like a military campaign, and people listened to this handsome admiral telling you to wash your hands. Unfortunately, that love-in has passed and he has seemed a bit vainglorious. Also, promising to “depoliticise” things does not really excite the young very much. Like Marques Mendes, he did the best among the older voters. They are clearly losing momentum amongst younger right-wing voters to both the IL and Chega, however.
Both the PSD and the CDS-PP have decided not to endorse Seguro over Ventura. This is a big win for Chega, and is the trend in Europe. The “alt-right” parties or whatever you want to call them start as being considered basically Nazis who no-one will work with, and then over time red lines get broken and indeed this is one such example. The fact the PSD considers Chega and the PS “equally bad” means that if the trend continues, they will move closer together, and indeed the party has moved to the right under Montenegro.
Chega – 60 seats
Chega will definitely be happy that Ventura made the second round, but disappointed to not take first place. He does now get a couple of weeks of increased attention, something he clearly craves even more than most politicians, but will take a huge effort to win. Ultimately, voters for the most part do consider him too extreme. I find it interesting his vote share was so low (11%) amongst college-educated voters, and so high amongst the diaspora (40.9%). How about that: an anti-immigrant politician who polls the best amongst immigrants! What is clear is that his voters are the most loyal: he did better than the AD/PS candidates did at keeping voters from the parliamentary election and most of his voters decided well in advance they were voting for him. Unfortunately, there is too big a chunk of the country that will not vote for him at all. That said, the fact that the PSD, CDS-PP and IL have refused to endorse Seguro over him shows that more and more parties are used to working with him, breaking the ‘cordon sanitaire’.
Socialist Party – 58 seats
The Socialists needed a win and they’ve got it. Seguro performed significantly beyond expectations and is nearly guaranteed to become the next President. He benefitted massively from the fact that, unlike the centre-right, there wasn’t really a significant rival on the left. After a record low vote share in the 2025 parliamentary election of 23% (which was also a defeat for the broad left), they can take this win, although they should not get overexcited. They did well amongst their base (older voters, as is often the case with European ‘big two’ parties, and also college graduates), but Seguro was a candidate that tempted other voters to pick the PS, including 17% of AD voters in 2025. Notably, he did better for those who made their decision in the last week. Still, an excellent day for the Socialist Party and they will hold the Presidency once more barring a miracle.
Liberal Initiative – 9 seats
This was a good solid result for the IL. They beat the PSD and Gouveia e Melo to become the main centre-right candidate, and even won a plurality of AD 2025 voters, winning 31% of them compared to 29% for the official candidate Marques Mendes. Cotrim de Figueiredo remains a well-liked figure amongst the IL base, and unsurprisingly they did much better amongst the young than any other cohort. To me, their right-wing type of liberalism, perhaps veering into the territory of libertarianism, is an interesting ideology but maybe not one that can capture people the same way as right-wing populism. However, they represent a band of ‘alternative’ rightism to the AD without breaking red lines in the same way Chega still do, and this result shows they do have a bit of momentum at this stage.
LIVRE – 6 seats
This was a bad result for the ‘alternative’ left more broadly, but LIVRE in particular. Jorge Pinto came ninth with 0.7% of the vote despite being considered one of the eight ‘major’ candidates, and indeed performed worse than the satirical candidate Manuel João Vieira. Unlike the explicitly radical socialist parties, who have been falling rapidly in the last decade, LIVRE actually is a growing force, being a young-focused, progressive, green party. This time though, they got squeezed by Seguro, perhaps with these voters worried about a “right vs. right” runoff, or recognising that unlike in Portugal’s PR system, a vote for Pinto would be a wasted vote here, or wanting to stop Ventura winning the first round. Whatever the motivation, LIVRE will quickly forget this vote.
Unitary Democratic Coalition – 3 seats
This is a coalition between the PCP and the Ecologist Party, who are basically considered a satellite party of the the PCP. Anyway, they are fading as a relevant force quickly and had their worst ever result in 2024, followed by an even worse won in 2025. They have never really done well in presidential elections, but this was still their worst result ever, coming seventh. Yet again, they got squeezed, but 1.6% of the vote is a very low sum. It feels like a long time since the CDU got any wins.
Left Bloc – 1 seat
Like the CDU, the Left Bloc is rapidly falling as a political force. After record results in 2015 and 2019, they were punished in 2022 and then in 2025 fell to just one seat. Here, they got nowhere close to challenging and are left licking their wounds, while the youth have clearly been captivated by other forces on the left (LIVRE, despite their bad result this time) and right (the IL and Chega).
The other two parties with one seat, People Animals Nature (PAN) and Together for the People (JPP) didn’t nominate anyone, although PAN has endorsed Seguro for the second round. JPP has not endorsed anyone, but its sole MP endorsed Seguro. PAN is another green progressive party, and after seeing the LIVRE result it seems wise to have stayed out. JPP is a broadly centrist party in Madeira (mostly), and is seen as a regionalist party.
Other than Gouveia e Melo, the three independents do not warrant further discussion, other than the fact that 1.1% of people voted for the satirical candidate Vieira. The analysis of that part will be left to the reader.
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What does Benin’s election tell us about the different type of regime?
On 11 January, Benin held a parliamentary election for its unicameral legislature, the National Assembly. The elections was for a five-year term for all 109 seats.
Benin factfile:
- Population: 13.8 million
- Religions: 52.2% Christian, 24.6% Islam, 17.9% African traditional religions such as Vodún (‘Voodoo’), 5.3% Other/None
- Ethnicities: Various ethnic groups such as Fon (38.4%), Adja (15.1%), Yoruba (12%), etc.
- Type of government: Unitary presidential republic
- Freedom in the World 2025 score: 60/100 (Partly Free)
The first part of the article will be about the facts of the election. There are 24 multi-member constituencies elected by PR. In the previous election of 2023, a threshold of 10% in place. Now, to be elected, 10% in every constituency is needed, and if a party does not ‘conclude coalition agreements’ before an election, it is raised to 20%. A deposit of F.CFA 249m is required to run, and parties must run in each constituency. An agreement led to the 2027 election being moved forward a year, thus the deputies will have five-year terms instead of four-year ones. There is also one seat per constituency reserved for women.
Three parties won seats in the 2023 election. First was the Progressive Union Renewal (UPR), a pro-government party it won 37.6% of the vote, and 53 seats that time. Its leader is Joseph Djogbenou, the personal lawyer of President Patrice Talon. He has been Minister of Justice from 2016 to 2018, President of the Constitutional Court from 2018 to 2022, and then leader of the UPR.
The Republican Bloc won 29.2% of the vote and 28 seats at the 2023 vote. They are also a pro-government party, led by Abdoulaye Bio Tchané, an economist who ran for President but lost to Talon, later backing him in a runoff.
Finally, The Democrats, in opposition to President Talon, won 24.2% of the vote, which also translated into 28 seats.
The government and opposition have had strained relations. The Democrats accused the pro-government parties of cheating in the 2023 vote. Constitutional amendments are being planned to introduce a powerful upper house (which would include ex-Presidents and have members selected by the current one), and increase terms to seven years. In December 2025, a coup attempt by junior officers was foiled with aid from Nigeria: there had previously been a coup plot foiled in 2024. Benin sits in the West African region, known for its ‘coup belt’ (including the one in Niger in 2023), but Benin itself has been seen as a stable democracy. However, the opposition condemned the coup and pledged support to the government (in this matter). There were five parties in all, including the three with incumbent seats.
Benin is known as a stable democracy for the region then, but the election was more muted, lacking the large rallies which are famous in Africa, instead with online and local canvassing. The Democrats were the only party to require 20% for not reaching an agreement.
The results showed the UPR on 41.2% of the vote and sixty seats (up seven), a majority. The Republican Bloc won 36.6% of the vote and 49 (up 21), with The Democrats winning 16.1%, thus not reaching the 20% threshold and losing all 28 seats. No other party got even halfway to reaching 10%. 3.0% of votes were invalid or blank, and turnout was 36.7%.
Analysis
In my 2026 preview, I already covered Benin’s history. Basically, it gained independence from France in 1960, and was unstable with coups. In 1972, Mathieu Kérékou came to power, and he later declared it a communist one-party state. In 1989 like many communists, he gave up power and Benin became a stable democracy with fair elections in 1991 every five years. In 2016, the independent businessman Patrice Talon took power. He has put his thumb on the scale with tricks like the raised threshold and election deposit, but is term-limited and cannot run again in 2026. An ally, Economy and Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni, is expected to replace him easily. As I predicted in the January round-up, there indeed was a Parliament with no opposition, with the UPR and Republican Bloc basically being the same thing.
So never mind going through that story again in any more detail than above. Instead, let’s analyse Benin’s “regime”, or more, use Benin as an example to look at different types thereof.
When categorising systems, there are three ways to do so: the party system, the institutional framework, and the actual competitiveness. The third is far more important than the first two. Though whether a country is presidential or parliamentary; unitary or federal and so on does have an impact on its regime, ultimately a democratic President has much more in common with a democratic Prime Minister than he does a dictator President. Similarly, the President of an autocratic ‘republic’ has more in common with a King of an absolute monarchy than he does a President of a democracy. And dominant-party systems like Japan are still fairer than the two-party system Benin has become!
Therefore, we will concern ourself with the second type. Obviously, there are some countries that are pure democracies, and some which are pure dictatorships. Eritrea or North Korea are the standard-bearers for the latter type, and while there are (to be honest) a huge number of the first, normally Scandinavia seems to be cited as top dogs for democracy, as well as the Benelux countries, and some others such as New Zealand. But of course, not all countries can be easy to put on the same side as New Zealand, or North Korea. Take Benin. It’s not North Korea. There are opposition parties, and they can run for election. They can campaign, and there are no “songs about the Great Leader”. But it’s not New Zealand either. Every trick in the book is used against the opposition. From time to time, people are arrested. The internet sometimes goes off.
Opposition poster in Benin for the 2023 election Here are the categories I have come up with:
Category A: In the most democratic countries, the opposition is genuinely the opposition. It is an alternative government for the country that has a real chance of winning power at the next election. This is not to say that if a government is popular and the opposition isn’t that it does not fit in the category, as long as it is within the normal bounds thereof (for instance, the UK in the 1980s and 2000s with Conservative and Labour governments were still in this category, even though the opposition was ‘in the doldrums’). Crucially, there should be some ideological basis, such as socialist, liberal, conservative, and so on. The UK is an example of such a country.
Category B: The next category is still a democracy, but a different type. Politics has polarised into simply ‘the government’ and the ‘opposition’. This is especially the case when it is based on tribe, ethnicity, or religion, but it doesn’t have to be. The elections happen regularly and change of power happens normally. I see this type of thing happening more and more now, with two ‘blocs’ that change power between them. It has even happened in multi-party systems like Sweden, with ‘red’ and ‘blue’ blocs which every party is now part of. Two-party systems don’t always fit here (the 20th century US being an example), but they often do. Many democratic countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, are like this.
Those are the only two ‘true’ democracies on the list.
Category C: This is similar to Category B, but with changes of power not being normal. Often, the leader is democratically elected, but has power for a long time, putting their thumb on the scale. Therefore, politics really does become a battle of ‘government’ vs ‘opposition’, often to the extent that ideology completely disappears. For instance, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán democratically won election in 2010. He then made various constitutional changes, and is seen by some as an autocrat. The opposition is still able to run for election and win power, and there is not generally state repression of them. Normally, tricks are played within the constitutional order, such as the purchasing of opposition media by allies (different to the suppression of media by the state). By now, ideology has often gone out the window. For instance, nearly every opposition party be they left or right has endorsed or joined one opposition party, the Tisza Party. The same can be said in India, where Narendra Modi has been seen to flex his muscles ‘too much’ in a true democracy, and nearly every party not part of the ruling NDA joined the opposition INDIA alliance. The key thing here is that it still feels realistic that the ruling party may lose power electorally under the right circumstances.
Category D: This is similar to Category C in many ways, but there is a stronger crackdown on opposition. Members may be arrested on dodgy charges, newspapers shut down, and the arm of the state is used against them. The opposition can still run and exist, but the hurdles are not just selective enforcement of the law, but sometimes arbitrary arrests. An example of this is Turkey, where Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested and disqualified from the presidency for corruption, conveniently removing the government’s main rival. Even in Turkey, it is still theoretically possible for the opposition to have some major wins, and even take power. But it is practically impossible.
Category E: In Category E, it is often less dangerous to be a prominent member of the opposition than Category D. However, elections are not competitive here. Instead, the ruling figure continuously keeps power and keeps the country in a state of permanent ‘transition’ using various electoral tricks. Often, there will be “round-table” meetings and “reforms” will be agreed to, leading to hope that there will be real fair elections at some point in the future. This never happens, and therefore, power remains in the same hands, though democracy formally exists. This is also the category for states in actual transition, such as Syria.
Category F: In Category F, there is a large and noisy opposition, but they will never have any meaningful power at all (unlike C and D, where they may well have local positions and could even be competitive in elections, and E where they are sometimes given junior places in unity governments). They will campaign with all their might, but always lose no matter what, and often be subject to harsh crackdowns. Often, the leader will have some form of cult of personality at this level. This type is very common in 21st century Africa, with Uganda and Zimbabwe being examples (Zimbabwe did have a period around the 2008 election in Category E as well). However, other countries include Venezuela.
By now, we are firmly in ‘dictatorship level’.
Category G: In these countries, opposition is treated even more harshly, so much so that it cannot be a serious electoral force at all. In Category F countries, elections are styled as often between the dictator and the main opposition, such as in Uganda. In Category G countries such as Russia, there isn’t even a nominal contest. There, Vladimir Putin no longer faces serious competition. Often, the leader will get at least 65% of the vote, and crucially, the remainder of the vote will be splintered between opposition (it cannot be allowed to be a 65:35 split, it must be 65, 8, 7, etc) to underline that it is not a contest. Category G may have genuine opposition parties, but they are suppressed massively and hardly allowed to run at all. In practice every institution of the state is firmly in the hands of the government. Category G is the first category likely to have ‘controlled opposition’, with alternative parties only existing to give a facade of democracy.
Category H: Category H is similar to Category G, but opposition parties do not exist at all. Instead, each party is pro-government and they are all the same. The main difference is that Category G countries often once were democracies that have been suppressed over time. In Category H, there is often a transition from pure dictatorships, and though a mockery of a fair system has been created, in fact there is nothing of the sort. For instance, countries like Turkmenistan are an example: there is a constitutional system with multiple parties, but the parties are simply creations of the government. This is different to Russia, where opposition parties actually exist but are suppressed or co-opted.
Category I: The final country is Category I, where there is a constitutional dictatorship. If elections happen at all, there is only one party as stated by the constitution. Being in opposition at all is not just suppressed, but is an explicit crime. Absolute monarchies such as Qatar, and communist states such as North Korea are the most common examples of this. The personality cult (or sometimes party cult) is an all-consuming part of life here (indeed, it often is in other categories).
The most important part here is the role of opposition parties. In Category A, they have their own ideology and ideas, but in Category B, these are simplified to be that of a certain group or vague position such as left vs. right. By Category C, it is a battle of government vs opposition, and they have various tricks used to keep them from power in D and E, and outright suppression in F. In all categories here, the opposition dream of being the government one day though. In Category G and H however, they have a different purpose. Here, their main goal is to give the illusion of democracy. In modern times, this illusion has become nearly completely farcical and unnecessary. In Category I, the lack of opposition is meant to show the unity of the nation under the god-like person or party. No-one opposes the King because he is so benevolent and wise!
Benin is an interesting case because it shows that countries can change between categories, and do so relatively quickly, completely constitutionally. There was no war, revolution or coup in Benin, but it slid, probably to Category E, after being in Category B for 25 years. This happened simply through changes to the constitution by the duly and fairly elected President, and happened very quickly. It is now unclear how the opposition would ever take back power under the current system. The fact that the parties do not really have ideologies but are simply described as “pro-government” or “opposition” by media shows that this election is bigger than the soul of the country.
In general, countries tend to be moving down the ranks. Category A or B countries have been moved into Category C, D, and E quite quickly across the world, with A to B being a common trend too, as is E to G as countries stop pretending they need democratic development such as Russia (it was a common trend in the 20th century for Third World countries to move from I to H). Most of the time, this happens by constitutional governments. There are cases of coups or war having an impact too, such as Myanmar going from E to I. However, it seems that it is often the case that regimes go down within the constitution, and never up anymore. It is rare that a dictator will just give up power without a revolution or some external pressure. The fall of communism was that external pressure in Benin. But in a lot of cases, it doesn’t really seem to exist. The US was a major factor, but has retreated in its goal of ‘exporting democracy’ under the current second Trump presidency. However, autocratic powers, especially Russia, are keen to export autocracy.
It’s clear that democracy is in decline at the moment. Where would you put your country on the list? I hope I have made it abundantly clear that these are not at all fixed, even if there is no revolution, coup, or foreign event.
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Earth Elects 